On Tue, 12 Jul 2016 15:42:06 -0700 Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 07/08/2016 04:36 PM, Roland Shoemaker wrote: > > (Playing devils advocate) Why not just remove the nonce system > > entirely? > > > > The main use of the nonce system is to protect against TLS > > termination at a CDN (or MITM middleboxes) which could, if > > malicious, replay requests. Why not instead just recommend local > > termination of TLS and that implementing clients should pin the > > relevant API TLS keys? > I agree that this would be the best solution. Right now Let's Encrypt > relies on CDN termination for DDoS resistance and faster mitigation of > some front-end vulnerabilities. I'd be interested to hear from other > CAs (currently I think only SSLMate is participating on list): Do you > have a CDN in front of your API or not? SSLMate does not. If we did, it would probably only be on the endpoint to download a certificate, since the amount of traffic to that endpoint dwarfs everything else and it's trivially cacheable. That endpoint isn't security sensitive, so I'd want to move it to a different origin so the sensitive API operations could bypass the CDN. (Note that we're not a CA, but we have an ACME-like API that abstracts over several different CAs and adds some extra management functionality.) Regards, Andrew _______________________________________________ Acme mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme
