Reviewers,
I have drafted a set of changes intended to address IANA expert feedback
and remaining IESG feedback. A non-datatracker difference can be reviewed
[2] from the source repository. If these seem acceptable I can update the
datatracker revision ahead of the next IESG telechat.
Thanks for further feedback,
Brian S.

[2]
https://author-tools.ietf.org/diff?doc_1=draft-ietf-acme-dtnnodeid&url_2=https://briansipos.github.io/acme-dtnnodeid/draft-ietf-acme-dtnnodeid.txt&raw=1


On Wed, May 28, 2025 at 4:06 AM Mohamed Boucadair via Datatracker <
nore...@ietf.org> wrote:

> Mohamed Boucadair has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-acme-dtnnodeid-17: Discuss
>
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
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>
> Please refer to
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> for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
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>
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-acme-dtnnodeid/
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Hi Brian,
>
> Thank you for the effort put into this well-written the document. It is a
> great
> read.
>
> Thanks to Linda Dunbar for OPSDIR (-07/-10) back in 2022. I think the
> points
> raised by Linda are addressed in the latest version, especially the point
> highlighted by Brian at [1] on the subtleties between the various
> identifiers.
> Section 1.4 is crystal clear to me.
>
> Key operational considerations are fairly covered in the specification
> (e.g.,
> deployment and topology dependency assumptions, interoperability
> considerations
> and call out of mandatory to support algos, a good discussion on
> configurable
> knobs, some default and recommended values) let alone the clear statement
> on
> policies/configurations matters that are out of scope (Section 1.1). Of
> course,
> this does not need to be exhaustive given the intended Experimental
> status. A
> goal of the experiment may be to tune the recommended values, identify
> missing
> knobs, etc.
>
> # Meta comment
>
> It seems the document was WGLCed 4 years ago (2021). It seems also that the
> document was blocked because it depends on draft-sipos-dtn-bpv7-admin-iana,
> which was published since then as RFC9171 (2023). Some more context and
> explanation in the writeup to explain why/how it took us a long cycle get
> here
> would be helpful.
>
> # DISCUSS
>
> ## Experiment scope
>
> We do say in Section 1:
>
>       |  The emergent properties of DTN naming and BP security are still
>       |  being developed and explored, especially between different
>       |  organizational and administrative domains, so the
>       |  "experimental" status of this document is related more to the
>       |  practical utility of this kind of Node ID validation ** than to
>       |  the validation method itself **.
>
> But then in Section 3.5:
>
>       |  ** Part of the experimental nature of this validation method **,
> and
>       |  the bundle protocol more generally, is understanding its
>       |  vulnerability to different kinds of on-path attacks.  Some
>       |  attacks could be based on the topology of the BP overlay
>       |  network, while others could be based on the underlying
>       |  (internet protocol) network topology.  Because not all of the
>       |  attack surfaces of this validation method are known or fully
>       |  understood the usefulness of the technique described in this
>       |  section is also not assured.  The point of these requirements
>       |  is so that both the ACME client and server have consistent
>       |  logic for handling this technique.
>
> and the following in Section 4:
>
>       |  The usefulness of the integrity gateway to this validation
>       |  method is experimental because it is not a settled matter how
>       |  naming authority in a DTN is either allocated, delegated, or
>       |  enforced.  It is also not defined how the organization running
>       |  the CA (and its ACME server) can delegate some level of trust
>       |  to a different organization running a connected DTN with a
>       |  security gateway.  The organization running the integrity
>       |  gateway would need to apply some minimal amount of policy to
>       |  nodes running behind it, such as patterns to their Node IDs,
>       |  which would behave conceptually similar to delegation of sub-
>       |  domains in the domain name system (DNS) but without the online
>       |  interaction of DNS.
>
> The candidate experimental aspects are scattered in several places of the
> document (with an apparent conflict (?) between the two points). The
> description of the experiment is thus not clear to me. Can we please
> consider
> having a single section which describes the experiment and the set of
> criteria
> to use declare failure/success?
>
> ## RFC9174 is normative
>
> This is currently listed as informative, but it is used in a normative
> way. For
> example;
>
> CURRENT:
>    *  The Response Bundle Source Node ID is identical to the Node ID
>       being validated.  The comparison of Node IDs SHALL use the
>       comparison logic of the NODE-ID from Section 4.4.1 of [RFC9174].
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Please find below some few comments:
>
> # Cite authoritative refs
>
> CURRENT:
>    This document describes the ACME messages, BPv7 payloads, and BPSec
>
> # Code extract frozen in an RFC
>
> CURRENT:
>    The entire CDDL structure
>    can be extracted from the XML version of this document using the
>    XPath expression:
>
>    '//sourcecode[@type="cddl"]'
>
> Do we need this to be frozen in an RFC?
>
> # network policies
>
> CURRENT:
>    The specific use case of [RFC9174] allows, and for some
>    network policies requires, that a certificate authenticate both the
>    DNS name of an entity as well as the Node ID of the entity.
>
> Can we elaborate on these policies?
>
> # NOTE to the RFC Editor
>
> CURRENT:
>    [NOTE to the RFC Editor: For [RFC5050] compatibility the AR-TBD value
>    needs to be no larger than 15, but such compatibility is not needed.
>
> What is the purpose of this note, especially if you say “compatibility is
> not
> needed”? These matters are not the territory of the RFC editor, BTW.
>
> # RFC7942 should be cited as informative. Anyway, that RFC will be removed
> from
> final RFC.
>
> Cheers,
> Med
>
> [1]
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/last-call/nujBgHd6ZKHY6fG58ZWBKzFGVWs/
>
>
>
>
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