On Mon, May 12, 2008 at 7:46 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 12 May 2008, comex wrote:
> > You have not opposed the position that, because there is one party,
> > any judgement is equitable, therefore reasonably equitable, therefore
> > appropriate; in which case there would be no "serious doubt about the
> > appropriateness of the prior judgement".
>
> Er, from my text:
> > Ultimately, it the responsibility of the Courts to decide
> > what is equitable, and this power and duty extends to the Appeals board,
> > even if a single (or every) party in an equity case is satisfied with
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > the initial judgement.
>
> "single (or every)" covers the case where single = every.
To clarify: You have addressed the position that the judgement must be
equitable because everyone consented, which I agree is not a valid
conclusion in Agora. What the parties think about the judgement is
irrelevant. But reading the argument, this is the *only* position you
have addressed.
I was referring to the case that there cannot be unfairness within a
set of one. From m-w 'equity':
having or exhibiting equity : dealing fairly and equally with all
concerned <an equitable settlement of the dispute>
Since the dispute is purely between members of the contract, which
party is being treated better or worse than another?
How about the grammar argument?
A judgement is appropriate if and only if it is a reasonably
equitable resolution of the situation at hand with respect to
the matters raised in the initiation of the case and by the
parties in the course of the case.
Does this mean the judgement must be "reasonably equitable" and a
"resolution of the situation at hand with respect to the matters
raised"?
It could also be parsed as
- the judgement must be a "reasonably equitable resolution" of "the
situation at hand with respect to the matters raised", in which case
it is easy to argue that it can be an equitable resolution of
something while also being something else (in this case, a contest).
Or how about
- the judgement must be a "reasonably equitable resolution of the
situation at hand" "with respect to the matters raised"-- that is to
say, the rule says nothing about what it is with respect to other
matters, but only that with respect to the matters raised it is a
reasonably equitable resolution (which ais523's judgement of CFJ 1932
is).
Although there is "serious doubt" about the appropriateness of the
prior judgement, it is important to consider the effect of a REASSIGN
here. In any normal judicial case (even a criminal case), by the
design of the appeal system, REASSIGN will simply appoint a new judge
who will either assign the same judgement or a different one depending
on whether e found a flaw in the original judge's reasoning.
Therefore, the appeal panel's reasoning need not be particularly
sound; indeed, it should only take the argument to its conclusion and
OVERRULE if the original judgement was clearly wrong. Otherwise, an
appeal panel-- usually-- should consider itself satisfied when it has
demonstrated that the original arguments might be problematic.
But, of course, the scam here is in the judgement itself. If the CFJ
is REASSIGNed, even a judge who thought that ais523's judgement was
equitable could and probably would assign a simpler equitable
judgement. Although the equity CFJ may get more time in court, it
will have already been lost from the points of view of root and ais.
It is not the way of Agora to punish a successful scam.
I therefore suggest that the appeal panel EITHER
a) demonstrate that the scam is very unlikely to be an appropriate
judgement (regardless of whether or not it worked), or
b) call an inquiry case on whether the judgement was appropriate, and
postpone the appeal judgement until the inquiry case, which can be
appealed and reassigned without penalty, has been resolved.
For the record, I reiterate my belief that, while the judgement is
equitable and appropriate, its claim to be a contest is not valid.
