On Thu, 20 Nov 2008, Alex Smith wrote:
> Imagine R1 saying "Goethe CAN deregister by paying
> 1 Stem" and R2 saying "Goethe CANNOT deregister";
Both of these are claims on what can and can't be done by an action,
and neither defines the state of (de)registration. It's a bad example.
A better example is: R1 says "Voting Index Is a number." R2 says
"Goethe CAN set the Voting index to Green Cheese." I'm claiming
that this basic definition "is a number" is an (albeit implicit) claim
of precedence. Why can I claim that? Well...
> When there's an obvious direct conflict
> between two rules, as there is here, there isn't an implicit claim of
> precedence on either; there's an explicit clash, and the more powerful
> rule, or the rule with the lower number, takes precedence.
An important missing piece in your argument is that I used R1586 to
argue for definitional preference. R2 is actually in conflict with R1586
as well as R1. In particular from R1586:
"then that
entity and its properties continue to exist to whatever extent
is possible under the new definitions."
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
It is not possible for the Voting Index to be Green Cheese under its
definition as a number. As R2 would allow me to set it against the R1
"new definitions", R2 is in conflict with R1586 (and in the current case,
by numerical precedence, R1586 wins).
Finally, we're *both* making implicit claims. You're claiming the fact
that someone CAN set a numerical index to Green Cheese is an implicit
definition that the numerical index has a defined green cheese state.
I'm saying that the definition implicitly claims precedence (which only
works at the same Power to override numerical precedence) and forbids
a green cheese state under R1586 as it is not possible under the new
definitions. I still find my implicit claim far less of a stretch than
yours.
-Goethe
