I have to admit, when I first read that my initial thought was, "why?"
My second thought was, "well, why not?" But in the end my first
instinct won out and I again ask, "why?" I mean, SBS comes on an
appliance (or am I confusing that with open source version?) But to
dedicate a DC to an appliance AND have an SBS box seems to defeat the
purpose to me.
Virtualization would be a better bet to me.
RODC on Server Core would be the type of thing that could easily end
up in appliance format. Heck, that's half the time spent - figuring
out hardware to meet the demands. One shortcoming is that an
appliance is harder to support in this scenario because the settings,
performance, etc are all tied to the greater fabric. Could be a bit
of a support nightmare I'm sure.
To create an appliance with SBS on it would be of interest. To create
one for a DC doesn't hold a lot of appeal over virtualization to me.
Am I just missing something Susan?
On 7/29/06, *Brian Desmond* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
IMHO it would be hard to ship an appliance for an application which
requires designing the hardware around the scenario...
Thanks,
Brian Desmond
[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
c - 312.731.3132
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [mailto:ActiveDir-
<mailto:ActiveDir->
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] On
Behalf Of Susan Bradley, CPA aka Ebitz -
> SBS Rocks [MVP]
> Sent: Saturday, July 29, 2006 2:50 PM
> To: [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
> Subject: Re: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and Server Core
>
> Ah see but I don't like mushrooms.
>
> Stupid question alert?
>
> What's the specs on this? We've always joked that in SBSland
with our
> everything including the kitchen sink on our DCs if there was a
way to
> make the DC services like on a linksys sized box that attached
to the
> file/printer/email/kitchen sink box that would remove a lot of
> "OHMYGOSHYOUDOWHATTOYOURDC!" that we get from the enterprise crowd.
>
> Are there any embedded OS like plans for this server core RODC?
>
> Crawford, Scott wrote:
> > Well, since you offered....I'll take a large pan pepperoni and
> mushroom.
> >
> >
---------------------------------------------------------------------
> -
> > --
> > *From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> on behalf of Eric
> > Fleischman
> > *Sent:* Sat 7/29/2006 11:22 AM
> > *To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
> > *Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and Server
> Core
> >
> > I want to make one other thing clear....the other reason to
ship the
> > product in this state is secure by default.
> >
> > Out of the box, we have no idea what secrets you will want on the
> > RODC. We don't know your enterprise or your threat model. As such,
> > there's really no good choice....we too would be implicitly
turning
the
> > knob for "better out of the box admin experience" vs "more secure
out
> > of the box." No good choices.
> >
> > So, even if you assume that this state is good for no one (a
> > contention I'll disagree with, there are some enterprises that
will
> do
> > this, but that's not the point), it is still the right state in
which
> > to ship the product.
> >
> > This is like ordering pizza for every admin in every forest on
the
> planet.
> >
> > ~Eric
> >
> >
---------------------------------------------------------------------
> -
> > --
> >
> > *From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>] *On Behalf Of *Al
Mulnick
> > *Sent:* Friday, July 28, 2006 3:28 PM
> > *To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
> > *Subject:* Re: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and Server
> Core
> >
> > That's the ~Eric we've come to know :)
> >
> > Thanks for that view. I'll take your advice and check for the
traffic
> > and rethink the view on the RODC concept. Like you said, it may
prove
> > uninteresting, but after that amount of information from you,
Dmitri
> > and Guido, I'd hate to leave that stone unturned.
> >
> > I'll ping back if I get lost watching the traces. I appreciate the
> > offer and you guys taking the time to discuss this.
> >
> > Al
> >
> > On 7/28/06, *Eric Fleischman* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > <mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Al,
> >
> > Take your workstation and take a sniff of a logon. All traffic you
> > throw at the DC will work against the RODC. The only WAN
traffic in
> > that scenario would be the auth itself, a tiny amt of work.
(assuming
> > GC and all that is satisfied locally)
> >
> > So, the statement that authentication is your biggest use is
true,
> > kinda...you need to more carefully define the operation. I suspect
you
> > don't mean auth in the Kerberos sense, you mean "user logon"
really.
> > Unless your branch has a bunch of apps that do Kerb work and no
> > clients....then you can correct me and we have a totally different
> > conversation on our hands. :)
> >
> > Answering some questions of yours, from this and other forks
of the
> > thread.....
