Can be overcome.
 
I won't document specifics because I don't believe in publishing publicly details on security issues that can't be blocked, but anything you do that involves locking admins out of something can be overcome except maybe for some file encryption stuff, maybe. I say file encryption simply because I haven't dug into it, if I did, possibly I would know for sure that could be overcome as well.
 
Restricted groups will raise the bar for entry though. Just like many of the other compensating factors. The thing you are doing is slowing down someone who doesn't know enough or slowing down someone who does know enough to be caught up by auditing and monitoring but does anyone truly monitor that closely? The better be if there is a question of trust with the admins.
 
I agree with Gil that trust is granular and actually started to put that into my last post but thought it was already too long. The spirit in that is wrapped in the statement here
 
"If a company doesn't have a very small group of people that it can safely trust with its crown jewel of base security (auth and authorization at least) then it has to concede that it has to give permissions to people they can't trust and need the appropriate compensating measures dependent on how much the company really cares whether or not the person does something bad."
 
When it comes down to it in the end, you can't trust anyone but yourself to do what is best for you. No one will do what is best for the company unless that also works out for themselves. You have to make a judgement call that the things that the person would do fall within an acceptable range for you and if you are looking out for the company, for the company as well.
 
For instance, I was trusted to manage some pretty serious systems and pretty much I wouldn't be questioned a whole lot on anything I thought needed to be done and if I was questioned the chances are good I could prove out technically why it must be done that way whether or not it really did or not. However, I wasn't trusted very much to go talk on my own to management outside of my chain or to users and very few developers. When I did that, things tended to blow up because I have a habit of not coddling people in terms of systems and security and architecture. Actually I think my last firing had in great part to do with the fact that I sent an email to the Director of IT pointing out deficiencies I saw in the corporate IT direction and that we were headed for some trouble if some things weren't taken into account and corrected.
 
 A lot of people don't like that from analysts and get whiney or upset or mad. They don't want to hear that something isn't safe or perfect or great, they want to hear that they can sleep soundly every night and never worry about a problem. That way when something goes pear shaped they can come back and yell at the person who told them that and point them out for the firing squad. If my systems can take a backwards turn at 2AM and I have to deal with it, I want to get that out in the open the first day I take it on or find out about it, not 6 months later after it happens. On the positive side, my management and myself rarely got caught in something we couldn't fairly easily handle or hadn't had some expectation of happening. My group was the only support group not working during the great blackout a few years ago. We came in and checked out what was happening and walked around for a bit and then I jumped in my topless wrangler and drove home in a mad crazy rain shower laughing and enjoying myself all the way.
 
 
   joe


From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Myrick, Todd (NIH/CC/DNA)
Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2005 12:22 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] Problem: Limit Domain Admins and Administrators

How about using a GPO’s restricted group feature and only granting Enterprise Administrators the ability to manage that GPO.  You could set that on the Site Level (Although I am not a big fan of Site level GPO’s)

 

Todd Myrick

MVP

 


From: Ruston, Neil [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2005 12:06 PM
To: '[email protected]'
Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] Problem: Limit Domain Admins and Administrators

 

These are all valid points but when put into practice can be troublesome.

 

Firstly, who monitors the admins? It certainly cannot be the admins themselves, so then who should it be? If the buck stops somewhere outside these admins, then where does it actually stop? Ideally, a forest (and each domain) is assigned an owner, who would be that person. Deciding who that should be is the tough part, however.

 

Secondly, where are these admin events sent? If sent to a console that the admins themselves manage, then again, we have a conflict of interest. So now we need a separate, secure, isolated application which monitors the admins and sends alters to this as yet undefined forest / domain Owner. How do we implement this such that the Admins cannot alter the data in that app etc etc?

 

Change Auditor is a great facilitator which may be used to help monitor the admins, but the 2 points above (and no doubt others) still need to be understand, addressed and overcome.

 

 

neil

MVP - dir services

 

-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Gil Kirkpatrick
Sent: 09 March 2005 16:55
To: [email protected]
Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] Problem: Limit Domain Admins and Administrators

Rick's comments are spot-on. Trust is a gradient thing, not binary. You trust people *up to a point*. Where that point is depends on you, your admins, and your environment. Unfortunately, delegation of administrative rights isn't a gradient thing... you get rights in great clumps. Once you put the domain admins SID in a person's token, you've given him the keys to the car, along with a credit card.

 

I think a good approach is "trust but verify". Grant the admins the rights they need, and audit and review their administrative actions in detail and in real(ish) time. You can catch and repair most screw ups before they have a significant impact on the enterprise, and over time you develop a better (read: more accurate) level of trust in your admins. Good service administration requires an up-front approval process and a reliable auditing process. That's in fact why we built Change Auditor for AD :)

 

-gil

 


From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of joe
Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2005 8:11 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] Problem: Limit Domain Admins and Administrators

Hey Rick, I didn't say how it should be done below, specifically I didn't say fire anyone. I just indicated he couldn't do what he wanted to do and other things that he has to avoid if he wants to avoid that same issue. Actually I agree with what you recommended in your previous post about spinning up role specific groups and delegated permissions.

