(...message continued.) 12. The abstraction may of course be syntactic or semantic or even pragmatic. If it is syntactic and formal the abstraction may at least be isomorphic or biomorphic or geometric. Isomorphic abstraction can be intriguing when found to be similar, but when taken to its extreme it can become confusing to mind. Biomorphic abstraction can be interesting when found to be peculiar, but when taken to its extreme it can become threatening to mind. Geometric abstraction can be involving when familiar, but when taken to its extreme it can become boring to mind. These are some of the consequential effects evoked by the correlation of signs to minds. 13. Usually in most acts of semiosis, in order to get at or decode the objects and contents or subjects and meanings of signs, icons are scanned, yet indexes are probed, but symbols are read. The more unfamiliar or unrecognized the representation is, of say a pictorially depicted sign, then the more interpretive decoding will be needed on the part of the signer. The immediate object, and whether it is mainly abstract or concrete, may be clear enough when scanned in the form of the sign, but any further content or subject matter or meaning may require further probing or reading. In the extreme, even the obscure iconic sign to be fully understood must be read as if it were a narrative discourse or literary fiction, but this act is to merely use an existing verbal language to report on an object, and not to make a new kind of nonverbal language. A high degree of naturalistic realism scanned and recognized in an illustrated iconic picture may breed boredom and even contempt due to its common familiarity, but its skilled applied rendering can also breed wonder and respect, as can the formal rendering of unknown indexes and unknown symbols. 14. The way Peirce held signers to correlate an image or idea in mind with some other object like an inner mental idea or an outer material object is by way of thoughts. For him thoughts are themselves the superior signs of objects, but the thoughts as signs can be icons or indexes or symbols, and the thoughts therefore can be nondiscursive or recursive or discursive. The thought and as a nonlingual or lingual sign however is not in the mind, but rather the mind is in thought, so that the image or idea lays in the sign and the sign as a thought, say for example as envisioned or noted in mind or as drafted or scribed on paper. The thought and as a sign with its referred object as an image or idea hence exists independent of mind, because other minds familiar with this thoughtful act of semiosis can also potentially know it. The mind cannot know another mind, but it can know the thought of another mind.
...Frances partly wrote in effect... In Peircean pragmatism there is "existential graphing" but no mention of mapping at all that could be found by me in his writings. If his logical graphing is held to be somewhat equivalent to psychical mapping, then something might be made of this. It would all turn on signs and especially on icons. ...Michael partly wrote in effect... What I had in mind was whether Peirce defined how correlations are structured between two ideas or an idea and an external entity, and how we use many different kinds of representations, from map drawings that graphically depict terrain features, to drawings that depict objects, to ad hoc maps like using the salt and pepper shaker and a knife to represent a street and two buildings. I think gestures are different too from unambiguous signs like pointing to more elaborately abstracted gestures like wiggling or undulating or shrugging. Perhaps his "existential graphing" describes some formalized way of establishing discrete correlations between different concepts. Analogies and metaphors are forms of concept mapping, just as the salt and pepper shakers are crude forms of physical mapping. I have been interested in the range or degree of "realism" in pictures, from the "highly realistic" to the "very abstract". I believe that the high degree of naturalism in paintings expedites the mental interpretation that follows, and by comparison as the degree of naturalistic finish lessens the interpretation relies more and more on using a kind of "language" in which the lines are "read" to "depict" the details of the subject. Thus, there is a large category of pictures that are not "naturalistic" but are readily recognized as realistic pictures. Then at the other end are the representational pictures whose forms of portrayal do not rely on close correlation to the subject, and I believe we "read" these more, so that we see them as some kind of natural looking proxy or miniature or surrogate. I am fascinated how cartoons and caricatures work; how we read our way through the unrealistic nature of cartoons. I'm really intrigued by the way we recognize public figures in political cartoons. This circles around and touches again on the idea of "reading" the pictures, almost as if they were composed of letters. I was wondering where in Peirce he describes the way we correlate an idea to something else. ...Kate partly wrote in effect... On using a kind of "language" in which the lines are "read" to "depict" the details of the subject, this is about marks. ...Armando partly wrote in effect... The higher the degree of recognizable naturalism in art the less it stimulates the mind. ...Michael partly wrote in effect... Perhaps high naturalism produces a reaction of marvel or wonder.
