On 10/23/2018 2:47 PM, Salz, Rich wrote:
    I don't know, there is many ways, but most likely someone will design an
     attack out of this and use it.
If so (and I doubt it), such an attack would work on any web server/client combination, and is not specific to ACME.

I don't have the mind set to think like an attacker, in internet security you can be astonished how attackers think, but let say you can only manage to know when a server (lets say university campus server) will request a certificate then all what you need is to make sure dns pointed to your laptop, and continue with the issuance the certificate, now you can utilize the CRL url in your certificate to make the victim clients makes call to an illicit url, monitored by the authority and that url let them download 50mb (crl request doesn't have size limit), how the victims can explain their phones and laptops downloaded such things, and here is the kick, the security software installed on the PC might make that request, those requests are not monitored by the system and most likely will bypass any firewall.

I completely agree many of those attacks not specific to ACME, but with ACME it's concerning the parties in contact with the victim, and ACME has the ability to prevent and enhance the internet in overall.

The core of the problem is with root store and who to trust, 15-20 years ago downloading a root store and verify it was something alien and unaccepted, now downloading 5mb can take few seconds and verifying it take way less, acme server can issue certificates using more than one CA certificate even it might have more than one root certificate, so why not to supply mini store so the clients of acme server can communicate in secure manner without trusting the system or any pre-supplied data, they just download the root store from example.com and you are good to go, all what is needed is acme URL or DNS with a key for DNSSEC or a key supplied by the ACME server itself.

The current internet has well defined security protocols but in many cases depends on weak points, while creating new draft for such lets say root store will not go further than a draft or may be a RFC without adoption, and that why acme protocol and this draft has the power to change all of that, i am not calling for reinventing the wheel but to put a seed for better and secure internet, this seed might replace the crippled wheel, this draft will be mass adopted and i know this out of scope of this protocol intended usage, but still it has the power and the opportunity to do so, and on top of that you all who can make that happen, just think out of the box, and discuss this in depth, will this be best practice or bad practice? will such expansion to this protocol make the internet more secure or useless waste of time ? does such extra measures to secure the certificate issuance contradict with other RFC or enhance them?


Please don't only think about this as how to prevent an attack (one or many) because what can go wrong will do, and this draft does have way more power and ability to move things very far in security, and i trust you can do good by at least discussing the big picture and how things will be in few years from now, as whole current system is wired with human factor administrating few key points, and all those secure castles are waiting for one CA server to fail and this will disturb the whole internet to its core.

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