Thanks, merged.

On Fri, Dec 2, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <j...@eff.org> wrote:

> LGTM
>
>
> On 12/02/2016 11:18 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
>
> Here you go:
>
> https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme/pull/220
>
> On Fri, Dec 2, 2016 at 2:14 PM, Richard Barnes <r...@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 2, 2016 at 1:30 PM, Jacob Hoffman-Andrews < <j...@eff.org>
>> j...@eff.org> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> > Richard Barnes wrote:
>>> >> An implementation such as you describe would also violate the
>>> semantics of
>>> >> the "authorization" field.  The authorizations listed are supposed to
>>> be
>>> >> those that the CA used to issue the certificate.  Note the past tense
>>> >> there; these are the authorizations that were considered at the time
>>> of
>>> >> issuance, not now.  So replacing them with updated ones is not
>>> helpful.
>>> Okay, I'm convinced that the server should take steps to make sure the
>>> list is immutable, however:
>>>
>>> On 11/29/2016 08:25 PM, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
>>> > I see no reason why clients should be burdened (by way of ``MUST'')
>>> > with detecting a condition that will not arise with compliant
>>> > servers, and is unlikely to cause practical issues if it does occur
>>> > after a certificate has been issued.
>>> I agree with this. This makes sense as a server requirement rather than
>>> a client requirement.
>>>
>>
>> Yep, sounds good to me.  I'm going to merge #208, then handle this as a
>> follow-on.  Expect a PR shortly.
>>
>>
>>
>
>
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