 

The answer is really simple in all worlds, mine, the perfect one, and the real one. Either you don't give people those rights or if you can't go that route, you MUST realize and understand you can't lock it down. No amount of doing anything will ever get you to the point where you can block a determined and knowledgeable admin or someone who is in a position to grant that to themselves. Period.

 

One of the biggest security issues I see anywhere is the assumption that things are safe due to people not understanding the basic mechanics of Windows security. Because one person doesn't know how to compromise a system or do something doesn't mean someone else doesn't, that goes for you, me, Dean, or even your best MS Internal Security experts. You can never prove a system safe, only unsafe.

 

The straight up answer to any question of how do I block a DA from doing x in the directory is always, YOU CAN'T. At that point you make the decision of not granting the rights, granting the rights and putting a bunch of procedures in place that make you think (or maybe you don't but the infosec people do) it is safe to assuage yourself or a clueless information security group[1],  grant the rights and putting a bunch of auditing around it, granting the rights and forcing yourself to trust the person who you have given a gun.

 

Once you understand you can't block DA's from doing anything they want, EVER, you have to start to understand who can get DA. The easiest is obviously anyone with admin rights on a DC. But anyone who can manipulate services, drivers (even print drivers if the server executes them) or any other system files, schedule AT jobs, can get local interactive logon (this will depend on what vulns are currently available and not patched on the DC or what files you can get placed where - lots of stupid admins you can take advantage of), or anyone with physical access to the DC.

 

The last thing we as a group should ever say to anyone is that you can make an environment safe from Admins. We can't, others can't. People need to understand that. Once people get over that thought, then they are better prepared to come up with the solution that has the concessions necessary to work. If a company doesn't have a very small group of people that it can safely trust with its crown jewel of base security (auth and authorization at least) then it has to concede that it has to give permissions to people they can't trust and need the appropriate compensating measures dependent on how much the company really cares whether or not the person does something bad.

 

  joe 

 

 

[1] Being paranoid doesn't make you a good security person, though it is a good start. Many security people I have met are more paranoid than technical. Their technical knowledge is limited to understanding how to use the the available security tools, not necessarily the concepts and the guts behind them.  

 

 


From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Rick Kingslan
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 11:10 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] Problem: Limit Domain Admins and Administrators

joe -

 

Great answer in a perfect world.  Great answer in the joe-run world.  I'd like to do the same, but it's kind of funny that the guys I can't really trust, the company still employs because I can't get evidence that is going to get them fired to the degree in which HR is not going to spend the next 30 years in a court room over false termination.  If Rick Neuheisal can get $4.7 Million for being fired as a coach because he violated NCAA rules, I'm sure that the morons that I have to employ can make our life tough by being stupid on our network.

 

I can't move them off to other functions.  Why?  If I can't fire them, I can't replace them.  Management (upper) is kind of funny that way in the world that I live in.  The best that I can hope to do is to remove rights to the point that if they piss themselves, it's just their own mess - no one elses.

 

I suspect Mr. Lunsford is much more like me.  He's in an environment where he has to employ people that aren't as good as we'd like them to be.  Or, maybe even as trustworthy as we'd like.  So, that means that we:

 

  • protect ourselves as well as possible while we build the long trail of documentation to shit-can them
  • figure out a way to mitigate the damage as much as possible - hence the suggestions that I posted

 

Usually, the advice that "You can't do that" isn't realistic.

 

-rtk

 


From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of joe
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 9:39 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] Problem: Limit Domain Admins and Administrators

 

You can't. Period.

 

Solution: Don't give these people who are untrustworthy administrator or any native group access and don't let them log on interactively to your DCs or allow them to modify the file systems nor registry nor services.

 

Summary: You can't. Period.

 

   joe

 


From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 7:01 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [ActiveDir] Problem: Limit Domain Admins and Administrators


Problem:
Need to lockdown Domain Admins and Administrators so that they can not add
additional users the Domain Admins and Administrators group.

Possible Solution:
Remove the permission's from the Domain Admins and Administrators so that
only Enterprise Admins can change their membership.

Anyone got a better idea or know if the solution will not work ?


Thank You ! And have a nice day !

**************************************************************
Mark Lunsford
KAISER PERMANENTE
Directory Services Identify Management (DSIM/NOS)
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Outside Phone: 925-926-5898
Tie Line Phone: 8-473-5898
C ell: 925-200-0047
Remedy Group: NOPS SCRTY DSIM NOS
**************************************************************

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