> There is linguistic-specific knowledge (which is learned), but no > linguistic-specific inference rule (which is innate). The rules alone > are not enough to produce human-level NLP performance, though should > be sufficient to learn the needed knowledge (given proper experience, > of course).
A subtler point, however, is that the *adaptation of inference control heuristics* that takes place as a consequence of reasoning about physical events, may be *useful adaptation* for the purpose of reasoning about linguistic structures. This, I think, is the deeper reason that understanding the physical world is useful as a crutch for later on understanding language. To be more explicit: In doing backward or forward chaining inference, a mind needs to use experience to bias its choice of which inference rules to apply at which steps. It's obvious that linguistic reasoning experience is helpful in biasing rule-choices in future linguistic reasoning instances; and it's obvious that physical reasoning experience is helpful in biasing rule-choices in future lphysical reasoning instances. But it's not obvious that physical reasoning experience is helpful in biasing rule-choices in future linguistic reasoning instances. Yet I suspect this is the case. -- Ben ------- To unsubscribe, change your address, or temporarily deactivate your subscription, please go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
