What is the best of Van Gogh and how do we know it? If you can't answer that question you can't answer what the best or worst or the identity of any art. In fact to even say the best of Van Gogh is to imply that there is something mind-independent that defines the best. That's the same as saying art is.... WC
--- On Sun, 3/1/09, Michael Brady <[email protected]> wrote: > From: Michael Brady <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: Against "Good Art Exists" #2 > To: [email protected] > Date: Sunday, March 1, 2009, 11:45 AM > On Mar 1, 2009, at 11:15 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > > The best of Mozart affords me an experience I prize; > ditto the best of Van Gogh, and best of Dickinson. But am I > justified in calling all of them instances of a sui generis > event called "aesthetic experience"? > > > > Get rid of that "affords me an experience" > phrase. It's flabby, inexact, and dissimulating. > Instead, say, "When I listen to Mozart, I feel > _______." "When I see a Van Gogh, I feel > __________." Etc. Or say, "When I read Dickinson, > I react ______________." > > Instrumental music is a good example to use here, there > being almost no notional referent to music in the way that > words or pictures have relatively clear referents, AND > referents that can be manipulated or juxtaposed in a way > that involves rules of order (syntax, composition, > exposition, perspective, spatial adjustments, etc.) that, > when applied to the words or pictures, themselves give rise > a constructed "meaning." > > For myself--and I suspect for many others--the feeling I > get when I hear, say, Finlandia or Classical Symphony or > Jupiter or other work is (a) unique to the work and (b) > similar to my feeling for any other piece of music, but (c) > distinctly different from *similar* feelings caused by > other, non-musical stiumuli. It's the (a) and (b) parts > that lead to the derivative term, "aesthetic experience > [feeling, response]." Likewise for paintings: the > strong feeling I get when I see Van Der Weyden's > "Deposition" is similar, but not identical, to the > feeling I get when I see Cezanne's "View of > L'Estaque" or Motherwell's "Spanish > Elegies." > > I believe the crucial, the necessary and sufficient, > property of an "artwork" is the truth-conditions > to which it is subjected. (And thus, the > 'definition' of "art" is a functional > one.) If the object is offered to us--and received by us--as > a documentation or transcription of the referent, then we > judge the work by its fidelity to the referent and > (typically) derive our emotion reaction from the depicted > subject. But if the subject is offered to us--and received > by us--as a provisional portrayal, as a simulation or > recreation or contemplation of the subject, then we judge > the work, not by its faithfulness in representing the > subject, but by how well it stimulates our awareness of its > adroitness in making, of the maker's skill and insight, > and that awareness satisfies our perceptions of fitness, > relationship, and other sensory delights. > > To say that one gets an aesthetic experience from seeing a > WoA, and a WoA is some thing that gives an a.e. is patently > circular. If one result of perceiving an WoA is to undergo > an a.e., then clearly a WoA must be defined by some other > criteria. (But to say that only a WoA can produce an a.e. in > me is not circular, because the definition of WoA > doesn't depend on the a.e. part.) > > "I trust I make myself obscure?" > "Perfectly, Thomas." > --from "A Man for All Seasons" > > > | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | > Michael Brady > [email protected]
