> So before dropping qualia from the discussion it would be > valuable to see if > there is a practical agenda related to this issue and, if there > is, we could > concentrate discussion on that. > > Cheers, Philip
Philip, I think there *is* a practical agenda related to qualia, but it's one that can't be explored via talking, it's one that can only be explored via experimentation with, say -- human brains via advanced tools we don't have now -- genuine AGI's ... -- more advanced methods of making physics measurements At some point, we'll be able to take intelligent systems and do fine-grained experiments with them, to discover what physical/software changes cause them to report qualia associated with what dynamics within them. We'll be able to measure quantum fields carefully enough to see if there's really any Hameroff-ian physical difference in the macroscopic quantum dynamics of the brain when reported qualia are present. Most critically, we'll be able to mess with the "reporting mechanism" of intelligent systems to try to probe the relationship between "actual qualia" (a term which may or may not mean anything from a scientific perspective) and "reported qualia." This will allow us to explore my hypothesis that "reported qualia are qualia that happen to occur in parts of the brain that are good at doing reporting." Suppose for instance, * we connect reporting mechanisms to various parts X of a real or simulated brain and then find that reported qualia often occur in X in this circumstance (when various co-factors are met, probably), whereas they rarely occur in X otherwise * we find that some physical correlate of qualia (whether Hameroffian or not) -- occurs in X even when X is not connected to the reporting mechanism -- occurs in X *and* the reporting mechanism when X is connected to the reporting mechanism, and ensuing qualia are reported This will provide some interesting circumstantial evidence that maybe qualia are present in X all along but just aren't being reported... And I'm sure a lot of other, even more interesting ideas will come up once experimental tools advance appropriately, allowing us to more fully understand these issues. But with experimental tools at the stage they are now, it's hard for me to see how to make real progress on the issue. What's clear is that * the theory of "qualia" as it now stands isn't really good enough to explain the reported nature of qualia * nor are neuroscience and cognitive psychology as they now stand good enough to explain the reported nature of qualia, at least not in the opinion of a vast number of us (some hardcore anti-qualists disagree!) So I suspect that a largely new theoretical understanding is going to come about at some point, but I think it will probably come about as a result of theorists coming to grips with the detailed results of experiments like the ones I've described above. -- Ben G ------- To unsubscribe, change your address, or temporarily deactivate your subscription, please go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
