On Sep 15, 2003, at 2:36 AM, arnoud wrote:
On Sunday 14 September 2003 18:38, Tim wrote:On Sep 14, 2003, at 5:30 PM, arnoud wrote:Hello Tim, The other ontological monist stances are philosophical idealism and neutral monism. But almost nobody holds those theories anymore (not?). Materialism is by far the most dominant monist position. Like Fodor said: we are all materialists now for the same reason Churchill was for democracy: the alternatives are even worse.
Physicalism is actually an argument for one type of
description and one principle mode of knowing based on the idea that it is the most common variety of monism. Basically, it is very loaded.
What do you mean?
Well, what I mean by this is that materialism presupposes either a pragmatic epistemology - like what you suggest below that materialism be judged by the "success of the natural sciences".
I don't think the materialist epistemology is necessarily pragmatic. (However,
I am to a large degree. )
I see now that in my typing I left off the second half of that sentence. Sorry for the confusion. The sentence (which has "either" in it) should have ended as "or an arbitrary epistemological grounding." I should be careful here that I am really talking about the empiricism you are espousing. I suppose someone could be a materialist and a direct realist. That is actually not far from where I am coming from. Monism + participatory
I think the point is that the materialist epistemology (i.e. empiricism) IS necessarily pragmatic ( unless it borrows assumptions from elsewhere).
Wittgenstein isactually useful here if we were to look some of his arguments on following a rule or theorem proving and likening that to scientific knowledge. If we were to say that the "reason" - i.e. the formula representation - for X is Y - where Y is a TOE - than is it in particular "privileged" and a unique reference of "reason."
Why do you always immediately go to TOE? And what is the point you are trying to make?
Because TOE is the best case scenario for the physicalist/materialist point of view. Am I wrong in this? I am trying to grant as much as possible. After all, it is quite possible that such a theory is never reached. By that, I mean that there are open problems in physics for an indefinite period. I am not talking about the obvious issue that even if we thought we had a TOE it could be mistaken when some new phenomenon or new observation leads to its refutation/modification. A TOE means that we no longer have any questions we know of in Physics which does not have an answer. There is always the possibility of new questions.
To me it does not matter if such an interesting theory is found (at least for the purposes of this argument) because I believe it will (a) be restricted to a particular context of observable, or (b) converge to a theory of substance that is more complex and might look at lot more like traditional metaphysics (all be it with more sophisticated measuring abilities).
I am nottrying to get embroiled in trivialities here - I think it is important that we recognize that materialism is a ontology presupposition which has highly prejudicial consequences in invalidating certain modes of knowing.
It's not prejudical, the truth of materialism is established a postiori, after
centuries of science.
If materialism is true that does not implicate all non-material talk is
forbidden, but just that one needs to be instrumentalist about that.
First, materialism is NOT a postiori. ELEMENTS of it are. The current materialist ontology - protons, quarks, fields, information, etc. - is like words written on a page. There must be something to write on - i.e. background assumptions such as regularity, etc. You seem to think that these come through the experience RATHER than make the experience intelligible. They are in fact a priori. If they were not the case, then it would make the universe unintelligible. How could something that is necessary for intelligibility be proved a postiori? Once again, if it is a non-foundationalist view you would look for, then how could beliefs which are closer to the center of a web of beliefs ever be disproved by something along the periphery?
This is the same mistake as the positivists - the theory is self-refuting if taken on itself. It must be supplemented. Saying that the goal and the justification is pragmatic IS a valid response. Most of what you are saying fits this, so I see no point in trying to argue that there are alternatives which are not arbitrary.
Also,
You see - by saying "one needs to be instrumentalist about that" you are creating a criteria which limits what can satisfy it to a subjective or pragmatic measure. SO, I think you are really arguing Pragmatism whether you like it or not. I don't have an issue here, I am just trying to get to the bottom of it.
I.E. it may be perfectly valid for me to say something like -"God told me X" and for that phenomenon to supersede the authority of
another large set of observations. This is somewhat the epistemological
position staked out by Reformed Epistomologists such as Plantiga or
others.
If you really think that is valid, the bottom falls outof our discussion. I
can't think of a more worse epistemological foundation than God.
I really don't see this as anything other than polemical or at worst condescending. My point was not specifically to do with divine revelation, but to understate that empiricism rests on a set of background assumptions which I can cling too through associative or entailment relations (the latter for foundationalists, the former for coherence views of truth). Essentially, it is perfectly legitimate (epistemologically) to seek knowledge through non-scientific means (i.e. something that is not repeatable and predictable) if it does not contradict or interfere with the rest of the beliefs I hold. In fact, the point of the Reformed Epistemologists is that since there is a hierarchy of beliefs in terms of my commitment to them, it is quite reasonable to show that some types of experience may have sufficient effect as to justify my belief in a given proposition without having the proposition be subject to another test of validation (such as the Scientific Method). They are coming at the problem from a non-foundationalist perspective and trying to be consistent. I am not saying I agree with this, but I think it is a interesting perspective. Rorty does the same thing with a different agenda and ends up with a different set of beliefs.
