Please define non-epistemic. Do you mean non-material, as in non-physical? WC
--- On Tue, 10/14/08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: The major causes of philosophical confusion > To: [email protected] > Date: Tuesday, October 14, 2008, 11:03 PM > This is the third and last part of my response to Luc's > long, interesting > posting. A principle aim of mine has been to make us all > wary of abstract, > generic labels, because, too often, a) such labels involve > us in reifying; b) > they > lead us into disputes that seem fundamental but are merely > label-deep; c) if > the label is a familiar term, we are too likely to assume > the term occasions > the > same notion in different readers; and d) the repeated > confident use of the > label lulls us into believing our notion behind it is sound > even though we've > never closely examined it. (For example, I mentioned I have > a draft of a > posting > in which I make what I admit is the seemingly preposterous > suggestion that no > one EVER has had a serviceably clear notion of > "relations".) > > To go back to the "beginning": In an earlier > post, Luc put this question: > > "Where is the aesthetic experience if sensing is > non-epistemic?" > > Brady asked Luc to explain it. Brady was shrewd enough not > to pose his > question as "What IS epistemic?" In effect, > Brady was asking what > characteristics > an experience must have to prompt Luc to call it > 'epistemic'. > > (True to form, I resist "is" in discussions like > this. I maintain it's not a > question of what an aesthetic experience "IS", or > whether an experience IS > "epistemic". This form, "What is X?" is > one of the ways our language leads us > to > reify objects before any reason is given to believe such > objects "exist".) > > In evident response to Brady's request, Luc wrote: > > "In order to understand what an aesthetic experience > might be, I am trying to > understand where it is, and when does it occur. > > "It as been said that aesthetic involves the senses > (sensorial receptors); > fine. But if you believe, as I do, that sensing is > non-epistemic, that sensing > is not a conscious mental state, that there is no > qualitative resemblance, > just > structural isomorphism, then you have to ask yourself the > question I put > forward." [I.e. "Where is the aesthetic > experience if sensing is > non-epistemic?"] > > When I looked at Luc's ostensible answer to Brady's > request that Luc explain > "epistemic". I noted that Luc seemed perhaps to > be saying: "I call sensing > non-epistemic because, 1) sensing is not a conscious mental > state, and 2) in > sensing there is no qualitative resemblance, just > structural isomorphism." (I > assume he was not saying, "and 3) I call sensing > non-epistemic because it is > non-epistemic." > > I tried to deal with 1) and 2) two posts ago by citing > seeming difficulties > -- or mere disagreement about terminology -- in 1) and 2). > I did that in an > attempt to obviate entirely the use of 'epistemic'. > General words intended to > convey complex notion are often literally a shield between > the speaker's > meaning > and the reader's mind. We read them and have next to no > sure idea what to > think. > > I've found that engaging the non-philosophers on this > forum is good for > academics and nerdy people like me who come armored (and > blinkered) with terms > for > general abstractions. Such terms don't work here, and > we're forced to > "explain" them by breaking them down, if we can, > into shared OBSERVATIONS that > everyone is more likely to grasp serviceably. > > The assumed actions of words by which they allegedly > "signify", "denote", > "pick out" their "meanings" -- indeed, > not just "meanings" but ANY object or > notion -- are chimerical. The "words" do nothing, > they are inert ink on paper, > but > a contemplating mind will process them, largely by > summoning up associations > with previous encounters with the word. However, the less > "concrete" the word, > more "abstract" the previous notions, then the > blurrier and the more > ambiguously multipicitous will the new arising notions > occasioned by the word > be. > It's a mistake for philosophically-schooled guys to > depend on them, > unexplained, > for serviceable communication. > > What's in MY mind when I say "aesthetic > experience" is not likely to be > what's in YOUR mind -- and neither one of us is > "wrong", because (without > pre-use > stipulated and accepted conditions) there is no > mind-independent standard for > determining the alleged "rightness" or > "wrongness" of any word-use or notions > behind a word. "Community convention" is solely a > factor affecting the > likelihood of a term's serviceably conveying what's > on the speaker's mind. It > can > never "prove" that one's notion behind a word > -- like 'game' or 'art' -- is > "right". This is even true of a line like, > "The cat is on the mat," where > alleged > "factuality" would seem to -- but does not -- > determine "rightness" or > wrongness". > > However, what can be persuasively conveyed, I think, is why > certain > word-usages or notions are fatally fuzzy, or inconsistent, > or contrary to what > we can > believe if we examine them very, very closely. > > I supply below an abbreviated list of terms, some of which > look deceptively > "simple". But each of them has, to use a Catholic > term, been "the occasion for > sins" of our minds under a), b), c), and d) above. > > I've tried hard on the forum to expose the malignant > confusion so often > traceable to language-use, and to charging forward with > unexamined notions too > profoundly muddled to allow fruitful outcomes of
