On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 5:00 PM, Kathleen Moriarty < [email protected]> wrote:
> Hi Richard, > > Thanks for posting the diff, I reviewed the changes and they look > good, but I have a couple of questions. FYI - I had started looking > at the PR, but something came up, sorry for the delay and this was a > good reminder. > > On Thu, Oct 19, 2017 at 12:45 PM, Richard Barnes <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi Kathleen, > > > > Thanks for the review. Some responses inline. I've started a PR to > respond > > to these comments here: > > > > https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme/pull/345 > > > > I agree with Daniel that we should hold off on IETF LC until we've > addressed > > the issues around proactive issuance / caching of CSRs. That may > require a > > re-WGLC, but once that's closed, it should be safe to send to IETF LC. > > > > > > On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 4:14 PM, Kathleen Moriarty > > <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > >> Hello, > >> > >> Thank you to the editors and WG for your efforts on > >> draft-ietf-acme-acme, it's a well written and easy to understand > >> draft. I do have a few comments, that need to be address by the > >> editors and SHEPHERD. > >> > >> Please review the idnits. There are a few warnings that should be > >> correctable and can be addressed, but more importantly, it calls out > >> several downrefs that are not in the shepherd writeup. These need to > >> be in the writeup and then also mentioned in the IETF last call > >> announcement (I'll make sure the latter happens). > >> > >> Here's my mostly editorial comments: > >> > >> Introduction: > >> It reads very well, but it would be helpful to those unfamiliar with > >> the work to explicitly state that ACME is about DV certificates. The > >> first sentence of the last paragraph seems like the best place to add > >> this in. > >> Current text: > >> This document describes an extensible framework for automating the > >> issuance and domain validation procedure, thereby allowing servers > >> and infrastructural software to obtain certificates without user > >> interaction. > >> Proposed: > >> This document describes an extensible framework for automating the > >> issuance and domain validation procedure for DV certificates, > >> thereby allowing servers > >> and infrastructural software to obtain certificates without user > >> interaction. > > > > > > As others have pointed out, ACME is not just about DV. PR has some > > clarification on this point. > > I see the text on uses in other PKI contexts in the introduction, but > don't see anything on the certificate types and out-of-band processes > (as is the case for the STIR use case Mary mentioned). Maybe I'm > missing it, can you tell me where to look? > I don't think you're missing anything. What do you mean by "certificate types and out-of-band processes"? How is that different from "other PKI contexts"? > > > > > >> > >> I do like how the introduction is framed as it’s clear the level of > >> security provided by the certificates issued via ACME. Thanks for > >> that. > >> > >> The introduction should also make it clear that ACME can be used for > >> other services using DV certificates, not just HTTP. This is > >> mentioned in the Terminology section, but I think a clear sentence > >> upfront would be helpful. > >> > >> Section 2: Nit/suggestion: Change the tense to read as a published RFC > >> in the last paragraph, last sentence (take it or leave it). > >> Current: > >> Such close integration of ACME with HTTPS > >> servers would allow the immediate and automated deployment of > >> certificates as they are issued, sparing the human administrator from > >> much of the time-consuming work described in the previous section. > >> Proposed: > >> Such close integration of ACME with HTTPS > >> servers allows the immediate and automated deployment of > >> certificates as they are issued, sparing the human administrator from > >> much of the time-consuming work described in the previous section. > > > > > > Done. > > > > > >> > >> IANA Section: > >> Everything looks good except that RFC5226 has been obsoleted, so the > >> new reference is RFC8126 and “specification required” > >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8126#section-4.6 still means the same > >> thing, so using that is fine. > > > > > > Updated reference. > > > > > >> > >> Security considerations: > >> I think it would be good to mention here that they are DV certs so the > >> reader understands from he introduction and this section the level of > >> cert issued through ACME and doesn’t assume a higher level of > >> assurance. > >> > >> s/ACME is a protocol for managing certificates/ACME is a protocol for > >> managing DV certificates/ > > > > > > Given the discussion about DV, I don't think this change is appropriate. > > > > > >> > >> 10.1 - I know this is obvious to the people in the WG, but a reference > >> to RFC7525 to properly configure TLS 1.2 should be included to protect > >> against the mentioned attacks. If you want to also reference TLS 1.3 > >> and specify no 0-RTT that would be good too. It’d be great to see > >> this get widely deployed, so there may be a number of newcomers > >> reading this to make their lives easier with cert > >> issuance/maintenance. > > > > > > I don't see how TLS configuration plays into the security considerations > for > > ACME. How you use the certificates you get from ACME is your business, > and > > indeed, several of the envisioned applications have nothing to do with > TLS > > (e.g., the email and STIR use cases). > > > > That said, I have added some language to suggest that ACME servers should > > follow the advice in RFC 7525. 0xRTT should be safe here, because there > are > > anti-replay protections at the application layer. > > Can you add a pointer in your text about the provided anti-replay > protections in the application layer? > Draft PR here: https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme/pull/348 --Richard > > Thanks, > Kathleen > > > > > > >> > >> 10.2 - what if the server that the account verifier has an account on > >> (client for ACME) is compromised and is used to request new > >> certificates or perform other actions? I think this is one of the > >> larger risks, so mentioning this is possible and hardening measures > >> should be taken to prevent compromise would be prudent. Hardening > >> measures or appropriate security controls should be broadly understood > >> terms (I think) so that you wouldn’t need to list out things like > >> turing off unnecessary services. > > > > > > Added a brief note. > > > > > >> > >> 10.5 - I would think you’d see requests for new phishing domains > >> rather than known ones through this process. What would you look for > >> there as that’s a complex problem - it would be hard to know all legit > >> names to know if one was a play off of the original. This happened > >> with equifax - they provided a site name with a typo and a ‘white hat’ > >> attacker had set up a site that looked just like theirs at that site. > >> But it was announced by equifax. Tough problem as automating a check > >> on the DNS registration may not detect something unusual, but maybe > >> recommending this check could help? RDP lessens what needs to be > >> shared from whois though, although I don’t think that’s widely > >> deployed. > > > > > > This is a policy question, not one for the issuance protocol. > > > > --Richard > > > > > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> Best regards, > >> Kathleen > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Acme mailing list > >> [email protected] > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme > > > > > > > > -- > > Best regards, > Kathleen >
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