Is it "for us" or "by us"? wc
________________________________ From: Boris Shoshensky <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2009 7:02:31 AM Subject: Re: Reading Rancihre "Perhaps the 'aesthetic experience' is simply a special case of 'experience'?" Is not every experience is a special case? The difference is the importance of it for us. Boris Shoshensky ---------- Original Message ---------- From: imago Asthetik <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Subject: Re: Reading Rancihre Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2009 11:12:14 -0400 > for me the most interesting subject in "philosophy of art": the aesthetic > experience. > Would you say, Cheerskep, that you are more interested in the metaphysics of experience than in the philosophy of art? Perhaps the 'aesthetic experience' is simply a special case of 'experience'? On Sun, Sep 27, 2009 at 12:44 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > In a message dated 9/27/09 12:04:09 PM, [email protected] writes: > > "Ranciere". > > Rancieree was ventured by the forum in the recent past, and the book > addressed failed to sustain lister interest. > > > For what it is worth, I do not think that questions of ontology are > > particularly pressing. In fact, I think that Danto has solved the > problem > > (i.e. the distinguishing feature of art is conceptual, not perceptual), > > although I may not agree with all of the conclusions he draws from his > > solution. > > > > How pressing they are varies from one person to another -- i.e. > "pressing" > is not an absolute condition, there is no mind-independent Platonic ontic > category of "pressing matters". It's pressing to one if one is interested. > > But I agree that much lively and edifying discussion in philosophy of art > can be carried on without addressing the "matephysical status" of art. > For > example, a closer examination of the experiences called 'aesthetic > experiences' would be interesting to me. > > I can't claim familiarity with Danto's notions of conceptual and > perceptual, so I have no idea what he had in mind. This I know: > aestheticians > wrangle endlessly and vacuously about the alleged > category/quality/ontological-status of a general thing called "art" and > about > individual works. "Now that's > art!" "No, it isn't!" "You're both balled up! That's like arguing over > whether a given act is a 'sin'or a given person a 'genius'. The 'is' there > is > utterly misplaced because it suggests a mind-independent category." > > What in the early pages of the Kivy discourged me was his ostensible > acceptance that a given work either "is" or "isn't" art. But I admit I did > not > initially read enough to confirm that that is his position throughout the > book. > > Here's one example of the stunting effect (for me) of Kivy's position. I'd > want to examine certain experiences occasioned by contemplating various > events/objects that are very seldom called "art" -- e.g. a sporting > contest, > "real life drama". My reason is that the feeling I've derived from such > events has sometimes been for me indistinguishable from the "aesthetic > experiences" ordinarily associated with, say, works by Van Gogh, > Shakespeare, > Keats, > Mozart et al. But if Kivy takes the position that a public event or a > natural > vista "is" not a "work of art", therefore we need not consider the > experiences it occasions, he is, by fiat, barring sufficient discussion > of > what is > for me the most interesting subject in "philosophy of art": the aesthetic > experience. ____________________________________________________________ Cheap Diet Help Tips. Click here. http://thirdpartyoffers.netzero.net/TGL2241/fc/BLSrjpYZnASFKFWXbSeYOct5RLx6DN EwvTGKs20iBdxg71JP13wFXR2K8cY/
