Main problem is that Assessor and Rulekeepor are really demanding for different reasons and it may be difficult to get someone to fill a combined role consistently.
On Jul 8, 2017 16:16, "Cuddle Beam" <cuddleb...@gmail.com> wrote: > "Ghost" Rulesets like the one we have now are disorientating. > > Proto: > Merge Assesor and Rulekeepor, and have them publish the new ruleset once a > proposal amending it is enacted. > > On Sat, Jul 8, 2017 at 10:56 PM, Aris Merchant <thoughtsoflifeandlight17@ > gmail.com> wrote: > >> Judge's arguments for CFJ 3532: >> >> This call for judgment inquires whether the "existing solely" clause >> (hereinafter The Clause) of Rule 2166, which defines assets, prevents >> assets >> referenced by multiple rules from existing. I turn first to the relevant >> text >> of the rule, which is as follows: >> >> An asset is an entity defined as such by a rule (hereafter its backing >> document), and existing solely because its backing document defines its >> existence. >> >> Clearly The Clause prevents, say, the sun from being defined as an asset. >> This >> is good, because if the sun could be an asset the rules might make it >> destructible, and then we'd be forced to accept, for game purposes, that >> there >> was no sun. It would be even more problematic if we accepted persons, and >> therefore players, as assets. Obviously the rules are free to make such >> definitions anyway (although we might argue over whether they would have >> any >> effect, considering the interests of the game). However, in the past >> we've allowed contracts to define assets, explaining the necessity of such >> restrictions. >> >> The Clause prevents another class of situations as well. It prevents >> two different rules from defining the same asset. In older forms, it has >> done >> the same for a rule and a contract (CFJs 1922-1923). The question raised >> here is >> whether even referencing an asset would create such a situation. This >> raises >> interesting questions about the way we interpret the rules. It has long >> been >> understood that even if a term used in the rules is undefined, we are >> obliged to >> try our best to figure out what it means. Thus, even without the rule >> defining >> shinies, we would "interpret them into existence". Without shinies, >> pending >> would be impossible, and we would be unable to pay out salaries, among >> other >> problems. So, it is apparent that we might consider shinies existent even >> without the intervention of their defining rule, arguably triggering The >> Clause. >> >> The historical interpretation of The Clause, however, does not support >> this >> argument. There are no precedents that clearly apply to this situation, >> although >> in CFJ 3381 the Honorable Judge ais523 appears to assume in passing that >> such >> things are possible. But our current situation is not unprecedented, >> there are >> merely no applicable _judicial_ precedents. Rule 2166 is not a new rule. >> It was, >> in fact, a rather aged rule at time it was repealed, and it only seems >> new to >> us because of its recent reenactment. One example of a similar situation >> is the >> point, which was the general unit of currency under this [1] ruleset. I >> can find >> no record of anyone complaining that they didn't exist. >> >> If we were to ignore history, would we find? Well, the idea that we >> interpret >> terms in the rules in a way that gives them effect is largely a matter of >> tradition. No rule says that, in the absence of a definition from either >> conventional English or the rules, we have to try to interpret the rules >> the way >> they are intended to be read. Another consideration is the interests of >> the >> game; certainly it would seem to be in the game's best interest to have a >> definition for shinies, and all of the clarifications of their behavior >> that >> come with it. >> >> I know all the Platonists (if that is the right term, perhaps Logicians >> would >> be better) in the crowd out jeering at me for refusing to consider the >> matter >> logically, a priori, from the wording on up. I will therefore close with >> two >> arguments that I hope will placate them. First, the doctrine that the >> rules and >> the terms in them must be given meaning in accordance with common sense >> exists >> to make the game playable. If every typo or invented but undefined term >> stopped >> the game, then the game would long since have ended. We have to keep >> playing, >> and in order to keep playing, we often need to interpret the rules the >> way they >> are intended to be read. The core thesis of the doctrine is that the >> rules need >> to have their common sense meaning; using it to rob the rules of what >> they are >> plainly intended to mean violates that principle. It would essentially be >> using >> the doctrine to violate its own basis for existence. >> >> Second, and perhaps most convincingly, the argument that the rules >> conflict >> with each other is only valid under circumstances that are themselves >> internally >> inconsistent. If we view the rules Platonically/logically, then only one >> rule >> attempts to define assets. If we consider the rules >> Pragmatically/legally, then >> their common sense intent shines through. It is only when we look at one >> rule >> one way and another rule another way that a contradiction between rules >> arises. >> As it is a longstanding principle of rule interpretation that, if >> reasonably >> possible, we will attempt to construe the rules so that no contradiction >> occurs, >> it is sensible to here use the only consistent interpretation, which also >> happens to be the only one that doesn't violate the plain meaning of any >> of >> the rules in question. >> >> I conclude my judgment by noting that there may in fact be one judicial >> precedent that has some real bearing on this situation. Once there was a >> contract that defined an asset called a "prop". I don't really know the >> details >> of the situation, but even after the contract stopped existing, people >> still >> acted like props existed. They were informally handed around and reported >> on, >> as if they still existed. Later that contract was brought back, and a CFJ >> was >> called to inquire into whether The Clause prevented them from being >> assets. >> I realize that this is completely different from our current situation, >> and >> that principles of rule interpretation are stronger and more established >> than most informal traditions. Still, both are matters of tradition and >> the collective imagination, and the fact remains that the one line verdict >> of CFJ 2344, which to the best of my knowledge has not been overturned, >> judged >> that props were a valid asset. >> >> I judge CFJ 3532 TRUE. >> >> [1] https://mailman.agoranomic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/private/agora >> -official/2008-July/004749.html >> >> -Aris >> > >
