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Thank you for the info Dan From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steve Linehan That is the acronym for a
Microsoft Technical Account Manager (TAM). Customers with custom support
such as Premier Support generally have a TAM that is assigned to them. Thanks, -Steve From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of DeStefano, Dan Excuse my ignorance, but
what is a TAM? Dan From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of ASB >>And knowing it, I can always take extra
precautions. The knowing it consists of "don't do it, because
you can't secure it" There are no extra precautions to take.
Certainly, you can increase your auditing, but you could do that now without
knowing anything else. >>basically, 25% more prepared and secure
against this type of attack is better than 0%. The more people that know, the higher the potential of
attack. And, as folks have pointed out, since there are no viable
workarounds, it doesn't help anyone to have the number of potential attackers
increased. Call your TAM and see if he or she will provide enough
details for you to feel comfortable. -ASB FAST, CHEAP, SECURE: Pick Any TWO
On 9/23/05, Kamlesh Parmar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
I have to disagree a bit here... Certainly, obscuring of information is
not the way to feel secure. If I don't know, how it is done, then how do I know,
that I will be able to detect it, and trace it. basically, 25% more prepared and secure against this
type of attack is better than 0%. and certainly it helps calibrate how much
paranoid I have to be. :-) I would like to know, how it is done, as our team
is currently migrating some good number of domains to single domain.
And we are going to give local guys rights to logon to DC for some system
maintenance purposes, till final single domain is cleaned up and we revert back
to core team for day-to-day maintenance. So I am very much interested in knowing it. On 9/23/05, joe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote: The docs
are wrong. Many of us have been hounding MS on this for years. They really
started straightening out docs with K3. Some of the older 2K docs still suggest
this security boundary at the domain. It really came to a head when Lucent put
out a paper on this and it started getting quoted in the newsgroups and some of
us just flamed the crap out of it. No one
here or anywhere should really publish how to exploit rights on a DC to take
over a forest. The answer is pretty self-evident if someone understands the
underpinnings and processes used in AD and since we can't fully
protect against it, it is better left undocumented. If there was a
guaranteed safe way to protect ourselves, then we could publish
that workaround and some time later publish the issue.
joe From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf
Of DeStefano, Dan I thought that in ad domains
are considered security boundaries. In the cert exams, namely the 70-219, they
are considered as such. Also, how would a domain admin of a child domain
elevate his privileges? Dan From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On
Behalf Of Phil Renouf Even as a domain admin of a Child domain they will
still be able to munge your forest or elevate their priviledges. The security
boundary in AD is at the forest, not the domain. Phil On 9/22/05, Gideon
Ashcraft <
[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: The only thing to do is to make him an admin of that
site, or better yet make that site a child domain and make him a domain admin
of that child domain. I know from experience that using a DC as anything but a
DC is a freakin pain in the ass, my predecessor set a DC up as a print/file
server and another as a SQL server (finally able to demote that one now, soon
hopefully). But my citrix profiles are on the domain controller, and after
months of trying to set delegation up properly in AD and setting up permissions
in the appropriate folders on the DC, the only way I was able to get my
Helpdesk admin set up to create accounts with my scripts so that I didn't have
to do it was to make him a domain admin. My company is too damn cheap to get me
another server to put the citrix profiles somewhere else. Oh yeah, and its an
app server for network install of office (can you feel my pain). So, if there is only one server in the site and
its a DC, the only way to get him to do anything is to make him a domain admin
(make it a child domain so he can't climb up the tree) Gideon Ashcraft Network Admin Screen Actors Guild Look through the
archives. The short answer is...
"Just don't do it". You can't possibly secure this regardless of what
anyone says. If someone says it can be made safe, stop asking them technical
questions about Domain Controllers and Active Directory. Either you trust the
person or you don't. If you don't trust the person, then don't put the person
in a position to show you the meaning of screwed. From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On
Behalf Of van Donk, Fred I have a contractor in a remote site. There is only 1
server in that site which is a DC. He needs to administer that server. -Create shares -Make file/share permissions -Change user passwords in the User OU for that site. He is not allowed to log on to any other server is
the domain. When I make him a "Server Operator" he can
logon to any server in the domain. Any idea on how to lock him down to that one server
and then how to lock him down on that one OU where he should only be allowed to
change the passwords of the users. Thanks! Fred
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- RE: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security DeStefano, Dan
- RE: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security joe
- Re: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security James_Day
- RE: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security Cace, Andrew
- RE: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security David Adner
- RE: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security joe
- RE: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security Roger Seielstad
- Re: [ActiveDir] Domain Controller Security Kamlesh Parmar