> >
> > > What conditions would make it so that the password policy
would be
> > configured such that the password replication
> >
> > > was not allowed?
> >
> > There is a policy (not group policy, administrative one defined in
AD
> > itself) which defines what can be cached there and what can
not. The
> > statement made (I think first by Dmitri, but I then commented
on it
> > further) was that by default, this policy allows almost nothing to
be
> > cached. You could tweak this in your enterprise and change what is
> > cached, anything from the near-nothing default to almost every
secret
> > in the domain. You can choose.
> >
> > > Would that just be that the RODC is no longer trusted (i.e.
it was
> > abducted or otherwise compromised?)
> >
> > Well, we never know if an RODC was compromised. Rather, RODC was
> built
> > such that you the admin can assume they are compromised, and fully
> > understand the scope of compromise in your enterprise should it
> happen
> > one day, and respond to said event.
> >
> > So, I say you should look at this problem the other way.... Treat
your
> > RODCs /as if /they were about to get compromised, then make real
> > decisions around how much work the recovery from said compromise
> would
> > be vs. actually having an environment that is useful,
reliable, easy
> > to manage, etc. That's what I was talking about re: the
knobs....you
> can
> > turn said knobs and make decisions that work for you. And
we'll have
> > documentation that will help you do this.
> >
> > > Or is that something that some admin can configure and hurt
> > themselves? Better yet, if that were true, is there any value
left
in
> > the
> >
> > > RODC that can't get a password hash?
> >
> > I think I answered this but please holler if it is still unclear.
> >
> > > Outside of "GP work" what else comes to mind that is
off-loaded to
> > the local site that you can think of?
> >
> > Take a network sniff of your clients talking to your DCs for a
day.
> > Almost all of that stuff. J You could have apps, you have logon
> > itself, etc.
> >
> > > Perhaps I'm looking at this sideways?
> >
> > Every environment is different. It is entirely possible that a
> > secret-less RODC is totally uninteresting in your enterprise.
That
> > said, I would argue that you probably haven't done enough
> > investigation yet to really know if that's true or not...it's not
> > personal, why would you? This has likely never been relevant.
Almost
> > no one does this sort of analysis unless they absolutely have to.
> >
> > Take some data, please report back to us. I'd love to look at said
> > data with you if you're unclear as to what would fall in what
bucket.
> >
> > Hope this helps. Please holler back with questions.
> >
> > ~Eric
> >
> >
---------------------------------------------------------------------
> -
> > --
> >
> > *From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > <mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > <mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>] *On Behalf Of *Al
> Mulnick
> > *Sent:* Friday, July 28, 2006 10:34 AM
> >
> >
> > *To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
> > <mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
> >
> > *Subject:* Re: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and Server
> Core
> >
> > More clarity is always welcome.
> >
> > I suspect I'm trying to get my mind around the GPO providing that
> much
> > value that I would want to put a DC in the local brach as part of
the
> > design vs. trying really hard to use as little of the GPO as
possible
> > and making sure that the changes are as infrequent as possible.
> >
> > Authentication and name resolution are my biggest uses for a
local
DC
> > in a branch. Outside of Exchange of course. Everything else I
try to
> > keep as compartmentalized as I can because if my WAN is a concern
> such
> > that I can't use authentication across the wire (or can't
trust it)
> > then I have some big concerns about the branch environment and how
> > autonomous it is.
> >
> > Outside of "GP work" what else comes to mind that is off-loaded to
> the
> > local site that you can think of?
> >
> > Perhaps I'm looking at this sideways?
> >
> > On 7/28/06, *Eric Fleischman* < [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>> wrote:
> >
> > To add a bit more...
> >
> > > The part that makes me wonder about the "story" is if it
stores no
> > secrets is the server doing anything for me?
> >
> > The short answer is yes.
> >
> > The bulk of the work that a DC does, even in the auth code
path, may
> > not involve the secret. So even if the secret checking work is
> > "outsourced" to a hub DC, there is a lot more work that the
local DC
> > can perform for the user. For example, if it is an interactive
logon,
> > consider all of the GP work alone that is done that is now local.
> >
> > At the end of the day, you have a knob....you can make real
security
> > trade-offs based upon what attack surface you can accept &
mitigate,
> > what administrative story you want, etc. You get to choose what
> > secrets end up on the RODC. The product is built such that you can
> > turn these knobs as you see fit but the default knob setting is
"more
> > secure".
