One further thought. ACME uses an absolute time for expiration. This uses a relative time. I think that I prefer the former. I realize that consistency might be impossible in this case, since the recurrent duration is necessarily relative, but I though it worth raising.
On 19 Jun. 2017 10:08 am, "Martin Thomson" <martin.thom...@gmail.com> wrote: > A few brief comments on this draft. > > On 16 June 2017 at 22:19, <internet-dra...@ietf.org> wrote: > > This memo proposes an ACME extension to enable the issuance of short- > > term and automatically renewed certificates. This allows a domain > > name owner to delegate the use of certificates to another party, > > while retaining the capability to cancel this delegation at any time > > with no need to rely on certificate revocation mechanisms. > > I found the introduction overly specific. The generic use case is to > simplify the deployment of certificates to unprivileged nodes. The > unprivileged nodes then only need to be configured with a URL for > their certificates. > > That requires a couple of paragraphs of exposition at most. This > extends to Section 2, which describes a system architecture that > implies the existence of protocol elements that are simply not defined > in this document. > > Sections 1 and 2 could much more clearly describe what *this* document > provides. It provides an extension to ACME that allows for the > creation of a certificate that automatically renews. > > The focus on the CDN case affects the entire document. The point is > that the authorized entity is delegating the ability to use a > certificate for its name to an unprivileged node. Don't use "CDN", > "content owner" or any of these highly specific terms. Use generic > terms; make new terms if necessary. FWIW, while NDC is a cute > reversal, "consumer" really isn't accurate. > > draft-iab-web-pki-problems has been abandoned. It's not a great idea > to cite it. > > In Section 3.1.1, I think that the resolution of these fields, being > in days, is not conducive to reducing granularity. (Or will you > permit 5.7e-3 as a value?) > > Section 3.1.1 needs to clearly articulate how > "recurrent-certificate-validity" (could this be any more verbose and > hard to type?) relates to "expires". > > Please include a definition for the new attributes, rather than just > providing an example and commenting the JSON. > > In Section 3.1.2, you REALLY, REALLY need to authenticate this > request. My suggestion is to change this to a POST request with { > "recurrent": false }. (I'd have suggested PUT or PATCH, but ACME's > reliance on JWS perverts that in ways that is incompatible with those > methods.) > > In Section 3.2, the discussion about a Proxy is misleading. The only > relevant actor in this is an ACME client. This section could be > reduced to: > > An ACME client discovers whether a server supports this extension by > examining a newly created order. The "recurrent" member will exist if > the server supports automatic recurring certificate issuance; the > "recurrent" member will be true if the server accepts the request. > > Can the server specify a shorter value for "recurrent-total-lifetime"? > > I don't understand Section 3.3 at all. I'd recommend removing this > section. The DNO will decide what authorizations it requests amply > without this level of proscription in standards. > > In Section 3.4, the use of the Expires header field is a common > mistake. This is an HTTP caching directive. It should probably be > shorter than the expiration time of the certificate (half in fact), > but not for the reasons that you might think. The purpose of a > recommendation on Expires is to ensure that the certificate is not > cached beyond the point where a newer certificate will be issued. You > should remove this text. > > Section 5.1 should be promoted to Section 5 > > Don't mention time-sensitive policy actions by the CA/B Forum. > > Can't you simply ensure that the CDN can't modify the CAA record? >
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