Frances to Luis with thanks for the lead...
The text on the "analytic philosophy of architecture" is an
interesting idea as a teaching resource and course. From a
theoretic stance, it also seems to offer some good directions in
attempting to frame a sound global theory of architecture. The
idea presented however seems to be somewhat limited and perhaps
may not go far enough. In reading the text there are therefore
several points proposed by the author that may stir some further
debate. The author states that architecture should be made prone
to questions, and that philosophy is the best means by which to
make good questions, but that to satisfy the tenets of philosophy
no answers at all to even good questions need necessarily emerge;
so that the task of analytic philosophy therefore is to posit
good questions about architecture. The curiosities and queries
raised in the text, with some attached editorial remarks of mine,
are listed below by me roughly in order of their appearance, and
arbitrarily numbered for easy finding.
(01) He states architecture is visual and non-discursive, but
fails to differentiate the visible from the visual, or the
nondiscursive from the recursive and discursive, which for me are
substantial.
(02) He feels that analytic philosophy must be tailored to suit
undergraduate students, which likely means to degrade it.
(03) For him architecture is artistic, but his aesthetics is only
on the beauty of form, thus his use of analytic philosophy is on
aesthetic architecture, yet his analytic philosophy ranges from
aesthetics or beauty to ethics or morality, and presumably to
logics or legality.
(04) Even though his analytic philosophy of architecture entails
aesthetics and ethics, no mention of logics is actually made.
(05) He insists that critical and analytical thinking is best
realized via writing.
(06) Students and scholars of the visual architectural arts he
holds should become proficient in the verbal grammatical arts so
as to better use their writing skills at articulating their
thoughts on the topic of architecture. This lingual ability would
presumably go to criticizing and analyzing the architectural
field logically and philosophically.
(07) For him the thought of the academician would thus be in
their mind, but for me under semiotics thought is in the written
text as a narrative discourse and literary faction, and not in
the mind.
(08) Noted in this analytic quest is an implied curiosity, and
inquiry via exploration, and discovery, which tern for me is a
summarized basis of empirical scientific methods.
(09) No substitution or correction of existing theories is
suggested or warranted by him, which seems unduly limited, yet he
holds that the quest and search should be for the justified
rational foundation of architectural criticism and analysis.
(10) That word called "architecture" is deemed by him to mean a
general class or type of object, under which particular token
objects of architecture would fall, their existence of which may
be extant or extinct, but whether the class or type is an
objective phenomenal construct independent of mind or a
subjective nominal construct dependent on mind is not addressed
or clarified.
(11) He calls the token architectural object simply a work, but
he also wants it to be a work of art, which suggests to me that
objects or works of architecture cannot be other than artistic.
(12) The possibility of a philosophic relativity is pursued by
him in that he states there may indeed be several architectural
classes or types, and even several groups of tokens under each
kind of class or type. My feeling is that there can be only one
global class or type, but that there may be many token kinds or
subclasses of individual tokens.
(13) The role of experience and intent and expression for
architects is considered by him to be an important part of what
makes objects architecture and of what makes architectural
objects into works of art, but this may at least commit the
intentional fallacy.
(14) The relevant issues in the architectural mix must he says
include the delineation of ethical goodness, fairness, rightness,
correctness, duty, responsibility, virtue, and justice, but for
me these requirements are extra aesthetic and extra artistic
facets of architecture, which seems to contradict his own
insistence on aesthetic and artistic dominance if not
exclusivity. For me applied aesthetics would be ethics, and
applied ethics would be logics.
(15) The topic of architectural theory he says has emerged only
recently as a subject of intellectual interest among professional
philosophers, and that the subject has surfaced especially in the
rigorous analytic tradition of formal philosophy, but that the
results of these findings have not been adequately included in
either the theory of practice of architecture.
(16) In his scheme the term "theory" is placed first as the
antecedent and ordinate and dominant concept, while the term
"practice" is made the subsequent and subservient and subordinate
concept, but it is still unclear to me whether theory comes
before or after practice.