I'm not going to digress into a debate on God or His role in all of this. I really don't see it as productive at this time. But, I am not conceding anything on that point either. I will only say this. A few replies back, there was a brief debate over the Descartes' Cogito. Most people miss that the Cogito was not intended as a sufficient proof of the existence of a mind. It is an argument, but it is NOT (despite many readers' opinion) intended as an argument against skepticism, which is a presupposed argument before arguing for a mind. In the third Meditations, Descartes makes it clear that the deceiving evil demon could be sufficiently cunning to even be mistaken about the referent of 'I' - the core of the argument of the second Meditations that 'I' is a name and that the referent of the name is not a material substance (harkening back to his meditation on a piece of wax). Instead, Descartes propounds that his faith in his cognitive capacities is an extension of his BELIEF that God is benevolent and provides him assurance in what is perceived by his senses (mental representations/cognitions in this context). Descartes believed that any investigation required a set of background assumptions. I am not arguing for Cartesianism here, just making an analogy that may explain why I want to leave the epistemological room for something valuable.
Materialism is to say that through test and observation of experienced phenomenon, when have overriding access to the normative patterns of the universe we experience.
I don't think we speak the same language here. 'normative patterns of the
universe'??? What do you mean by that? I don't agree at all with this
formulation of materialism, and I've never seen a similar definition. (And is
it a grammatically correct sentence?)
When -> We. Typo. I think (hopefully not presumptuously) that Ben would get this. A theory is a representation of patterns of experience that is validated by the passing of arguments (in the form of hypothetical values) into the representation and getting a set of arguments back that would line up with a actual experiment. Normative patterns are a way of expressing the aggregation of experimentation that under-girds scientific theories. Sorry for the confusing vocabulary. I am working at language that can be a middle ground between the CS/Math, philosophers, and scientific types in this forum. Sometimes, too much economy is confusing.
Since the fruit of this is betterunderstanding of the set of experienced phenomenon that Materialism accepts
In principle no experience may be excluded, according to the scientific method. And Materialism must stay in that framework.
What about experience that says the scientific method does not work in contexts A, B, and C? Is it not true that phenomenon that throws into doubt the scientific method is better doubted or rejected than amending the method? Those are more often called "illusions" or old vocabulary and their implications dismissed. This is the Kuhn point again.
as valid a priori it is somewhat like an incomplete formalsystem where the particular set mappings are unknown. What happens on this, however, is difficult because history has shown that the context or frame of mapping is continually needing to be extended (that was my point on the TOE-Information-Religious convergence).
I really have no idea what you're talking about.
Having cited Churchland, I am a little surprised you didn't follow. His reductionism rest on the assumption that a complete system will eventually be discovered that accounts for all phenomenon scientifically. It is one thing to know the functions and not know the values to map. It is another thing to know the values and rely on regularity/induction to create mappings. It is finally, quite another to NOT know if you are mapping the RIGHT way. The problem with materialist/scientific epistemology as an ultimate one is that it can never know if we are mapping the RIGHT way and by its own criteria, it has been proven wrong more often than any other mechanism. Below, I show that it can never be proven correct. So, we have to change or criteria of correctness to be happy - i.e. back to pragmatism again.
The convergence idea is that we already are perceiving (intuitionally) that the current context of mapping is woefully inadequate for many (a) people, (b) problems, and (c) phenomenon. Many are seriously considering altering many assumptions about the mapping process. By that I am NOT saying that people are contemplating leaving or amending the scientific method (that would be a Modern way of speaking), but instead that what we mean by science is shifting as we realize that many things we thought might "stuff" are in fact patterns of information that are epistemologically influenced by the fact that they are observed.
To bottom line this, what I am trying to say is that advocates of materialism make a lot of assumptions about the justification of its knowledge.
Well, you have to have criteria, and those criteria must not be biased towards
certain theories a priori. My pragmatist criteria are good prediction of the
outcome of experiments and succesful intervention in the world (technology).
Theories (in their context of practice) that lead to better prediction of a
system and more power to intervene succesfully in a system than other
theories (in their context) can be said to be more true than the other
theories.
This statement sounds nice, but is curiously arbitrary. Taken at one level it is odd for someone to say "Well, you have to have criteria, and those criteria must not be biased toward certain theories a priori." What is that? Is your criteria open for amendment? Or does it judge everything? What if leading to better prediction lead inextricably to substantial increases in human suffering? I know that this is a little odd, but I am a taking something that some pragmatists would bring up? Closure is a difficult thing. It is easy for the divinely inspired and arbitrary for everyone else :-)
On the face of it, I see nothing wrong with what you are saying. I am just hopeful that it can be seen as somewhat arbitrary and not really grounded in any artificial authority.
They are ultimately reduced to a kind of utility orpragmatic measure that they take as ultimate.
I follow the criteria formulated above, because of - what Wittgenstein called
- logical compulsion. There can be no infinite regress of justification. At
some point one needs to say: this is simply true.
