On Thu, 2010-01-14 at 09:24 -0800, Kerim Aydin wrote: > In a greater sense, here's my conceptual problem with ratification. > We've said (I think in a court case?) that if a ratification occurs on > a report describes a state that is IMPOSSIBLE in a continuous sense > (e.g. setting an asset to a negative quantity) then the reality > "reasserts" itself. However, once a vote is cast and past the voting > period, it is equally IMPOSSIBLE factually to change it (change the > past) so why doesn't reality reassert itself in this case, too? Although I don't believe in the reasserting-reality interpretation, just using a logical argument I come to the same conclusion as you. The problem is with "assume this incorrect thing were true"; subjunctive arguments are nearly always difficult or impossible to establish the truth of. (Remember that, from a contradiction, anything follows!)
> This brings it back to my original question. What ratification is > ask us to act as if the IMPOSSIBLE were true. So if the rules were > changed such that ratification of an IMPOSSIBLE state was the only way > to adopt proposals, it would still mean rules changes were > IMPOSSIBLE, but just that we accept that the impossible happened > through self-ratification. So would R1698 act to keep such said > changes from happening? This question may be wholly a semantic one, > but it's a semantic interpretation that affects the operation of R1698. Valid point, I'm pretty convinced that ratification is broken, now. (Possibly by being too ambiguous to have an effect.) I still don't think the general concept of ratification is too weak to provide a mechanism around 1698; but the specific implementation we have at the moment may be. -- ais523
