[Comment: Aren't logic and common sense *opposed*?]
Discursive [logical, propositional] Knowledge vs Practical [tacit] Knowledge
http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/working-papers/wp24mcanulla.pdf
a) Knowledge: practical and discursive
Most, if not all understandings of tradition stress the way in which
knowledge and beliefs are transmitted or transferred over time. However, as
we have seen, different perspectives place varying emphases on the types of
knowledge and belief being transferred. Some make practical and tacit
knowledge primary, others make rational and/or intellectual knowledge forms
of knowledge central. However, in principle there is no reason to assume
that both types of knowledge are not important to tradition. Yet to maintain
this necessitates examining to what extent these kind of knowledge are
distinct and/or compatible. It will be suggested below that we might gain a
better grasp of traditions by making a clear distinction between the
different types of knowledge they can transmit. Stompka's unpacking of the
objects of tradition into material and ideal components is instructive here.
For this draws our attention to examine not just the relations between the
different ideas within traditions, but also the relations between people and
the physical objects relevant to a tradition. Drawing on realist social
theory, I suggest drawing a distinction between practical and discursive
forms of knowledge3.
Practical knowledge
. Centrally concerns subject-object relations e.g. someone's skill in using
a bottle-opener
. Primarily tacit in content, as it involves engaging with reality through
activity and dealings with artifacts (rather than manipulating symbols)
. Cognitive content entails non-verbal theorising and development of skills
(rather than enunciation of propositions) (Archer, 2000: 166)
Practical knowledge emerges from our active engagement with the world of
objects. In this view pre-verbal practical action is the way in which
infants learn principles of logical reasoning. Learning these principles in
a is necessary and prior to discursive socialisation and the acquisition of
language. However, there is no reason to believe that such non-linguistic
forms of practical action cease following the learning of language (Archer,
2000: 153). Indeed the practical skills we develop often do not depend in a
direct way upon language e.g. our abilities to use a bottle opener, or to
control car gears through use of a clutch, are something we gain a 'feel'
for. The best kinds of car-user instruction manual do not of themselves help
develop many of the practical skills we need for driving. As such practical
knowledge is regulated by our relations with material culture i.e. the
objects and artifacts we encounter (ibid. 166) Practical knowledge is thus
implicit and tacit, gained through activity rather than through engaging
with linguistic propositions or discursive symbols. When practical knowledge
is transmitted (e.g. in the form of tradition) it is done so in the form of
'apprenticeship' where skilled individual e.g. Mastercraftsmen or a
Professional demonstrates good practice and offers practical criticism and
evaluation (ibid. 176) Once such skills are acquired, the use of such
practical knowledge often becomes 'second nature'.
Discursive knowledge
. Centrally concerns subject-subject relations and linguistic communication
. Consists of theories, arguments, social norms and their propositional
formulation (Archer, 2000: 173-176)
. Consist of linguistically generated meaning and symbols
Discursive knowledge is developed through our linguistic powers to
communicate meaningfully and to attribute meanings to our relations. Thus
discursive knowledge may consist of theories, arguments, social norms and
the kinds of propositions associated with them (e.g. 'maximum liberty
requires a minimal state'). The ideas contained within discursive knowledge
stand in logical relationship to one another and can usually be represented
in propositional forms. It is through discursive knowledge that we develop
and maintain ideational commitments to particular doctrines, theories or
world-views (Archer, 2000: 173-176). Discursive knowledge can act to
constrain and/or enable our projects as actors in the world. In turn, this
discursive knowledge can be elaborated or transformed as a result of our
socio-linguistic interactions. Discursive knowledge is transmitted, or
handed down (e.g. within tradition) through 'scholarship', the teaching of
linguistically encoded theories and propositions.
b) The interaction between practical and discursive knowledge
If such a distinction between practical and discursive knowledge is accepted
then it is clear that traditions may vary in the extent to which they
consist of each type. For example, a tradition of British farming would
clearly involve a high element of practical knowledge. Conversely, an
academic tradition, such as 'analytic' philosophy, primarily consists of
discursive knowledge. At the same time many other traditions we might pick
out, such as 'British Labourism' may contain significant elements of both
practical and discursive knowledge.
If we accept that our traditions may contain these distinct types of
knowledge a key question is, how do these distinct types of knowledge relate
to one another? To what extent do they interrelate or 'translate' into one
another? Pierre Bourdieu argues that the practical knowledge cannot be
translated into discursive knowledge (echoing certain of Oakeshott's
themes). For Bourdieu, practical and tacit knowledge is simply
incommensurable with discursive knowledge (Archer, 2000: 151). He argues
practice has a logic of immediacy, urgency and pragmatic common sense which
stands opposed to logic of the logician. In Bourdieu's view it is 'a logic
of practice that flouts logical logic' (Bourdieu, 1990: 86, quoted in
Archer, 2000: 151)
In contrast, Archer believes that it is possible to have a significant (but
nowhere near exhaustive) degree of translation between practical and
discursive knowledge. Indeed, she suggests this is exactly what people are
doing in constructing discursive guides for practical action, such as maps
and sheet music. Thus tacit knowledge can be used and 'converted' to
explicitly 14
codify practices over time. Often discursive knowledge (e.g. in the form of
new theory) is developed with the hope of modifying or improving practices.
In turn, changes in practices and development of new skills sometimes prompt
new discursive representations. However, such translation may not be easy,
or in some instances possible. New theories may not 'work' in practice and
some practices may defy clear discursive articulation. For example extensive
skills in reading music (discursive knowledge) will not improve the playing
of someone who lacks 'feel' for his or her instrument (practical knowledge)
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agi
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