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I read the below and thought...
Yes Mr. President, until something bad happens there is no
reason to take that nuclear device away from the students. They don't meet any
of our terrorist criteria so there is only minimal concern. If they cause
damage, we will know better for next time...
Do not wait for technical solutions for policy problems.
You will wait a long time. If I received a dollar for every time I was told
someone couldn't do their job in some new way I proposed they do it I would be
retired. Not once have I run into a case where someone couldn't do their job
after the change and usually, they had better clue what they were doing too
because they tried to figure out what they couldn't do with whatever I was
taking away so they could prove they needed it.
This isn't anything new anywhere by any shot. People don't
like to lose power unless they actually understand with great power comes great
responsibility. If I walk into your network to check things out for you, I want
a normal ID with Exchange view, no more. People are usually surprised and are
like, don't you want Enterprise Admin... My response is "What and be able to be
blamed the moment something blows up, NFW." Anytime something gets screwed up in
a forest because of a change, the first people to look to blame are anyone with
EA or DA, the next ones are anyone who can elevate to those
levels.
When I was at the Widget company, I once opened up ADUC
(yeah it was a weird day...) and low and behold I see an object where an object
shouldn't be and the first words out of my mouth were to shout across the
room... Vern, you aren't supposed to use your Domain Admin ID[1]. Vern said
something like... I knew I shouldn't have done that. He was trying to help
someone out. Perfect reason why he actually shouldn't have had a DA ID. :) EAs
and DAs shouldn't be "helping people out", they should follow very strict
processes and procedures that are thought up and agreed upon in advance. While
there are times you may have to fly by the seat of your pants to figure things
out, it should be a very odd case and should be done by the most senior tech who
is responsible for coming up with the processes in the first place. Does this
piss people off... yes, quite often. However, the role of the DA/EA is not to
make individual people happy, it is to keep the overall AD and security safe and
stable. Intelligent management understands that and should be happy to hear an
EA/DA say no to some stupid request they make because that is why they pay
them.
joe
[1] Vern was my manager, we had 3 engineers with EA/DA and
Vern was the manager. He had an ID because he was always the backup to the team
in case we were all hit by a bus or couldn't otherwise respond to a page. Unlike
most CIO's, he was a techie and could fix things if required and also he used
his ID to do things that we all as a team said was stupid to do but someone from
above absolutely ordered it to be done. Basically if something stupid was
required to be done, he rather do it himself as the manager than force an
engineer to do it.
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Myrick, Todd (NIH/CC/DCRI) [E] Sent: Friday, June 23, 2006 12:57 PM To: [email protected] Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] AD Security permission continues to be "auto-removed" I guess my point of view is this. I do what is equitable for the situation, and try to maintain the peace as best as possible. I myself use dual credentials, encourage others to do it as well, but I also understand that “people do what works”, and CYA with a message to my direct reports about concerns I have. So until a situation arises that warrants a change in practice that I can champion, I patiently wait, and hope for no major disaster. Now I will say, when we came across this issue, we were able to make a stronger case to remove collaboration credentials from protected groups, still there was a lot of resistance from admins to change the way they went about their work. This has changed with more people becoming security aware, and the organizations going through security audits, etc.
I am not disagreeing that multiple credentials are not a best practice, but until MS sneaks a few more of these tweaks into their system, we will deal bad administration practices for quite some time. And getting people to do what is “Best” can put into a lot of “Political, Emotional, and Geopolitical” battles unless you have solid backing.
Todd
From: joe
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Yeah, like rename Domain Admins to "Unimportant People" and create a new group called Domain Admins and put the CIO in it. There is no excuse for a CIO to be in Domain Admins unless the company is under 5 people.
The only people who should be in domain admins are the people you expect to fix everything when the world hits the floor. If someone isn't in that category, they don't get rights to modify everything because it just puts them in a position to cause work for someone else.
I would tell that to the CIO of any company. If the CIO wants, he can hold the envelope that has the password for the builtin Admin account, that password should be like 250 characters so he/she isn't interested in actually trying to use it.
-- O'Reilly Active Directory Third Edition - http://www.joeware.net/win/ad3e.htm
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Behalf Of Myrick, Todd
(NIH/CC/DCRI) [E] Only Sith deal in absolutes… :P
When you have a CIO that likes to be in the Domain Admins group, you sometimes have to pick your battles.
Todd
From: joe
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
There is no debate on admins having multiple creds, one for admin work and one for normal work. Just do it. :)
To put it nicely, if a company doesn't do this, they are just being silly[1].
I am trying to figure out if there is ever a valid reason I think that an admin should have a single ID in a company. I can't come up with one.
joe
[1] Instead of silly think of mean words used to describe really silly people.
-- O'Reilly Active Directory Third Edition - http://www.joeware.net/win/ad3e.htm
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Behalf Of Myrick, Todd
(NIH/CC/DCRI) [E] One more thing to add to this from my experience.
I think we had situations arise where someone was trying to pragmatically modify or read attributes on accounts in the protected groups and was not able to due to their membership within a protected group. This of course started the hot debate on admins having multiple credentials, one for administrative duties, the other for collaborative and identity purposes.
Todd
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
I have a 2-part discussion of this behavior starting here: http://www.akomolafe.com/JustSaying/tabid/193/EntryID/19/Default.aspx
It's a bit headache-inducing, but at least you will get the benefit of knowing that it is "by design"
HTH
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Behalf Of J B We have some users that have mobile devices that connect to Exchange. The 3rd party application uses a dedicated account to send mail from the devices. This account needs to have "Send As..." permissions on each of the user accounts' security settings. We have set it in all users (about two dozen) but one user in particular has a problem. We set the permission and give it "Send As..." rights (just like all the others - no different), but usually within an hour, the newly added permission is gone - not just the "Send As" setting, but the whole account name is gone from this user's security settings as if we never added it in the first place. We have five DC's and I have tried adding it from each DC with the same results. I am baffled by this. Does anyone have any suggestions? |
- RE: [ActiveDir] AD Security permission co... deji
- RE: [ActiveDir] AD Security permissi... Myrick, Todd \(NIH/CC/DCRI\) [E]
- RE: [ActiveDir] AD Security perm... joe
- RE: [ActiveDir] AD Security ... Myrick, Todd \(NIH/CC/DCRI\) [E]
- RE: [ActiveDir] AD Secur... Marcus.Oh
- RE: [ActiveDir] AD Secur... joe
- Re: [ActiveDir] AD ... J B
- RE: [ActiveDir] AD ... Myrick, Todd \(NIH/CC/DCRI\) [E]
- RE: [ActiveDir]... joe
- RE: [Active... Deji Akomolafe
- RE: [Active... Myrick, Todd \(NIH/CC/DCRI\) [E]
- RE: [ActiveDir] AD ... Brian Desmond
- Re: [ActiveDir] AD Secur... Al Lilianstrom
- RE: [ActiveDir] AD ... Myrick, Todd \(NIH/CC/DCRI\) [E]
- RE: [ActiveDir]... joe
- RE: [Active... Myrick, Todd \(NIH/CC/DCRI\) [E]
- Re: [Active... Al Lilianstrom
- Re: [ActiveDir] AD Security permissi... J B
- RE: [ActiveDir] AD Security permissi... Myrick, Todd \(NIH/CC/DCRI\) [E]
