I've lost track of Mallory's post re the 'reliability' of knowledge versus beliefs. But I like his thinking and want to get into this issue.
I define beliefs as unsupported assumptions. I define knowledge as remembered experience or proved assumptions. I'm inclined to agree with Mallory's pragmatic approach but when we examine it carefully it see that his reliability is really not opposed to belief but is in fact a part of it. When we say that such and such is reliable then we are assuming that it might not be reliable. If something is perfectly reliable then it can be stated as a invariable fact or law. The part of reliability that is uncertain requires belief, an assumption that reliability can be counted on even though we can't be perfectly certain of it. This is what I mean when I claim that belief is always a part of knowing. If belief is always present in knowing and since knowing is sometimes less certain than at other times, the belief quotient is variable, but never at zero or never at 100% (since even Laws of Nature might be superseded, even though most probably not). I say belief is never total, or 100%, because even supposedly sheer fantasy is based on some knowing (some real experience in the world). So I like to think of belief and knowing as linked together as a sliding scale where if one is increased the other is decreased. One might object that it is possible to say that a certain knowledge can be "believed in" but I consider that to be an honorific use of the term belief because if one has knowledge then that's it. Belief would be an absence of knowledge in my model. If some belief is always present in knowing then why make a division between a domain of knowing and a domain of believing? It's only a difference of degree to say that I know my cat exists (even though he has just scampered out of the room) and I know that God exists. Both instances of knowing require some belief, although much less with respect to my cat and much more with respect to God. WC ----- Original Message ---- From: Mike Mallory <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Sent: Tue, December 6, 2011 9:13:04 PM Subject: Re: Aesthetics, intellect, high intelligence, and sensibility. I'll second Cheerskep (and Hume and Penn Jillette). There is so much we do understand about the world, I don't see why it is necessary or even desirable to start positing assumptions about a divine purpose or "overwhelming rightness." I enjoy religious music and art and understand the attraction of the aesthetics of religion, but my enjoyment is limited to a fictive stance. Mike Mallory ----- Original Message ----- From: "leosullivan" <[email protected]> To: <[email protected]> Sent: Sunday, September 11, 2011 5:10 PM Subject: Re: Aesthetics, intellect, high intelligence, and sensibility. > I agree with conger and apparently pascal on this.you have to start somewhere >and you might as well start with assumption of the existence of the lord as >so >mnay have done before you. It isn't religious fervor or angels of heaven that >is the basis but more of an assumption that somehow there is an overwhelming >rightness that will out in the end.that assumption is the basis for >everything >else aesthetics included > Kate Sullivan > Sent from my iPod > > On Sep 11, 2011, at 7:13 PM, William Conger <[email protected]> wrote: > >> For some reason Cheerskep ignores my main point that belief is not a choice >but >> a necessity of consciousness. This aspect of belief has nothing to do with >>the >> existence of a god or gods or anything at all concerned with religious >belief. >> But it does imply that Cheerskep's denial of belief ignores the fundamental >> fact that our brains and consciousness rely on a-priori assumptions, about the >> next moment, thought, act all the way on to grand totaliing concepts like God. >> That's also the underlying assumption that Pascal, in the context and >language >> of his time, recognized in his argument. Is it silly? Of course! Any >> admission of assumptions -- the first recognition of philosophers from >> Plato >>to >> Kant and beyond -- is silly form the standpoint of being conjectural and >> impossible to set beyond the circle of subjectivity. >> >> It's no less a silly presumption to deny the "verities" of religion (I extend >> this to consciousness) than it is to accept them. What satisfactions does >> Cheerskep attain by denying them? Whatever they are, those satisfactions >> are >>no >> more substantial than the ones he denies. When he says he can't belive, what >> takes its place? >> >> What's really silly is to presume the historical imagery of God, angels, >> and >>all >> the rest, is to be taken as the substances and not as transient symbols. If >>the >> symbols are silly does that mean that the symbolized is silly? I've seen many >> silly portraits of Lincoln. Was Lincoln silly? >> >> wc >> >> >> ----- Original Message ---- >> From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> >> To: [email protected] >> Sent: Sun, September 11, 2011 5:50:12 PM >> Subject: Re: Aesthetics, intellect, high intelligence, and sensibility. >> >> William asks: >> >>> Why is Cheerskep still angry over his early disillusionment with >>> religion. >>> >> I'm sorry you believe this about me, William. My sole remark about religion >> was this: >> >> With the departure of the religious faith of my youth went many reassuring >> verities. >> >> That remark does not seem to me sufficient evidence of anger. Nor do I >> recall any such feeling at the time (or after). When I came to realize there >> is >> no Santa Claus I didn't get angry either. A more likely emotion might be one >> of sadness, but I also didn't feel that with either disillusion. >> >> I admit I can imagine someone else getting angry, either about promises >> broken ("I was told I'd go to heaven if I were good!") or burdens that >"faith" >> brought with it ("I felt uncomfortable guilt about masturbating and other >> sexual stuff because I was told they were impure!"), but for whatever reason >> once a belief in a deity or Santa Claus was behind me, I simply never had >> such thoughts. "Ah! Well of course Santa Claus doesn't exist! Well that >> was >> a child's thought anyway." "Ah. So there's no heaven. Well, if you think >> about that was a silly thought anyway." >> >> As for Pascal's wager the way he expressed it, I thought that was pretty >> silly too because it implied that belief is subject to an act of will, and >> I've never found that so for me. An early murmur of disbelief came when I >read >> that God is an eternal being who is perfect and thus never changes, and yet >> he is credited with all sorts of acts affecting humans, that struck my young >> mind as impossible, and by no straining effort of mind could I make myself >> think otherwise. I accept there may be others who can, by an "act of faith", >> block out such doubts, but that ability is denied me. Once I came to see >> the various alleged attributes of angels as silly, that was that for any >> further belief in them. The belief or rejection of belief was definitely >> not >a >> voluntary act.
