Frances to William and others... Under realist pragmatism, the false and the true are objective quantitative laws that may be felt or found in signs by signers. Not all signs however will bear or carry laws that might be false or true. For pragmatist semioticians there are three main kinds of signs called icons and indexes and symbols. All genuine icons are grounded in some formal similarity to their referred objects, and will thus be neither false nor true, but are logically senseless. All signs however must be made up of icons to some degree. All genuine indexes are grounded in some causal contiguity to their referred objects, and will thus be either false or true to their effect, which makes them logically sensorial. All signs however are of indexes to some degree, because only brute factual tokens in nature can be felt or sensed or known as signs of any kind. All symbols are grounded in some conventional arbitrarity to their referred objects, and will thus be only true, which makes them logically sensible. In other words, any object can be agreed as a symbol of any other object, if the sign is simply known as a symbol, therefore the status of a sign as a symbol cannot be denied so long as the sign is known as a symbol, even if only to the sole signer secretly alone; otherwise the symbolic sign must revert to being a sheer brute index, or even to being a mere fleeting icon.
Now, if an object as art is found or held or deemed to be mainly an icon, then any falsity or truth is irrelevant to that artwork; at least in regard to the object being logically sensorial or sensible as false or true art. The fallibility of such an object in being art must then be found elsewhere other than in falsity or truth, perhaps in say its form. If the truth of an object or if the object in being true is fallible, this status of fallibility need not entail that the truth is false. The fallibility need only entail that the object is neither false nor true, but is logically senseless. The false as fallible and the true as fallible may merely signify the existence of some logical senselessness. Metaphysical phenomena like lofty works of high fine art cannot have their aesthetic or artistic artiness verified by empirical scientific means. All that signers as say aestheticians and artisans and artists can do is observe what they feel they seem to sense, and then express this observation to others expert in the activity. Such acts or observation and expression are the processes of phenomenology, which is regarded as a science, but a science that is clearly different from other sciences that use empirical methods of experiention and experimentation. All phenomena are things, but when sensed the things are represented as real facts; and if the facts are representative of some other facts, then they further become signed as signs of objects to signers. There are therefore represented facts given to sense that are not signs, because such facts represent themselves alone; and represented facts of other facts also given to sense that are hence objects and signs of objects. If some mere aspect of a sign or an object or a thing is felt to be sensed, then it is real. When a signer feels they sense the seeming phenomenal haze of facts or likely phenomenal stuff, the haze is an indirect representation and a sign of the stuff. The signer due to the limits of their sense can only make a good guess that the seeming haze is the likely stuff. The sensed haze is a token representative sign of the stuff, be it a brute object or a sheer fact or a mere thing. If an ideal general tone or a rational universal type is to be felt sensed, then it can only be sensed as an exemplified real token that stands for or represents the tone or type. Any phenomenal attributed essence as a tone and any phenomenal exemplified presence as a type can only be felt or sensed or known as a phenomenal manifested substance or a token.
