On 2011-07-08 13:55, Gilles Chanteperdrix wrote: > On 07/07/2011 09:14 PM, Jan Kiszka wrote: >> From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kis...@siemens.com> >> >> Page protection changes issued via mprotect, e.g. to enable executable >> stacks, cause spurious minor faults as they remove the write permission >> from the modified range again. Avoid this by faking shared pages so that >> vm_get_page_prot returns the desired page permissions. > > This looks dangerous to me. Have you checked that write to private heaps > will not end up corrupting shared data?
Can't follow this yet. If you check the comment on protection_map in mm/mmap.c, the difference between private and shared is in real write vs. COW-able write. That's what my patch is exploiting to get the proper arch-dependent page protection bits. Are you aware of side effects or do you know a better way to inject write permissions into the protection flags? Jan
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