Hi Eric,

I am not saying it is the CA job (although, good CAs will impose max life-times on keys), but it seems to me that this issue should be addressed since it would violate one of the basic security principles when it comes to crypto, i.e. key lifetime. Maybe adding something to this regard could be useful so that "TLS operators" and CDN operators do not shoot themselves in the foot :D

Cheers,
Max


On 3/30/17 12:53 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
I don't think it's the CA's job to dictate policy in this area.

-Ekr


On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 12:26 PM, Dr. Pala <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    Hi all,

    I have a small question about the I-D. In particular, it seems to
    me that this proposal circumvents any limitation on the effective
    lifetime of a short-lived-cert's keypair. From a cryptographic
    standpoint of view, it is good practice to impose strict lifetimes
    on keys (i.e., usually via validity periods in certificates) to
    limit the issue of successful attacks on the crypto scheme (e.g.,
    key factorization). This proposal would de-facto remove this
    property by adopting re-issuing instead of re-keying when renewing
    a certificate.

    Although the CA might be able to track the usage of a key from the
    initial CSRs, the automatic issuance of the certificate itself
    without the constraints of the key longevity seems quite dangerous
    and possibly open to a policy of "set-and-forget" that might last
    for... years... (automatically not re-issuing the certificate
    based on key-size + CSR timestamp would, I think, create issues
    for CDNs as there would be no indication when a new LURK/CSR cycle
    is needed).

    Am I reading it wrong / missing something ?

    Cheers,
    Max

-- Massimiliano Pala, PhD
    Director at OpenCA Labs
    twitter: @openca

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Massimiliano Pala
Director at OpenCA Labs
twitter: @_mpala_

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