Michael, In my world (government PKI systems), the RA doesn't get to do that. Either the CSR is accepted or it is rejected. The CA has a profile it follows, if the CSR is missing things, the CA adds them before the certificate is signed. The RA can do none of that. In our case, most RAs are actually people, so there can be a back channel to the requestor which can be used to sort it all out.
How this all happens in the case of 'little things', I don't know. We do have a 'portal' for devices, but it would probably be quite 'heavy' for your use cases. On Tue, Jun 8, 2021 at 4:15 PM Michael Richardson <[email protected]> wrote: > > Owen Friel \(ofriel\) <[email protected]> wrote: > deb> Again architecture: If the EST Server sits in front of a large > deb> organization, then domain validation is more interesting, and the > deb> Get /csrattrs may or may not be able to recommend a SAN, right? I > deb> can see that policy oids could be provided, if that is a thing in > deb> these systems. [we use policy oids in US DOD, but that is > possibly > deb> uncommon elsewhere.] > > ofriel> That is also a fair point, for complex deployments its not > clear > ofriel> what policy the EST server may want to apply before assigning a > ofriel> SAN. The text in section 3 currently states: > > “EST servers could use this mechanism to tell the client what fields > to > include in the CSR Subject and Subject Alternative Name fields” > > ofriel> We could beef up that statement and explicitly state that the > ofriel> policy by which the EST determines the SAN to specify is > ofriel> explicitly out of scope. And also note that policy OIDs could > be > ofriel> provided. > > I would love to hear from operators and designers of CAs about how a > RA can communicate to the CA about things it doesn't like, or wishes to > add, > to a certificate request. > > The CSR is immutable, being signed by the EE requesting. > ACME doesn't provide any out-of-CSR mechanism, nor does CMC or CMP (correct > me if I'm wrong here!)... Max and I talked a lot about this when design > RFC8995, > and we had to conclude that it was simply non-standard. > > In the case of ACP (RFC8994) use of BRSKI, like the Ford Model-T, the CSR > may > contain anything the Pledge wants to put in, it will get an otherName > containing the encoded ACP IPv6 ULA. > > In implementing, I also realized that the GET /csrattrs is > pseudo-idempotent. > When first called, it needs to allocate an IPv6 ULA for that node, and it > needs to store it, such that whenever the same IDevID does the GET, it gets > the same answer. It's uncomfortable having to change database state on a > GET, but at least the result is cachable! > > In the ACME integrations, we haven't said how the RA will decide what > dNSName > SAN will be returned, but the same property will apply. The RA needs to > collect a CSR that it can pass along up ACME, and for which is can do > dns-01 > challenges. > > -- > Michael Richardson <[email protected]> . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting ) > Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide > >
_______________________________________________ Acme mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme
