Re: 'hough I abjure the layman and his kitchen-table English, I can't do it without a final word in his defense. Granted, he uses the misleading word 'real' but I'd claim his usage is more approvable than Derek's. He would say the metallic structure in Paris we call the 'Eiffel Tower' is "real", and Santa's factory is "not real". Derek says they are both "real". I maintain the layman's distinction "between the real and the imaginary" is worth preserving, though in stuffier, more defensible lingo: "between the notional and the non-notional".
Derek suggests he is puzzled by the distinction, but I have little doubt he sees it well enough, and accepts it. But by insisting they are both "real" he obliterates the layman's good point.' I'm not sure I follow the all of Cheerskep's post but I do follow this bit - or anyway think I do. I can certainly see the distinction between an object such as the Eiffel Tower and an imaginary object such as Santa's factory. That is, in a world in which the only things that can counted as real are those whose existence can be verified by a kind of open, public inspection, the Eiffel Tower is real and Santa's factory is certainly not. (That is the layman's understanding that I think Cheerskep is referring to.) But is that the only kind of world we inhabit? Getting away from children's fantasy for a moment, there are all kinds of things that are very real to me - memories, hopes, fears, joys (wish there were more!) - which don't wait upon public assent to achieve this status, and which would probably not be susceptible to it anyway (particularly since I am no doubt only half aware of many of them myself). And what about the field of history? Does any interpretation of history have the public verifiability of the Eiffel Tower? Yet for many people certain interpretations of history (and politics) are very, very real (often far too real I would say...) Which leads us to a strange paradox. If we regard the 'Eiffel Tower' test of reality as the most (or only) reliable one, those things that matter to us most - our hopes, fears, joys, sorrows, and maybe our political beliefs - are the things that are the least real. Very odd, surely, because people do all kinds of things - even kill other people, for example - in the name of their hopes, fears etc, and their political beliefs. But no one I imagine ever did anything very significant in the name of the Eiffel's Tower's existence or non-existence. Again I have probably wandered off Cheerskep's point DA On Sun, Apr 20, 2008 at 3:57 AM, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Derek quotes this line from me: > " Ordinary, healthy folk would say the structure in Paris we call 'The > Eiffel > Tower' is "real", while Santa Claus's house and factory at the North Pole > are > not "real". > > And he comments: > "Santa Claus's house etc are real in one world, aren't they? - the world > of > little children's fantasy. In that world it would be quite wrong to deny > their existence. What I am getting at is you seem to be very preoccupied > by a > distinction between things that are real because they name something 'out > there' > and things that do not name anything 'out there' - and, I gather, are > not > real?" > > Derek and I were pursuing this sub-thread because he wondered about my > earlier comment that he has traits and lacks that handicap him in doing > philosophy. > To dilute some of the lofty obnoxiousness of a comment like that, and to > stress the objective context in which I made it, I add this: I myself > inherently > lack the gifts required to be a good pole-vaulter, singer, painter, > pianist, > architect, and on and on. At Brown, the Chairman of the Department of Pure > Mathematics told me I should major in it. But I knew he was wrong. I knew > I could do > all right at a collegiate level, but I saw I lacked what it took to be a > "first class" mathematician. With work I could get better, but I had to > accept the > objective fact that indeed there are "gifts" required to be "first class", > I > could never "learn" such gifts, and that was that. > > The single sentence Derek focused on was taken from this sequence of three > consecutive sentences: > > "I used 'real' earlier to take advantage of the kitchen-table sense of the > word -- "non-notional entity". Ordinary, healthy folk would say the > structure in > Paris we call 'The Eiffel Tower' is "real", while Santa Claus's house and > factory at the North Pole are not "real". The trouble with my usage of > 'real' is > that notions are also entities, albeit always a little hazy and constantly > morphing, so they are also "real"." > > I maintain Derek's focal range is too narrow. If he could have held in > mind > all three sentences, I want to believe he wouldn't have made his comment > above. > My first two sentences confess I adopted the use of the word 'real' for > reprehensible expediency; it was an easy way of conveying a notion that > comes to > the "layman's" mind when he hears 'real'; my third sentence laments a > notional > side-effect of the word. > > Derek goes on to say: > "I would rather think about *the contexts* in which things are real, not > whether they name something 'out there' - an idea that puzzles me anyway." > > The fundamental distinction I tried to make in my posting was between > notional entities, and non-notional entities. I accept the ideas, > feelings, images in > our minds as entities. If I say "Eiffel Tower" to a Frenchman and a > shepherd > in the Andes, a vivid image will pop into the Frenchman's mind, and god > knows > what into the shepherd's mind. I accept those two fleeting notions as > entities. > > There are all sorts of puzzling ideas in philosophy of mind, but the gross > distinction between notional and non-notional entities should be > serviceably > non-puzzling here. (Derek should be puzzled by the idea that anything > whatever > ever "names" something, but that's for another posting.) > > Another dangerous but useful layman's usage makes a distinction "between > the > real and the imaginary". It's what I try to convey in stuffy, forbidding > philosophic lingo as "between the non-notional and the solely notional". > In less > stuffy lingo it's the distinction between what's "out there", and what's > solely > "in our mind". > > But, as I lamented, the trouble with the layman's asserting that Santa's > factory is not 'real', is that it suggests the image in someone's > imagination is > not an entity. But as an image in imagination, it is a notion, and all > notions > are indeed entities -- albeit notional entities only. There is no > non-notional > entity "corresponding" to the notional image of the factory. This is the > idea > the layman has in mind when he says Santa's factory isn't "real". > > I confessed and lamented my using 'real' as a convenience in > "communication". > I should have stuck to stuffy lingo. At this point I urge Derek -- and > myself > -- to abandon the word 'real'. Our not doing so led to this conclusion by > Derek: > > "You seem to be very preoccupied by a distinction between things that are > real because they name something 'out there' and things that do not name > anything > 'out there' - and, I gather, are not real?" > > I also urge Derek to be careful of the use of the word 'things'. It leads > to > confusion and inconsistency, and it's certainly not anything I said. One > interpretation says by 'things' Derek has in mind both a notion, and a > word, and > that Cheerskep is claiming notions and words are "real" when there is a > "corresponding" non-notional entity. When there is no such corresponding > non-notional