> >
> > I hope between my response and Dmitri's you are clear that the
belief
> > that it stores "nothing locally" is incorrect. If more clarity is
> > required please just holler.
> >
> > ~Eric
> >
> >
---------------------------------------------------------------------
> -
> > --
> >
> > *From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > <mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > <mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>] *On Behalf Of *Dmitri
> > Gavrilov
> > *Sent:* Friday, July 28, 2006 9:48 AM
> >
> >
> > *To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
> > <mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
> > *Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and Server
> Core
> >
> > The set of passwords that **can** be sent down to the RODC is
> > controlled by password replication policy. The passwords are sent
> down
> > by RODC's request, but the hub also checks whether the user
(whose
> pwd
> > is being requested) actually attempted to authenticate at RODC
(the
> > hub can induce this info from the traffic is sees). The pwd
hash is
> > sent down only if both are satisfied: pwd policy allows it and
the
> > user actually attempted to logon there.
> >
> > Pwd policy is "empty" by default, i.e. nobody is in "allowed to
> > reveal" list. It is admin's responsibility to populate this
list. We
> > might have some UI that helps with this process.
> >
> > Once the hash is sent down, there's no way to remove it from RODC,
> > basically because we do not trust that RODC will remove it,
even if
> > instructed to do so. Therefore, the only way to "expire" the
hash is
> > to change the password. We store the list of passwords that were
sent
> > down to RODC in an attribute on the RODC computer object (the
hub DC
> > updates the list when it sends a pwd). So, if the RODC is stolen,
you
> > can enumerate whose passwords were down there, and make these
users
> > reset their passwords. There's a constructed attribute that
returns
> > only the users whose * *current** passwords appear to be on the
RODC.
> >
> > WRT what data is sent down - currently, we send everything, sans a
> > handful of "secret" attributes, which are controlled by pwd
> > replication policy. There's a DCR to be able to configure the list
of
> > attributes that can go down to RODC (aka RODC PAS), but it is not
yet
> > clear if we will get it done or not. Note that the client data
access
> > story on RODC becomes quite convoluted because you don't know
if you
> > are seeing the whole object or only a subset of it. We do not
> normally
> > issue referrals due to "partial reads".
> >
> > *From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>] *On Behalf Of
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>
> > *Sent:* Friday, July 28, 2006 8:22 AM
> > *To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
> > <mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
> > *Subject:* RE: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and Server
> Core
> >
> > RODC stores password hashes only for a pre defined list of
users and
> > they are not stored on a permanent basis. [I'm unclear how the
latter
> > is achieved.]
> >
> > The goal is such that if the RODC were removed from the office
then
> no
> > password secrets could be extracted from that machine.
> >
> > neil
> >
> >
---------------------------------------------------------------------
> -
> > --
> >
> > *From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> [mailto:
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>] *On Behalf Of *Al
> Mulnick
> > *Sent:* 28 July 2006 16:08
> > *To:* [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
> > <mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
> > *Subject:* Re: [ActiveDir] Read-Only Domain Controller and Server
> Core
> >
> > The part that makes me wonder about the "story" is if it stores no
> > secrets is the server doing anything for me? Is there a point to
> > deploying the server in a remote office other than just being
able
to
> > point to it in the closet and say, "see, I do to earn my
paycheck!"
> >
> > I'm sure there's more, but I don't yet know which parts are public
> > information and which are NDA.
> >
> > Can you tell I'm concerned about the story being created? I like
> > stories; don't get me wrong. But I'm concerned that the story
being
> > spun up might be missing the mark and lead a few people astray.
> >
> > Safe to note that there are some features that differentiate the
RODC
> > from a NT4 BDC and that make it appealing in some cases.
> >
> > But if it actually does not store anything locally, ever, then
I'm
> not
> > sure it's worth the time to deploy one now is it?
> >
> > Al
> >
> >
> >
> > On 7/27/06, *Susan Bradley, CPA aka Ebitz - SBS Rocks [MVP]* <
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>> wrote:
> >
> > FYI:
> >
> > http://blogs.msdn.com/jolson/archive/2006/07/27/679801.aspx
> > < http://blogs.msdn.com/jolson/archive/2006/07/27/679801.aspx>
> >
> >
> > Read-Only Domain Controller and Server Core
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > List info : http://www.activedir.org/List.aspx
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