Re: 'our folk history ' What is 'folk history'? And who is the 'our'?
DA ----- Original Message ----- From: William Conger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [spam?] Re: Taste Date: Sat, 12 Apr 2008 09:57:59 -0700 (PDT) > --- "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > I'm not sure I follow all this. > > Because...? > > > > My point is simply this: I do not deny that (true) > > art > > elicits a specific kind of response. What I do deny > > is that > > our understanding of that response is helped one > > whit by > > calling it an aesthetic experience. In fact I think > > our > > understanding is, if anything, hindered and clouded > > by doing > > that because the term aesthetic has acquired so > > many > > different meanings, most of them misleading. > > What do you mean by specific response? Do you mean > something that could,with care, be defined or do you > mean specific in the sense of something that can't be > defined except for the person who had the experience? > And does that experience change from moment to moment > or does it remain static? If it, like every other > experience, changes from moment to moment, a lot or a > little, how can it be defined as a contained > experience? And then there is the issue of memory, or > experience in recollection...with its questions. > > If our folk history says that aesthetic experience has > a meaning, what is that meaning? If many meanings, > what are they? I don't know them. I don't think we > should give up inquiry because some folks don't bother > to go beyond labels. If aesthetic experiencers are in > fact indistinguihable from other experiences then that > does not mean they don't exist. It may mean they are > a part of all other experiences. I would agree that > aesthetic experiences can't be defined as they really > are but need to be symbolized in some way, even > including, but not limited to, ways that can't be > shared beyond the self. > > You can't hide behind folk philosophy and unexamined > reasoning to excuse your superficial comments. > > > > What I think happens all too often is that people > > are told > > about the notion 'aesthetic experience' and that > > that is > > what one gets from art (or maybe even nice > > sunsets...). Then > > every time they enjoy a work of art they say to > > themselves > > Ah yes, another aesthetic experience. As if that > > were > > an explanation of something and meant something > > clear and > > well understood. It isnt and it doesnt. > > I don't know of any cases in philosophical dialogue > where what you just said has any "cash value" (with > thanks to the pragmatists). It's just another example > of testing ideas against naive realism and finding > them lacking when in fact naive realism is the first > level of folk philosophy to be discredited in any > philosophical study. > > > > The word aesthetic has so many overlapping and > > vague > > meanings it is next to useless these days. Almost > > invariably when I come across it in a discussion of > > art, it > > is clear that the writer is just using it as a > > crutch - an > > excuse to avoid mental effort. > > Again, you're trying to wiggle out of a discussion by > speaking against a view that is recognized as having > no merit, has not been offered, and is irrelevant to > my earlier comments. > > Play the game or not but if you come onto the field, > you are playing. Otherwise go to the sidelines. > > > > DA > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: William Conger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > To: [email protected] > > Subject: Re: [spam?] Re: Taste > > Date: Sat, 12 Apr 2008 07:47:31 -0700 (PDT) > > > > > I reply that the real must be defined to the > > > satisfacion of those engaged in a discourse. > > There > > > must be an agreed starting point. Normally, but > > not > > > exclusively, modern thought regards the real in > > > scientific terms, as the real world, something > > > material and independent of our knowing it. But > > other > > > views have insisted that the real is our ideas of > > the > > > world even to the exclusion of any independent > > > material existence or way of knowing it. I > > suppose > > > there's a sizeable minority that claims the real > > to be > > > a blend of the material and our ideas of it. But > > as I > > > tried to point out, no one can make the immaterial > > > idea material and thus whatever ideas are or > > whatever > > > mental consciousness is, it can't be found out by > > > scientific means that are restricted to measuring > > > physical, causal properties. So we can't say what > > > aesthetic experience is if we insist on locating > > it as > > > we do material things, like atoms or cells. The > > only > > > way I can imagine identifying aesthetic experience > > is > > > through a make-believe (metaphorical) process by > > which > > > we pretend that ideas, experiences, consciousness, > > and > > > all mental activity (as opposed to physical brain > > > activity) are embodied in material form through > > > symbols. Thus one might say that one's aesthetic > > > experience in a specific case, such as the > > experience > > > of looking at a Titian painting, was "like" taking > > a > > > warm bath. Whether or not another person would > > embody > > > his or her aesthetic experience of the same Titian > > > painting the same way, with the same words, is > > > probably unlikely, but in discussion, the two > > Titian > > > observers might come to some reasonably agreeable > > > metaphor to symbolize their aesthetic experience, > > at > > > that time and place, etc. I presume the same > > > experience on another occasion would require a > > > different or at least altered metaphor. What > > remains > > > a problem is whether or not some metaphorical > > > translation of purely subjective > > feeling/experience > > > must occur even for the person involved who is not > > > attempting to describe it even to himself/herself. > > In > > > other words, can we know experience without > > > translating it from pure subjectivity to some type > > of > > > objectivity through language or any other symbol > > > system. I'm inclined to say yes, but in saying > > yes I > > > must believe that I can step aside from my own > > > consciousness and and yet remain purely