(17) In regard to the study of architectural theory, he holds the
angloamerican brand of logical philosophic analysis is likely
more important than the francoeurpoean brand of literary
philosophic criticism.
(18) It seems to him that philosophic aesthetes and aestheticians
have concentrated mainly on those lofty works of fine art that
are pictorial and sculptural and musical and theatrical and
lingual, to the exclusion of architectural works which are too
often held by philosophers to be the products of a useful craft
with an applied function that is also brutally different from the
other arts.
(19) The initial approach of analytical philosophy in addressing
the issue of architectural theory he presses should be one of
philosophical aesthetics, yet he continually tends to lump
aesthetics and ethics together as the requirement.
(20) Although the products of architecture as artworks are mainly
visual, they are for him also clearly different from other visual
artworks, such as pictures and sculptures and other tectonic
spectacles like earthworks and ballet and opera and theatre, so
that architectural works are necessarily dimensional, but the
main difference is that they have the enforced or empowered
purpose to be endowed with a practical function, such as
utilization or occupation or habitation; thus for him there is
therefore a metaphysical and a physical aspect to architecture.
What he seems to exclude are say new unfinished frames or old
useless relics with nothing now but some formal aesthetic
interest.
(21) Architecture he says is a practice that entails a process
and a product, but for me it also entails a project.
(22) There are certain necessary and sufficient and essential
conditions to satisfy he claims for an object to become an
architectural work, so that for the object to exist as a work it
hence must be predicated upon some sound basis, thus the object
must "have" objective qualities sensed in its form to be a work.
This tends to deny any subjectivity as a condition.
(23) Aside from its form, the other aspects of architecture made
prone to analysis include he says its content and meaning, its
value and worth, and its context and effect; but these aspects
are well outside any aesthetic or artistic criteria.
(24) The acts of communication and expression he insists are
important in architecture, but that these terms are often very
vague and ambiguous. For me also they are important, but they are
not unclear in logic or philosophy.
(25) The conceptual tool of semiotics he holds can be used to
analyze works, but for him semiotics is wrongly not held to be a
synonym or substitute for logics and is incorrectly held to be
well outside the sphere of logics.
(26) The criticism of "style" in the form of works is he posits
important to theory, but only within the context of its historic
continuity. This for me makes style a sign of ongoing iconic
similarity, to the exclusion of any indexic contiguity or
symbolic arbitrarity.
(27) The term "design" is mentioned very briefly by him, but is
not seemingly held in any great regard. For me "design" in
ontological metaphysics looms large as the key to evolutionary
telic purposes.
(28) He holds that there can be a "language of architecture" but
without clarifying what this means. If there could be a verbal
language of architecture, it would for me merely entail
linguistics with its grammar and syntax, so that a literary form
of written notation should follow. In other words, works have
meanings read into them, and are then subjects to write about.
The only language at the present is verbal linguistic language,
whether spoken or gestured or written. Making some kind of
semiotic signage system of architecture however would be
possible. Another intriguing possibility is the making of say a
virtual linguistic language like a visual language system, which
could be applied to architecture. Systems of both semiotic
signage and linguistic language do after all have an entity in
common, which is the sign.
(29) Architectural works he insists are cultural and social, but
this condition or criterion for me may not be discovered as an
intrinsic property of the works, but rather may be invented
arbitrarily and especially if they are deemed institutional.
(30) Philosophic ethics he says will claim that while architects
design their works they usually do not build or even use and own
them, so that such works therefore require certain controls that
are needed to assure they conform to standards, thus architects
must use only good ways and means to good goals and ends. This
for me further entails the imposition of duties and codes and
wills and taxes and rules and laws, but has little to do with an
object being architecture or such a work being art. It also
ignores the status of "national treasure" and "heritage site"
being conferred on some works, thereby bypassing all this
irrelevant ethical and national fuss.
