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----- Original Message -----
From: "Jef Allbright" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, June 08, 2006 10:04 PM Subject: Re: [agi] Four axioms > It seems to me it would be better to say that there is no absolute or > objective good-bad because evaluation of goodness is necessarily > relative to the subjective values of some agency. OK. That formulation works for me. > At this point I would like to propose a somewhat different metaethical > foundation that I think may be useful, providing at least some > contrast, if not clarity, in the ensuing discussion. > 1. Goodness is always assessed relative to the values of a subjective > agency. > 2. Any agency will assess as increasingly good those actions which > increasingly promote its values into the future. > 3. "Good" actions will be assessed as increasingly moral as they are > seen to work over increasing scope of agency, types of interaction and > duration. > > The practical implications of this reasoning are that increasing > awareness of (1) what works (increasingly objective > scientific/instrumental knowledge), applied to increasing awareness of > (2) our increasingly shared subjective values, leads to increasingly > effective social decision-making that is seen as increasingly good > (moral.) > > Therefore, we can and should rationally agree to promote the common > good via a framework supporting increasing awareness of (1) and (2) > above. OK. My initial impression was that this appears to me to be exactly isomorphic with my axioms so I had to agree with it. Then, I realized that I did have one clarity question -- How do you perceive "Goodness is always assessed relative to the values of a subjective agency" as being different from "Goodness is always assessed relative to the volition of a subjective agency" (which I would regard simply as a rewording of my axiom 1)? If your argument is that our values are often better than our wishes, then I see your point but feel that it is a minor wording difference since I regard volition as more of a reasoned desire than an idle wish (with the baggage that a value might be something imposed by G*d and not something that is an individual's volition). If you mean something else, then I don't understand the distinction yet. I would have absolutely no problem with an axiom
like 2. Any agency will assess as increasingly good those actions which
increasingly promote its volition in the future.
Item 3 initially seemed to be a bit unnecessary
since I translated it as 3. "Good" actions will be assessed as
increasingly good as they are seen to work over increasing scope of agency,
types of interaction and duration. It seemed a bit obvious to me to me
until I realized that that was the meat of my axiom 4 and that you really could
beat someone over the head with it. I think that it's a bit too subtle for
my tastes.
What's really nice about your approach is
that you didn't have to make an initial declaration of what is good. A
possible downside of your approach is that I didn't find it as easy to
comprehend and I think that this may be true of many other
people. Actually, though, now that I think more about it, the fact
that you didn't have to make an initial declaration of what is good is also a
downside since it doesn't require equality and doesn't clear out the
clutter of current beliefs. As an alternative formulation, I think that I
really like it but as a primary formulation, I think that it does nothing to
prevent the "G*d says" arguments from the average person since they won't be
willing (rather than able) to follow the increasing scope argument (Why DO I
have to include the infidel again? :-).
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Thanks.
Mark
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