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From: James Ratcliff
To: [email protected] Sent: Monday, June 12, 2006 3:52 PM Subject: Re: [agi] Re: Four axioms (WAS Two draft papers . . . .) >> you mentioned in a couple of responses the volition of the masses as your overall formula, I am putting a couple of thoughts together here, and that the intitial formula and rules for this would be hard-coded in the beginning. This initial "formula" would be
the four axioms and the rules would be the rules for extrapolation which
I'll be posting once I think I've got initial agreement on the axioms (and yes,
there is a substantial amount of voodoo in the rules for extrapolation that is
going to need to be gone over VERY carefully and the rules will probably need to
be eventually codified as axioms as well).
>> Using this as a starting point then, How do two AGI's develope
along a different line of beliefs?
If experience teaches the AGI's different things about
the world, then the AGI's will develop different beliefs. An AI whose
experience base only includes a tribe where ritualistic cannibalism is performed
after death to make survivors feel happier because the dead will forever remain
a part of them (a la Robert Heinlein's Stranger In a Strange
Land) and who never sees any of the diseases (primarily parasitic)
caused by cannibilism will conclude that cannibalism is friendly and good
. An AI whose experience base mainly includes people who are strongly
revulsed by any cannibalism and who has seen the diseases caused by cannibalism
will conclude that cannibalism is unfriendly and bad. Both AIs will be
"correct" within their respective worlds and will have to work out what is
friendly and good when their worlds collide.
>> My other main problem with your theory of volition and my own
Value formula is the future states. How can we possibly program them to
look so far forward and attempt to glean everyones future volition's. That
seems like an insurmountable task in itself.
My theory of volition has no problem with future states
because it ignores them as unnecessary and insufficiently calculable. I
agree fully with your assessment that looking forward and attempting to glean
everyone's future volition is an insurmountable task. It is my
current volition that causes me to take actions like
flossing my teeth because I know that it will benefit me in the future.
Trying to extrapolate my future volition would require guessing what I will
experience/learn and how I will react to it (and further, it is my strong
contention that any such extrapolation is very likely to be very
biased). It is my firm belief that Eliezer has unnecessarily headed
down a dead-end rabbithole with his CEV. I don't think that
guessing future volition is necessary for
friendliness.
>> Another take on that is a large set of value formulas, that
maybe we Could take a snapshot of, or a glimpse of, with trying to look directly
into everyones mind and seeing thier volitions.
The AI is going to have to have a good idea of what
people's volitions are. The best way to get this is to ask them (Most of
the time, the simplest solutions are the best as long as they are
sufficient.)
>> I think we may have to simulate this with a formula that takes
into account majority opinion, and protection for the minorities.
Exactly. The rules for extrapolation do exactly
this.
>> Thought: I want a piece of candy, but it is bad for my teeth, my weight, etc, does the robot give me a piece of candy when I ask? At what point though does he say no vs yes. How much of free will do the AI's attempt to put forward on us to 'protect' us, and our and the masses future volitions. The robot's decision as to whether or not to give you
the piece of candy is probably going to be based upon a) how well it believes
that you are capable of determining what is best for yourself, b) whether it
believes that it actually is good or bad for you, and c) how much
happiness giving you candy in this one instance is likely to
cause. If you are a mature adult, the AI will
generally expect that you know that large amounts of candy
are bad for you and that you will therefore self-regulate so it will probably
give you candy when you ask if it is easy for it to do so (i.e. there are not
substantial other trade-offs involved). Note, however, that the robot
is not in any way at all compelled to give you candy unless it wants to (because
it thinks it will cause the most
happiness for itself, you, and everyone else) because
<teaser>one of the rules of extrapolation is that no entity is required to
take action to fulfill the desires of another entity</teaser>. If
you are a child and it has seen you eat far too much candy, it will likely
decline to give you any. If you are a child and it knows that you haven't
had a lot of candy and that your parents wouldn't mind, it may well give it to
you. Note, however, that a robot declining to give you candy is VERY
different from a robot attempting to block your acquisition of candy.
The latter is a clear case of a conflict between two volitions
(your desire for candy and it's desire to prevent you from having
candy) that are explicitly declared as equal by axiom 2.
I am EXTREMELY leery of any
entity which trys to "protect me" because they "know what is better for me
than I do". That is the path to forcible "uplifting" (guaranteed to drive
many people absolutely berserk and to trigger
DeGaris's "artilect war"). It is also the path of Leon Kass telling me how
I can or can not modify myself.
>> You mentioned once in one of the posts, that your volitions would be represented by rules, I dont remember exactly your wording, but it seems more likely that we would have to define variations of these rules, and allow the AGI to learn more rules, as oppsed to giving them a very devious task of gleaning ones volition. No, my volitions are assumed to be exactly what I
say that they are or, in dire cases where I can't be consulted, what is normal
and common as long as there is no evidence to the contrary. Other people's
volitions are what they say they are or, in dire cases where they can't be
consulted, what is normal and common as long as there is no evidence to the
contrary.
Whether or not these volitions are friendly is
extrapolated/derived by rules from the initial four axioms. I believe that
the necessary set of rules for proper expansion is pretty small (yet will
produce infinite extrapolation based upon experience -- as in the case of the
two AIs considering the morality of cannibalism).
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