It's true, a "word sense" is not a crisp thing like a part-of-speech ... it's more of a cluster among usage-instances...
Yet, this kind of fuzzy, cluster-type category does play an important role in cognition, no? ben g 2008/3/27 Stephen Reed <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > Mike, > > An interesting paper on the meanings of words is "I don't believe in word > senses" by Adam Kilgarriff. He concludes: > > Following a description of the conflict between WSD [Word Sense > Disambiguation] and lexicological research, I examined the concept, 'word > sense'. It was not found to be sufficiently well defined to be a workable > basic unit of meaning. I then presented an account of word meaning in which > 'word sense' or 'lexical unit' is not a basic unit. Rather, the basic units > are occurrences of the word in context (operationalised as corpus > citations). In the simplest case, corpus citations fall into one or more > distinct clusters and each of these clusters, if large enough and distinct > enough from other clusters, forms a distinct word sense. But many or most > cases are not simple, and even for an apparently straightforward common noun > with physical objects as denotation, handbag, there are a significant number > of aberrant citations. The interactions between a word's uses and its senses > were explored in some detail. The analysis also charted the potential for > lexical creativity. The implication for WSD is that word senses are only > ever defined relative to a set of interests. The set of senses defined by a > dictionary may or may not match the set that is relevant for an NLP [Natural > Language Processing] application. The scientific study of language should > not include word senses as objects in its ontology. Where 'word senses' have > a role to play in a scientific vocabulary, they are to be construed as > abstractions over clusters of word usages. > > Accordingly, I am attracted to Fluid Construction Grammar in my own work > because the minimal constituent in that grammar is the construction, which > in some cases can be a word, but often is not. > > You gave as an example: > > > So if I tell you to "handle" an object, or a piece of business, like say > "removing a chair from the house" - that word "handle" is open-ended and > gives you vast freedom within certain parameters as to how to apply your > hand(s) to that object. > The utterance Texai, handle removing a chair from the house would, in my > system, be processed as an imperative construction, parsing out these > discourse referring objects: > > Texai - the software agent commanded to perform the handling action > handling action - specifically, the action in which responsibility for > accomplishing the removing action is accepted > removing action - the type of removing intended by the author of the command > house - the location of the action > chair - the item to be removed > imperative situation - the enclosing utterance situation in which these > other objects are related > The Texai system, as envisioned by me to operate, would recognize this > command as a parametrized task, then either (1) find an existing skill > module capable of performing the task, or (2) composing a sequence of more > primitive skills whose combination is capable of performing the task. > > As you point out, the task may be performed directly by the agent, or > indirectly by managing the effort of some other agent. The author of the > command does not care which alternative is chosen by the commanded agent - > hence the use of the word "handle" in this construction. > > -Steve > > Stephen L. Reed > > > Artificial Intelligence Researcher > http://texai.org/blog > http://texai.org > 3008 Oak Crest Ave. > Austin, Texas, USA 78704 > 512.791.7860 > > > > ----- Original Message ---- > From: Mike Tintner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: [email protected] > Sent: Thursday, March 27, 2008 11:04:08 AM > Subject: Re: [agi] Microsoft Launches Singularity > > John, > > I'm developing this argument more fully elsewhere, so I'll just give a > partial gist. What I'm saying - and I stand to be corrected - is that I > suspect that literally no one in AI and AGI (and perhaps philosophy) present > or past understands the nature of the tools they are using. > > All the tools - all the sign systems currently used - especially language - > are actually general-purpose - AS USED BY THE HUMAN BRAIN. > > The whole point of just about every word in language is that it constitutes > a general, open brief which can be instantiated in any one of an infinite > set of ways. > > So if I tell you to "handle" an object, or a piece of business, like say > "removing a chair from the house" - that word "handle" is open-ended and > gives you vast freedom within certain parameters as to how to apply your > hand(s) to that object. Your hands can be applied to move a given box, for > example, in a vast if not infinite range of positions and trajectories. Such > a general, open concept is of the essence of general intelligence, because > it means that you are immediately ready to adapt to new kinds of situation - > if your normal ways of handling boxes are blocked, you are ready to seek out > or improvise some strange new contorted two-finger hand position to pick up > the box - which also count as "handling". (And you will have actually done a > lot of this). > > So what is the "meaning" of "handle"? Well, to be precise, it doesn't have > a/one meaning, and isn't meant to - it has a range of possible > meanings/references, and you can choose which is most convenient in the > circumstances. > > > The same principles apply to just about every word in language and every > unit of logic and mathematics. > > But - and correct me - I don't think anyone in AI/AGI is using language or > any logico-mathematical systems in this general, open-ended way - the way > they are actually meant to be used - and the very foundation of General > Intelligence. > > Language and the other systems are always used by AGI in specific ways to > have specific meanings. YKY, typically, wanted a language for his system > which had precise meanings. Even Ben, I suspect, may only employ words in an > "open" way, in that their meanings can be changed with experience - but at > any given point their meanings will have to be specific. > > To be capable of generalising as the human brain does - and of true AGI - > you have to have a brain that simultaneously processes on at least two if > not three levels, with two/three different sign systems - including both > general and particular ones. > > > > John:>> Charles: >> I don't think a General Intelligence could be built > entirely > >> out > >> of > >> >> narrow AI components, but it might well be a relatively trivial add- > >> on. > >> >> Just consider how much of human intelligence is demonstrably "narrow > >> AI" > >> >> (well, not artificial, but you know what I mean). Object > >> recognition, > >> >> e.g. Then start trying to guess how much of the part that we can't > > > >> >> prove a classification for is likely to be a narrow intelligence > >> >> component. In my estimation (without factual backing) less than > >> 0.001 > >> >> of our intelligence is General Intellignece, possibly much less. > >> >> > > >> > > >> John: I agree that it may be <1%. > > >> > > >> > >> Oh boy, does this strike me as absurd. Don't have time for the theory > >> right > >> now, but just had to vent. Percentage estimates strike me as a bit > >> silly, > >> but if you want to aim for one, why not look at both your paragraphs, > >> word > >> by word. "Don't" "think" "might" "relatively" etc. Now which of those > >> words > >> can only be applied to a single type of activity, rather than an open- > >> ended > >> set of activities? Which cannot be instantiated in an open-ended if not > >> infinite set of ways? Which is not a very valuable if not key tool of a > >> General Intelligence, that can adapt to solve problems across domains? > >> Language IOW is the central (but not essential) instrument of human > >> general > >> intelligence - and I can't think offhand of a single world that is not a > >> tool for generalising across domains, including "Charles H." and "John > >> G.". > >> > >> In fact, every tool you guys use - logic, maths etc. - is similarly > >> general > >> and functions in similar ways. The above strikes me as a 99% failure to > >> understand the nature of general intelligence. > >> > > > > Mike you are 100% potentially right with a margin of error of 110%. LOL! > > > > Seriously Mike how do YOU indicate approximations? And how are you > > differentiating general and specific? And declaring relative absolutes and > > convenient infinitudes... I'm trying to understand your argument. > > > > John > > > > ------------------------------------------- > > agi > > Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > > RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ > > Modify Your Subscription: > > http://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > > > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > > > > > > > > -- > > No virus found in this incoming message. > > Checked by AVG. > > Version: 7.5.519 / Virus Database: 269.22.1/1345 - Release Date: 3/26/2008 > > 6:50 PM > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------- > agi > Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ > Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > > > ________________________________ > Never miss a thing. Make Yahoo your homepage. > ________________________________ > > agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "If men cease to believe that they will one day become gods then they will surely become worms." -- Henry Miller ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=98558129-0bdb63 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
