Hi Jef, Sorry -- my response to Eric Raymond's theory of consciousness was overly terse (a consequence of my extreme busy-ness these days).
My main criticism of his theory is that it doesn't seem to capture anything of the subjective psychological experience of free will. My own attempt to explain this experience and the possible mechanistic underpinning of it may be found at: http://www.goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2004/FreeWill.htm Next, his theory actually ties in with some (highly speculative) work I did recently on the philosophy of quantum measurement; see: http://www.goertzel.org/papers/ChaoQM.htm What I argue there, in brief, is that the mystery of quantum measurement becomes less mysterious if one assumes, among other things, that the universe itself has a finite computational capability. This assumption lets one argue that the "collapse of the wave function" occurs when some dynamic occurs that cannot be reversed except by using computational capability greater than that of the universe. I.e. there is no absolute irreversibility, there is only irreversibility relative to some reference computer -- but if the universe itself is considered as a particular reference computer, then there is irreversibility relative to the universe. Now, Raymond wants to say "A has free will relative to B if A is unpredictable by B." Well, if the universe has finite computational capacity, then we may say in some cases "A has (Raymondian) free will relative to the universe." And if my speculative theory of quantum measurement is correct, then this means "A has (Raymondian) free will relative to the universe, whenever A's dynamics involve collapse of the quantum wave function." My feeling is that free will as psychologically experienced by humans, is a subclass of abstract Raymondian free will. I think that our brains involve plenty of examples of unpredictability that are not experienced as free will. What I tried to do in my above-referenced essay on free will, was to explain which particular unpredictable nonlinear dynamics in the brain tend to be experienced as free will by people. -- Ben G > -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Behalf Of Jef Allbright > Sent: Thursday, October 21, 2004 8:07 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: [agi] ESR on philosophy of mind, free will, computability > and complexity theory > > > Ben - > > I know you, via the web, as one who has both a strong mathematical > (objective) background and also one who tends very strongly to value the > experiential (subjective) stance. > > How is it that your mathematical side can allow you to downplay a > solution to a difficult problem, saying the explanation makes it > unproblematic, but fault it for being non-intuitive to most people? > Doesn't that describe virtually all significant scientific advance? > > I came to a similar understanding of the problem of free will, which is > in the same family of problems as Personal Identity, The Hard Problem of > Consciousness, and Qualia, years ago and found it to be one of the most > liberating, and therefore subjectively positive, realizations I've ever > had. > > Our evolved sense of self fights this realization tooth and nail, but it > places many key philosophical problems into an understandable structure > that becomes entirely unproblematic. There's great practical value for > progress in studies of values, ethics, and politics as we approach the > boundaries of conventional understanding of these "common-sense" topics. > > BTW, I don't see any essential difference between ESR and Dennett on > this thinking. > > - Jef > > > > Ben Goertzel wrote: > > >Hmmm.. well, it looks to me like he just redefines free will in > a way that > >makes it unproblematic, but doesn't really match with most peoples' > >intuitive feeling about free will.... > > > >Saying "A has free will to B if B can't predict what A does" is all very > >well, but the intuitive notion of most people is that their free will is > >independent of who's observing them.... So the kind of free will his > >argument provides, is not the kind that most people intuitively feel like > >they have... > > > >-- Ben > > > > > > > >>-----Original Message----- > >>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > >>Behalf Of David Hart > >>Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 2004 3:40 AM > >>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >>Subject: [agi] ESR on philosophy of mind, free will, computability and > >>complexity theory > >> > >> > >>Hi, > >> > >>Eric Raymond (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_S._Raymond) has a > >>interesting short essay in his blog entitled "Predictability, > >>Computability, and Free Will". > >> > >> http://esr.ibiblio.org/index.php?m=200410#161 > >> > >>ESR has independently re-invented similar lines of thought to Wolfram, > >>Dennett, and others, but with his own angle. An interesting and concise > >>read. > >> > >>-dave > >> > >> > >> > >> > > ------- > To unsubscribe, change your address, or temporarily deactivate > your subscription, > please go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > ------- To unsubscribe, change your address, or temporarily deactivate your subscription, please go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
