I agree with most of what William wrote/opined in his last post.
I understand the feeling/reasoning function a little differently.
Logic/reasoning and feeling are present in our thinkng. At times the
proportion of one may approach zero ("Snakes in a Pllane" or recalling a
phone number). That they occur together does not imply that each requires
the other.
Geoff C
From: William Conger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Consciousness Assayed
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2008 13:33:13 -0700 (PDT)
With respect to definition, If consciousness is nothing except living then
it is nothing at all.
It's rather quaint to speak of pure consciousness, brute consciousness and
sure consciousness. We can't blame Peirce for that because he had to work
in the dark regarding how the brain functions. Nowadays, the Cartesian
mind-body split that relies on the division of reason from emotion or
emotion from imagination is largely put aside, except in religious beliefs
that assert a spirit world or life after death of the body (like Peirce).
But Peirce did seem to see necessary interlinking among his three types of
consciousness.
So far, the biologists can't say what consciousness is, or if it is, in
material terms. Yet we assume it is a functioning of our awareness,
somehow. Neurologists now claim , based on clinical evidence, a unity of
feeling and reasoning where one can't function without the other.
This unity of mental processes (in continual loopback rather than linear
activity) does echo Peirce at least in suggesting he was on to something
modern.
I do think Peirce came too soon. If he were working today, with the
benefits of new technologies and clinical options, he'd probably be a major
contributor in both science and philosophy.
WC
--- On Tue, 9/30/08, Frances Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Frances Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Consciousness Assayed
> To: "Aesthetics List" <[email protected]>
> Date: Tuesday, September 30, 2008, 1:49 PM
> Frances to list members...
> Below is my roughly edited version as culled from Peircean
> written passages of what Peircean consciousness is
> purported to
> be. It would be interesting to see if Peirce is correct,
> and how
> his theory stands up now in the face of recent findings and
> studies in fields currently dealing with consciousness.
> ------
> Consciousness is simply living, and in live organisms this
> state
> entails being variously unconscious or subconscious or
> preconscious or conscious. It is a quasi mental action for
> many
> nonhuman organisms or a mental action of the psychical
> psyche for
> most humans, but it will vary by degree depending on the
> kind of
> organism having it or the sort of organism bearing it.
> Consciousness by definition, and for it to be structurally
> consistent with the phenomenal categories under the general
> philosophy of realist pragmatism, is a trident that
> involves
> feeling and reacting and knowing.
>
> Feeling is pure consciousness, and is that trait of
> consciousness
> which may entail say a fleeting instance of time as a
> passively
> felt quality, without any recognition or analysis of what
> seems
> to be on the part of the living host.
>
> Reacting is brute consciousness, and is an interruption
> into the
> field of consciousness where there occurs a sense of
> insistence
> toward the resistance of an external fact, such as engaging
> another thing of matter or life like illness with the goal
> of
> perhaps a cure. The consequence of reaction is behavioral
> habits
> of conduct like a display or gesture or deed.
>
> Knowing is sure consciousness, and is a synthetic
> consciousness
> that tends to bind qualities and facts like time and space
> together with an awareness of sensing and willing and
> thinking
> and finally of learning about phenomena.
>
> Consciousness in the world of phenomena originally emerges
> in
> organisms as continuant things or representamena that are
> not yet
> existent objects or signs. It is a case of the self solely
> alone
> representing the self by the self to the self for the self
> as the
> self. As a qualitative state of representation, it is
> fundamentally iconic in essence and substance and presence.
> It is
> hence logically senseless and without any logical basis in
> fact,
> because it cannot be found as being false or true since it
> remains neither. Consciousness is therefore mainly of
> interest to
> psychologists as building experiences that are preparatory
> and
> contributory to semiotics or semiology, but is of little
> interest
> to logicians. The state of consciousness and the study of
> psychology is however of interest to logicians at least to
> the
> extent that such mental acts do account for the desire that
> logicians initially have for wishing and seeking and
> wanting
> truth in the first place, which desire is something that
> logic
> alone cannot account for but ought to.
> ------
