On Wednesday 10 September 2003 06:12, Ben Goertzel wrote:
> > Then you see qualia as something over and above (or next to) the material
> > world and you hold a kind of mind-bodydualism.
>
> Not "over and above" -- of course not.  "Next to" would be more accurate.

Well, that still sounds very much like dualism. I suppose it's just a matter 
of language.

>
> It's not quite a mind-body dualism, because both mind and body can be
> viewed from both the scientific and experiential perspectives.
>
> Mine is a dualism (or more generally a multi-ism) on the level of
> perspectives rather than realities.

Me too, but for me there's also a hierarchy with physics at the top, as the 
most correct and general persepctive one but often too detailed to be 
practical, and at the bottom are just instrumentalist perspectives. That 
means that for fundamental improvement in explanation theories need to be 
made more physical, more realistic, instead of just instrumentalistic.
Well, in cognitive science/psychology you see/have seen that happening. 

....................................
> > there is
> > also the philosophical behaviourism of Ryle and Wittgenstein (and
> > Dennett),
> > where mental terms like 'pain' 'believe' 'thought' are argued to have
> > objective meanings. W.: 'Internal events must have external
> > criteria'. The
> > evidence for pain is pain behaviour, to desire something is to act to get
> > that something, etc.
>
> I don't believe that internal events must have external criteria in order
> to be considered valid and existent.  This may be true from the scientific
> perspective, but not from all possible (or all useful) perspectives.

Well, to name internal events, there have to be rules/criteria for correct use 
of a term/name, like always for any use of language. How do you know how to 
use the word 'pain' for example, how did you learn its rule(s)? Well probably 
from your parents who told you you were in pain when you hit your knee or 
something like that and screamed afterwards. Behaviour was the necessary 
basis for this learning event.
For more information on this, see Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, 
Ryle's Concept of Mind, Dennett, Davidson etc.

Arnoud 

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