--On Tuesday, August 24, 2010 02:10:34 PM -0400 Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]> wrote:

I support this change.  It is after all the PTS servers responsibility
to understand whether two names refer to the same PTS ID.  If the PTS
server wants to treat all existing Kerberos v4 names as automatically
having synonyms that are Kerberos v5 and GSS-KRB5 name forms, that is an
implementation detail.

The thing I want to avoid is having multiple, independently-managed representations of Kerberos V5 principal names (or those of any other underlying authentication mechanism), which would allow them to get out of sync. Of course, it is possible to achieve this by requiring the ptserver to pick a canonical internal representation and map both forms onto it and back. However, this will be confusing to users -- since in practice Kerberos V5 is the _only_ mechanism currently supported, we will forever be answering bug reports of the form "I deleted one alias and they all went away" when in fact there only ever was one alias which was reported in two forms, or else bug reports of the form "I tried to add alias X and alias Y appeared instead" or "I tried to add alias X and it said it already exists".

In addition, one of the goals I had in mind during previous discussions on this functionality was that the ptserver would _not_ need to understand the semantics of every (any) name type. I don't want people to have to upgrade their ptserver to understand a new name type before they can deploy an experimental fileserver that supports that name type. The only things that should need to understand the semantics of authentication names are the authentication mechanism itself and the tools used by administrators to manipulate aliases. Server code outside the mechanism, including the ptserver, should not need to understand aliases.

As it stands, the onus to convert is on implementations of authentication mechanisms using GSS-krb5. Would it make people happier if we were to eliminate the Kerberos V5 name type and require Kerberos V5 names to always be represented as GSS export tokens? That would place the onus of conversion on things (rxkad, not mech-independent server code) that accept raw Kerberos V5 authentication.

-- Jeff

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