Hi all,
In-band CAA is now implemented on the reference CA at
https://acmeforonions.org and in the certbot-onion
<https://pypi.org/project/certbot-onion/> plugin.
draft-ietf-acme-onion-01 has also been published with the in-band CAA
spec (refined from my last email from issues that arose during
implementation).
Cheers,
Q
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On Fri, 13 Oct 2023 at 17:19, Q Misell <[email protected]> wrote:
I've found some time to specify in-band CAA, a quick first draft
is in the working draft[1]. Looking forward to hearing people's
thoughts.
[1]:
https://as207960.github.io/acme-onion/draft-ietf-acme-onion.html#name-alternative-in-band-present
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specifically stated. AS207960 Cyfyngedig, having a registered
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12417574
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EE102625532. Glauca Digital and the Glauca logo are registered
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On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 at 21:22, Q Misell <[email protected]> wrote:
Hi Silvio,
Thanks for that info, that's quite helpful.
I think the idea of allowing the client to just send the CAA
lines signed by its key would work well, and remove most if
not all of the problems I've been running into.
I'll work on implementing that in my draft, and see how
difficult it'd be to get that part only working in Boulder (as
Let's Encrypt have already indicated that they won't be
implementing http-01 and tls-alpn-01 for hidden services).
Cheers,
Q
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registered office at Lääne-Viru maakond, Tapa vald, Porkuni
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company registered in Estonia under № 16755226. Estonian VAT
№: EE102625532. Glauca Digital and the Glauca logo are
registered trademarks in the UK, under № UK00003718474 and №
UK00003718468, respectively.
On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 at 20:14, rhatto <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Thu, Sep 07, 2023 at 04:55:51PM +0100, Q Misell wrote:
> I've had some discussion recently with the Tor project
on implementation
> hurdles for draft-ietf-acme-onion. One concern that has
been raised by a few is
> the need to run a Tor client to validate requests, even
with onion-csr-01, due
> to the inclusion of CAA in the draft.
Hi Q, and thanks for bringing this up.
> One solution proposed to this is that the ACME client
MAY[1] send the hidden
> service descriptor to CA as part of the finalize
request. The CA also MAY
> require this, if they do not wish to run a Tor client.
This, to my knowledge,
> wouldn't reduce the security of the validation of CAA,
as the descriptor
> document is still cryptographically validated in the
same way using the current
> network consensus. Additionally the directory
authorities that serve
> descriptors are already non-trusted actors in Tor.
>
> The CA would still need a copy of the network consensus
document to verify
> the descriptor submitted by the client. Most directory
authorities however
> are reachable over standard HTTP over TCP, in addition
to HTTP over Tor.
> This would allow the CA to fetch the current consensus
without any
> connection to Tor. The consensus fetched this way would
still be verified
> against the trusted directory authorities of Tor[2].
Specifically, the "valid-after", "fresh-until", and
"hsdir_interval" are
the only consensus items needed to parse, decrypt and
validate an Onion
Service descriptor.
> What are people's thoughts on this, and more
importantly, what problems do
> people see with this?
After a lengthy discussion with Tor developers, we suggest
the following
options, prioritizing the least complex:
0. ACME clients MAY send "valid-after", "fresh-until" and
"hs_interval"
along with the descriptor, which would allow the ACME
Server to verify
CAA in a stateless way, without bootstrapping Tor to
fetch the
descriptor and without fetching the network consensus.
1. Only the descriptor is sent by the ACME client, so the
ACME server would
need to fetch and cache the network consensus.
2. The ACME client does not send the descriptor, leaving
to the ACME server
the job of fetching it, as stated on
draft-ietf-acme-onion-00.
For options 0 and 1 above, there are two ways that a
consensus (or just the
needed items) can be fetched either by ACME clients or
servers:
a. Through the Tor network, from one of many directory caches.
As this involves bootstrapping Tor, it makes more sense
for ACME
clients to do this fetching, as clients are probably
already connected
to Tor in order to run an Onion Service or to make the
ACME request
through Tor.
b. Doing HTTP over TCP, or HTTP over Tor to the directory
authorities.
While this is supported nowadays, it's not guaranteed
to work in the
long term, since this method is deprecated in favor of
the approach
above, and DirAuths may even stop serving the consensus
directly by HTTP
at some point.
This also requires checking the DirAuths' signatures in
the consensus
document.
> Should this be incorporated into the draft?
Yes, we support this idea, but also note that, despite
parsing and
validating an .onion descriptor being relatively
straightforward, it
involves more code to be maintained.
We understand that signed CAA parameters could be accepted
directly in
an ACME API request without reducing security and the need
to process an
entire descriptor.
--
Silvio Rhatto
pronouns he/him
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