Indeed. I also don't see the need for long authorization lifespans. Removing autorenewal would complement this well, and simplify the protocol.
Hugo Landau On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 11:24:54PM +0200, Benjamin Hof wrote: > Hi, > > Reading the ACME 02 draft, I have a concern regarding the identifier > authorization life time. > > Given a compromised TLS server, the attacker can solve an ACME challenge > and be authorized for the hosts's name. This authorization can then be > used to obtain valid certificates, even after the intrusion has been > stopped, for as long as the authorization is valid (ten months in > boulder). > > This risk comes in addition to common DV exposure and is present for > (almost) any TLS server, not only the ones using ACME. > > If the above holds, it would appear beneficial if the authorization was > valid only briefly: as long as it takes to obtain the desired > certificates. > > Is there a reason to allow the long life times? > > > Thanks! > > _______________________________________________ > Acme mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme _______________________________________________ Acme mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme
