PS-- I have thought of a weak argument: If a fact is not probabilistically learnable, then it is hard to see how it has much significance for an AI design. A non-learnable fact won't reliably change the performance of the AI, since if it did, it would be learnable. Furthermore, even if there were *some* important nonlearnable facts, it still seems like significant self-improvements could be made using only probabilistically learned facts. And, since the amount of time spent testing cases is a huge factor, RSI will not stop except due to limited memory, even in a relatively boring environment (unless the AI makes a rational decision to stop using resources on RSI since it has found a solution that is probably optimal).
On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 11:25 AM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Matt, > > Ok, you have me, I admit defeat. > > I could only continue my argument if I could pin down what sorts of > facts need to be learned with high probability for RSI, and show > somehow that this set does not include unlearnable facts. Learnable > facts form a larger set than provable facts, since for example we can > probabilistically declare that a program never halts if we run it for > a while and it doesn't. But there are certain facts that are not even > probabilistically learnable, so until I can show that none of these > are absolutely essential to RSI, I concede. > > --Abram Demski > > On Wed, Aug 27, 2008 at 6:48 PM, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>>First, I do not think it is terribly difficult to define a Goedel >>>machine that does not halt. It interacts with its environment, and >>>there is some utility value attached to this interaction, and it >>>attempts to rewrite its code to maximize this utility. >> >> It's not that the machine halts, but that it makes no further improvements >> once the best solution is found. This might not be a practical concern if >> the environment is very complex. >> >> However, I doubt that a Goedel machine could even be built. Legg showed [1] >> that Goedel incompleteness is ubiquitous. To paraphrase, beyond some low >> level of complexity, you can't prove anything. Perhaps this is the reason we >> have not (AFAIK) built a software model, even for very simple sets of axioms. >> >> If we resort to probabilistic evidence of improvement rather than proofs, >> then it is no longer a Goedel machine, and I think we would need >> experimental verification of RSI. Random modifications of code are much more >> likely to be harmful than helpful, so we would need to show that >> improvements could be detected with a very low false positive rate. >> >> 1. http://www.vetta.org/documents/IDSIA-12-06-1.pdf >> >> >> -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] >> >> >> >> ----- Original Message ---- >> From: Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> To: [email protected] >> Sent: Wednesday, August 27, 2008 11:40:24 AM >> Subject: Re: Goedel machines (was Re: Information theoretic approaches to >> AGI (was Re: [agi] The Necessity of Embodiment)) >> >> Matt, >> >> Thanks for the reply. There are 3 reasons that I can think of for >> calling Goedel machines "bounded": >> >> 1. As you assert, once a solution is found, it stops. >> 2. It will be on a finite computer, so it will eventually reach the >> one best version of itself that it can reach. >> 3. It can only make provably correct steps, which is very limiting >> thanks to Godel's incompleteness theorem. >> >> I'll try to argue that each of these limits can be overcome in >> principle, and we'll see if the result satisfies your RSI criteria. >> >> First, I do not think it is terribly difficult to define a Goedel >> machine that does not halt. It interacts with its environment, and >> there is some utility value attached to this interaction, and it >> attempts to rewrite its code to maximize this utility. >> >> The second and third need to be tackled together, because the main >> reason that a Goedel machine can't improve its own hardware is because >> there is uncertainty involved, so it would never be provably better. >> There is always some chance of hardware malfunction. So, I think it is >> necessary to grant the possibility of modifications that are merely >> very probably correct. Once this is done, 2 and 3 fall fairly easily, >> assuming that the machine begins life with a good probabilistic >> learning system. That is a big assumption, but we can grant it for the >> moment I think? >> >> For the sake of concreteness, let's say that the utility value is some >> (probably very complex) attempt to logically describe Eliezer-style >> Friendliness, and that the probabilistic learning system is an >> approximation of AIXI (which the system will improve over time along >> with everything else). (These two choices don't reflect my personal >> tastes, they are just examples.) >> >> By tweaking the allowances the system makes, we might either have a >> slow self-improver that is, say, 99.999% probable to only improve >> itself in the next 100 years, or a faster self-improver that is 50% >> guaranteed. >> >> Does this satisfy your criteria? >> >> On Wed, Aug 27, 2008 at 9:14 AM, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>>>Matt, >>>> >>>>What is your opinion on Goedel machines? >>>> >>>> http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/goedelmachine.html >>> >>> >>> Thanks for the link. If I understand correctly, this is a form of bounded >>> RSI, so it could not lead to a singularity. A Goedel machine is >>> functionally equivalent to AIXI^tl in that it finds the optimal >>> reinforcement learning solution given a fixed environment and utility >>> function. The difference is that AIXI^tl does a brute force search of all >>> machines up to length l for time t each, so it run in O(t 2^l) time. A >>> Goedel machine achieves the same result more efficiently through a series >>> of self improvments by proving that each proposed modification (including >>> modifications to its own proof search code) is a actual improvement. It >>> does this by using an instruction set such that it is impossible to >>> construct incorrect proof verification code. >>> >>> What I am looking for is unbounded RSI capable of increasing intelligence. >>> A Goedel machine doesn't do this because once it finds a solution, it >>> stops. This is the same problem as a chess playing program that plays >>> randomly modified copies of itself in death matches. At some point, it >>> completely solves the chess problem and stops improving. >>> >>> Ideally we should use a scalable test for intelligence such as Legg and >>> Hutter's universal intelligence, which measures expected accumulated reward >>> over a Solomonoff distribution of environments (random programs). We can't >>> compute this exactly because it requires testing an infinite number of >>> environments, but we can approximate it to arbitrary precision by randomly >>> sampling environments. >>> >>> RSI would require a series of increasingly complex test environments >>> because otherwise there is an exact solution such that RSI would stop once >>> found. For any environment with Kolmogorov complexity l, and agent can >>> guess all environments up to length l. But this means that RSI cannot be >>> implemented by a Turing machine because a parent with complexity l cannot >>> test its children because it cannot create environments with complexity >>> greater than l. >>> >>> RSI would be possible with a true source of randomness. A parent could >>> create arbitrarily complex environments by flipping a coin. In practice, we >>> usually ignore the difference between pseudo-random sources and true random >>> sources. But in the context of Turing machines that can execute exponential >>> complexity algorithms efficiently, we can't do this because the child could >>> easily guess the parent's generator, which has low complexity. >>> >>> One could argue that the real universe does have true random sources, such >>> as quantum mechanics. I am not convinced. The universe does have a definite >>> quantum state, but it is not possible to know it because a memory within >>> the universe cannot have more information than the universe. Therefore, any >>> theory of physics must appear random. >>> -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] >>> >>> >>> >>> ----- Original Message ---- >>> From: Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >>> To: [email protected] >>> Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 3:30:59 PM >>> Subject: Re: Information theoretic approaches to AGI (was Re: [agi] The >>> Necessity of Embodiment) >>> >>> Matt, >>> >>> What is your opinion on Goedel machines? >>> >>> http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/goedelmachine.html >>> >>> --Abram >>> >>> On Sun, Aug 24, 2008 at 5:46 PM, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>>> Eric Burton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>>>These have profound impacts on AGI design. First, AIXI is (provably) not >>>>>>computable, >>>>>>which means there is no easy shortcut to AGI. Second, universal >>>>>>intelligence is not >>>>>>computable because it requires testing in an infinite number of >>>>>>environments. Since >>>>>>there is no other well accepted test of intelligence above human level, >>>>>>it casts doubt on >>>>>>the main premise of the singularity: that if humans can create agents >>>>>>with greater than >>>>>>human intelligence, then so can they. >>>>> >>>>>I don't know for sure that these statements logically follow from one >>>>>another. >>>> >>>> They don't. I cannot prove that there is no non-evolutionary model of >>>> recursive self improvement (RSI). Nor can I prove that there is. But it is >>>> a question we need to answer before an evolutionary model becomes >>>> technically feasible, because an evolutionary model is definitely >>>> unfriendly. >>>> >>>>>Higher intelligence bootstrapping itself has already been proven on >>>>>Earth. Presumably it can happen in a simulation space as well, right? >>>> >>>> If you mean the evolution of humans, that is not an example of RSI. One >>>> requirement of friendly AI is that an AI cannot alter its human-designed >>>> goals. (Another is that we get the goals right, which is unsolved). >>>> However, in an evolutionary environment, the parents do not get to choose >>>> the goals of their children. Evolution chooses goals that maximize >>>> reproductive fitness, regardless of what you want. >>>> >>>> I have challenged this list as well as the singularity and SL4 lists to >>>> come up with an example of a mathematical, software, biological, or >>>> physical example of RSI, or at least a plausible argument that one could >>>> be created, and nobody has. To qualify, an agent has to modify itself or >>>> create a more intelligent copy of itself according to an intelligence test >>>> chosen by the original. The following are not examples of RSI: >>>> >>>> 1. Evolution of life, including humans. >>>> 2. Emergence of language, culture, writing, communication technology, and >>>> computers. >>>> 3. A chess playing (or tic-tac-toe, or factoring, or SAT solving) program >>>> that makes modified copies of itself by >>>> randomly flipping bits in a compressed representation of its source >>>> code, and playing its copies in death matches. >>>> 4. Selective breeding of children for those that get higher grades in >>>> school. >>>> 5. Genetic engineering of humans for larger brains. >>>> >>>> 1 fails because evolution is smarter than all of human civilization if you >>>> measure intelligence in bits of memory. A model of evolution uses 10^37 >>>> bits (10^10 bits of DNA per cell x 10^14 cells in the human body x 10^10 >>>> humans x 10^3 ratio of biomass to human mass). Human civilization has at >>>> most 10^25 bits (10^15 synapses in the human brain x 10^10 humans). >>>> >>>> 2 fails because individual humans are not getting smarter with each >>>> generation, at least not nearly as fast as civilization is advancing. >>>> Rather, there are more humans, and we are getting better organized through >>>> specialization of tasks. Human brains are not much different than they >>>> were 10,000 years ago. >>>> >>>> 3 fails because there are no known classes of problems that are provably >>>> hard to solve but easy to verify. Tic-tac-toe and chess have bounded >>>> complexity. It has not been proven that factoring is harder than >>>> multiplication. We don't know that P != NP, and even if we did, many >>>> NP-complete problems have special cases that are easy to solve, and we >>>> don't know how to program the parent to avoid these cases through >>>> successive generations. >>>> >>>> 4 fails because there is no evidence that above a certain level (about IQ >>>> 200) that childhood intelligence correlates with adult success. The >>>> problem is that adults of average intelligence can't agree on how success >>>> should be measured*. >>>> >>>> 5 fails for the same reason. >>>> >>>> *For example, the average person recognizes Einstein as a genius not >>>> because they are >>>> awed by his theories of general relativity, but because other people >>>> have said so. If you just read his papers (without understanding their >>>> great insights) and knew that he never learned to drive a car, you might >>>> conclude differently. >>>> >>>> -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------- >>>> agi >>>> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now >>>> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ >>>> Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?& >>>> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com >>>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------- >>> agi >>> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now >>> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ >>> Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?& >>> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------- >>> agi >>> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now >>> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ >>> Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?& >>> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com >>> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------- >> agi >> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now >> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ >> Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?& >> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------- >> agi >> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now >> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ >> Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?& >> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com >> > ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=111637683-c8fa51 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