Yes, touche. To say there can be no regress of justification based on what you have stated is to say you are unwilling to "justify" your criteria beyond what you have said. That is perfectly fine, as I have stated above. I just hope you don't conceive that this view is an entitlement to a privileged position. Wittgenstein also railed against reification of particular systems - the eye of the Tractatus, the view from eternity. I would say, however, that you may have mistaken the stream for the bedrock. But bedrock is what "is simply true" for you, I suppose.
I will deal with theissues of this below and show why it leads to postmodern drift.
Now, if we reject the foundationalist interpretation that I am supposing, it does not really improve the situation, because the coherence of the of explanatory power in ALL matters of value. Notions of perceived truth, right, wrong, etc. All have to be satisfied more readily or simply as a type of network
Now you are trying to reduce these concepts to (neurological) mechanisms, I
take it. But that is not necessary, elimination outof a final materialist
ontology is also possible (like Churchland does). After that, one can still
use concepts like 'truth', 'right'... by giving them an instrumentalist
status.
Maybe you think that is the incoherence.
No, biology does not enter into my thoughts here (accept as a potential source of uncertainty). I think I dealt with Churchland earlier.
Yes, I think it either arbitrary or incoherent.
where the lowest complexitypathway is from the observed idea (or state would be better in this
language) to an accurate projection to the solution space. Even this
methodology is an assumption (now that I think of it) and might lead to
circularity. I don't know if there is a way around this in coherence
theories of truth. I'm not saying one way or another, - just don't
know.
I
think this is some of what you were getting at Ben. Right?
It is difficult to see if the Physicalist model (or should I say materialist? - maybe more sincere) is really coherent in any common variety.
This seems very odd to me. What is so incoherent about physicalism?
The Dennett variety is actually rather vacuous in terms of its
epistemological justification. Most consistent thinkers who start off
trying to be good materialist/empiricists within analytic philosophy
tend to degrade into postmodern pragmatists (ala Richard Rorty). So,
we
need either subjective, shared, or objective truth, with the latter an
impossibility based on the problem of finite induction.
I don't quite follow this train of thought. Physicalism to me is
justified by
the success of the natural sciences with their materialist ontology of
atoms,
electrons, molecules and so on. Even the phenomenon of human beings
that used
to be thought to be outof the explanatory reach of the natural
sciences is
now more and more understood in materialistic terms. Other projects of
knowing seem to be far inferior, like mysticism, folk psychology,
phenomenology.
Where's the incoherence, the tendency to degrade in postmodern
pragmatists?
I think what I am suggesting us that the "grounding" of empiricism must
lie "outside of itself."
I thought we were talking about materialism not empiricism.
Sorry, slipped a little in a rush. I am talking about empiricism within the context of a materialist ontology.
This is comparable to some of Quine'scriticisms. Now, the problem of finite induction - i.e. that a finite number of observations (taken in itself) can never yield a convergence to a true rule. A Pattern or regularity is only so as it represents a sampling of set. This set, if unknown (even the essence of it features as well as their number are unknown) means that no sampling, no matter how large can converge to a particular function that has predictive value.
If there is no pattern, just random noise, yes, but not in general. If there
is a pattern in the observation, and you find that pattern, you can predict
future observations by extrapolating from the sample set according to that
pattern (and then see whether the prediction succeeds).
The real problem of induction is that uncertainty always remains. Induction
does not give conclusive evidence, just a best guess (or a few).
In the end Materialism is also just a best guess (about what exists), and it
will never be anything more.
I think that you missed my point entirely. There is no justification for the extrapolation if the sample is over an infinite set. The bayesian probability of accurate prediction of a GOOGLE of observations over an infinite set is still ZERO. It is a fluke that it works. Of course, the FACT that is works is suggestive (?) that there is regularity and order in the Universe. Of course, this is ASSUMED in making the guess.
So, there are no BETTER guesses. Just luckier ones.
Now, the fact that this process does yield valid prediction andgives the appearance of progress is suggestive of supplementary assumptions about the nature of the universe (i.e. remember the transcendental suggestions :-) ). Regularity of the universe and the well-formedness of our sensory manifolds to perceive it are necessary assumptions.
No, the regularity of the universe is not an assumption. It's the outcome of
scientific experimentation. If there is no regularity of the universe that
would have been the outcome of experiments.
I have already shown how the regularity IS an assumption. You may not accept this. I really don't know how to argue with that accept to say that you can't make any intelligible experiment without assuming regularity. You may disagree about HOW MUCH regularity there is and what 'regularity' means exactly, but there has to be some to make sense of anything. A precondition of intelligibility CANNOT be an outcome of scientific experimentation.
Of course, these CANNOT be validated WITHIN thematerialist view and its empiricist epistemology. They presuppose it to
have coherence. Of course, this rubs many original analytic
philosopher/empiricists the wrong way because it seems incoherent and
incomplete. To use another Wittgenstein metaphor from On Certainty -
there is a lot of stream, but no bedrock.
I hope it is more understandable now. Consistent materialists -> pragmatist -> arbitrary epistemological justification V undocumented presuppositions.
Bye, Arnoud
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