On 2/4/07, gts <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Personally I would be inclined to allow exceptions to Jaynes' second and third desiderata.
Exceptions to the first desiderata is known as the "reference class problem" --- when an individual is seen as instance of different categories, different probabilistic estimation follows.
Is it possible to program AGI without forcing it to abide by the tenets of objective/logical bayesianism?
It is not only possible, but inevitable --- none of the existing AGI project is designed that way.
Subjectivists like De Finetti and Ramsey define probability as degree of belief but unlike the objective/logical bayesians they measure it according to an agent's *willingness to act* on said degrees of belief, (as opposed to some supposed calculable mental barometer of rationally determined belief separate from the will). Even though I might support the subjectivist programme philosophically, I'm not sure if or how a programmer might get a handle on this subjective 'willingness to act', as distinct from the logical restraints that objective bayesians would already seek to impose.
That is indeed one of the problems of the subjectivists --- they leave too much problems for the practitioners of the theory to solve. Pei
-gts ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?list_id=303
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