On Fri, 26 Jun 2020 at 16:08, Kerim Aydin via agora-discussion <agora-discussion@agoranomic.org> wrote: > On 6/26/2020 8:49 AM, Publius Scribonius Scholasticus wrote: > > On 6/19/20 8:26 PM, Kerim Aydin via agora-official wrote: > >> The below CFJ is 3851. I assign it to Publius Scribonius Scholasticus. > >> > >> status: https://faculty.washington.edu/kerim/nomic/cases/#3851 > >> > >> =============================== CFJ 3851 =============================== > >> > >> R. Lee attempted to perform a forbidden action in the message in > >> evidence. > >> > >> ========================================================================== > >> Caller: G. > >> Barred: R. Lee > >> > >> Judge: Publius Scribonius Scholasticus > >> > >> ========================================================================== > >> > >> History: > >> > >> Called by G.: 19 Jun 2020 02:49:52 > >> Assigned to Publius Scribonius Scholasticus: [now] > >> > >> ========================================================================== > > First, let's look at the common language definition of "attempt", one of > > which is "[To] make an effort to achieve or complete".[0] By this > > definition, it seems clear that, since an intent is an effort to > > complete the intended action, R. Lee did attempt to perform a forbidden > > action; however, we should also look to the use of "attempt" as a term > > of art in jurisprudence. Here, we find possibly conflicting definitions: > > "Any act that is more than merely preparatory to the intended commission > > of a crime"[1] and "the crime of having the intent to commit and taking > > action in an effort to commit a crime that fails or is prevented".[2] > > The second of these is clearly fulfilled as R. Lee stated eir intent > > publicly and took action towards the commission of the crime, but the > > first rests upon whether the intent was "merely preparatory". Given that > > the statement of intent was a necessary condition for the later > > commission of the crime and could not have reasonably served any other > > purpose, I find that the intent was more than merely preparatory. Given > > that the three definitions are agreeable with respect to the > > circumstances, we need not further analyze which is best to use. As a > > result, I assign a judgment of TRUE to CFJ 3851. > > > > Actuallly.... I forgot about this, but I thought of something else here. > > I took it for granted that changing the ruleset below Power=4 to "Meep" > would ossify agora. However, this would remove the explicit definition of > contract, which would make the document (potentially) a "common-law" > agreement that in Agoran custom, could be modified by the consent of all > parties. > > And we'd still have the description of agora in Rules 101 and 1689. > > And you can make various arguments like - R101 still tells us a little > about the pieces we need to change an agreement (parties and an agreed > forum). Before the change we knew who the parties were, and we didn't > explicitly change that so they're the same; before the change we knew what > "public" meant, so that's still a common-law method of determining proof > of consent, etc. Also noting the recent judgement (on shines) that found > that rules-terms could persist in custom more than previously allowed. > > Or just tell me I'm silly and obviously the change would ossify agora, > that's fine too... > > -G.
I've thought it would be interesting to play a Nomic that starts with just one simple rule with text like "This is a Nomic; figure the rest out.". Or just on rules written down explicitly. It doesn't sound that silly for Agora to still work with just the power-4 rules plus Meeps. The rules sort of say "There are fora; you say your actions over the fora; proposals change the gamestate; here's an example "fountain" rule some people made; now go have fun!" Given the absence of other guidance, R1698 might be interpreted as implying that the players can adopt proposals, and that they take effect unless they would ossify Agora. - Falsifian
