Sherlock wrote:
Goethe, can you explain precisely why you believe the Speaker is not an = office, other than game custom? In the absence of any hard rules stating t= hat distinction, I think we should stick with R1450, which suggests strongl= y that the Speaker is an office.
Oh yikes, I notice from the FLR history that R1450 should have been changed in power from 1 to 2. If this is correct, that changes my arguments, and I agree with Maud! Michael, can you confirm that R1450 was in fact upmutated to power-2? My argument was predicated on R1450 being the lowest power among the conflicting rules in question. (Also note this in any proposals to change it). I was weighing a bungled re-write of the lowest-powered Rule of the group, R1450 (I wrote it without the intent of making the Speakership an office, and the strong intent that it wasn't an office) with the weight of R101, R103, R402, and R1006(first and last paragraphs), all which strongly imply that "Speakership" is different in mechanics than offices. All the other offices have the strong "X is an office, the holder is responsible for..." wording. I don't see why a judge can't reasonably require certain categories to require strong definitions: e.g. say "officership is important enough that we should require a direct, strong definition rather following the incidental phrasing of an ancillary, low-powered rule." If R1450 isn't in fact low-powered this alters the argument. Given two reasonable arguments, I was weighing the relative magnitude of the breakages. For example, accepting speaker=office would place replacement methods of the speaker in R402 and office-replacement methods in R1006 in conflict. -Goethe
