Detail: http://zenith.homelinux.net/cotc/viewcase.php?cfj=2768
=================== CFJ 2768 (Interest Index = 0) ====================
The IBA is a person.
========================================================================
Caller: Yally
Judge: G.
Judgement: UNDETERMINED
Appeal: 2768a
Decision: REASSIGN
Judge: coppro
Judgement: FALSE
========================================================================
History:
Called by Yally: 27 Feb 2010 00:17:48 GMT
Assigned to G.: 27 Feb 2010 17:05:40 GMT
Judged UNDETERMINED by G.: 01 Mar 2010 16:23:36 GMT
Appealed by comex: 02 Mar 2010 01:13:08 GMT
Appealed by coppro: 02 Mar 2010 01:27:16 GMT
Appealed by Yally: 02 Mar 2010 02:35:36 GMT
Appeal 2768a: 02 Mar 2010 02:35:36 GMT
REASSIGNED on Appeal: 06 Mar 2010 19:24:47 GMT
Assigned to comex: 06 Mar 2010 20:11:51 GMT
comex recused: 12 Mar 2010 17:23:07 GMT
Assigned to coppro: 14 Mar 2010 09:04:16 GMT
Judged FALSE by coppro: 21 Mar 2010 19:55:20 GMT
========================================================================
Judge G.'s Arguments:
With absolutely no caller's arguments nor cite to the long case-law
on personhood, or a single reference to events that may or may not
have made this entity a person, the caller has not done even the
merest preliminary level of reasonable homework to allow the judge
to have a start on this case. UNDETERMINED.
========================================================================
Judge coppro's Arguments:
CFJ 2768 is a simple case. Rule 2150 says "A person is an entity defined
as such by rules with power of at least 2." There is no rule defining
the IBA to be a person; therefore it s not one.
========================================================================
Detail: http://zenith.homelinux.net/cotc/viewcase.php?cfj=2769
=================== CFJ 2769 (Interest Index = 0) ====================
The IBA is a player.
========================================================================
Caller: Yally
Judge: G.
Judgement: UNDETERMINED
Appeal: 2769a
Decision: REASSIGN
Judge: coppro
Judgement: TRUE
========================================================================
History:
Called by Yally: 27 Feb 2010 00:17:48 GMT
Assigned to G.: 27 Feb 2010 17:05:40 GMT
Judged UNDETERMINED by G.: 01 Mar 2010 16:28:08 GMT
Appealed by comex: 02 Mar 2010 01:13:08 GMT
Appealed by coppro: 02 Mar 2010 01:27:16 GMT
Appealed by Yally: 02 Mar 2010 02:35:36 GMT
Appeal 2769a: 02 Mar 2010 02:35:36 GMT
REASSIGNED on Appeal: 06 Mar 2010 19:24:47 GMT
Assigned to comex: 06 Mar 2010 20:11:51 GMT
comex recused: 12 Mar 2010 17:23:07 GMT
Assigned to coppro: 14 Mar 2010 09:04:16 GMT
Judged TRUE by coppro: 21 Mar 2010 19:55:20 GMT
========================================================================
Judge G.'s Arguments:
UNDETERMINED (see CFJ 2768). -G.
========================================================================
Judge coppro's Arguments:
CFJs 2769 and 2772, which are effectively identical, are a stickier
issue. They question whether or not the IBA ceased to be an entity and
thus a player when the rules defining contracts were repealed. The
definition of a contract was, prior to the repeal of Rule 1742, "[a
binding agreement] goverened by the rules". This is key because it sets
a fundamental principle that the rules did not provide for contracts'
existence, merely their governance.
Binding agreements not governed by the rules can and do exist, and are
therefore valid Agoran entities. By legal convention, a binding
agreement (I will avoid the term 'contract' when referring to real-world
agreements) needs no physical existence; it can exist without any
document behind it, such as when an agreement is formed at a grocery
store to purchase a box of donuts.
Rule 1586 provides for a means for an entity to cease to exist if the
document backing it no longer defines that entity, but the real-world
law of binding agreements indicates that agreements exist without any
backing document; a document may exist to clarify the agreement, but it
is not fatal to the existence of the agreement if the document is lost
or destroyed. There are a few cases where a textual agreement is
required for it to be enforceable (see the Statute of Frauds), but the
lack of a text copy is not always fatal to the agreement (G 400 Holdings
Ltd. v. Yeoman Development Company Limited, 2008 ABQB 667)
In light of this, I find that the IBA and contracts in general did not
cease to exist as entities when Rule 1742 was repealed, although they
did cease to be subject generally to Agoran law. Accordingly, I judge
CFJs 2769 and 2772 to both be TRUE.
========================================================================
Detail: http://zenith.homelinux.net/cotc/viewcase.php?cfj=2772
=================== CFJ 2772 (Interest Index = 0) ====================
The IBA is a player
========================================================================
Caller: ais523
Judge: coppro
Judgement: TRUE
========================================================================
History:
Called by ais523: 01 Mar 2010 17:36:28 GMT
Assigned to comex: 06 Mar 2010 16:41:58 GMT
comex recused: 12 Mar 2010 17:23:07 GMT
Assigned to coppro: 14 Mar 2010 09:04:16 GMT
Judged TRUE by coppro: 21 Mar 2010 19:55:20 GMT
========================================================================
Caller's Arguments:
As far as I know, since contracts were repealed, the IBA's Citizenship
switch has never been flipped; I can't find a rule that would imply that
it could flip platonically, and nobody has tried to flip it
pragmatically. Therefore, the CFJ comes down to the existence or
otherwise of the switch in question. Rule 869 makes it clear that this
is equivalent to whether the IBA is an entity.
Rule 1586 provides for an entity to cease to exist if the documents
defining it are repealed or amended to cease defining it. This is a
rather confusing test in this case; the backing document for the IBA can
either be considered a legal fiction (in which case it may or may not
still exist), or an actual message that created it (in which case it
definitely does). There is a sort of confusion with contract law here;
if an actual document, in someone's email inbox, creates a contract, how
can it then be amended? On the other hand, if it's a legal fiction, what
rule creates/created that legal fiction, and does that legal fiction
still exist? In any case, rule 1586 does not seem to cause the repeal of
the backing document of another backing document to cause any entities
defined by the backing document to cease to exist; if the IBA's backing
document has disappeared, it wasn't by being amended (the IBA hasn't
been amended since contracts ceased to exist) or by being repealed (not
itself being a rule). So I can't find an interpretation in which rule
1586 itself causes the IBA to cease to exist.
Therefore, the point that remains to check, is whether the IBA continues
to exist as an entity, despite not being an Agoran contract any more. It
certainly seems possible for a construct within a nomic to survive the
downfall of that nomic (Nomic World is dead, but the FRC still exists
and is thriving); but it's hard to tell to what extent a former Agoran
contract can continue to be an entity. In particular, is it deserving of
a Citizenship switch?
Also of relevance here may be CFJ 1992 (which found that any thing was
an entity). So does "anything" include the IBA? Does "any thing"?
Even if the IBA is deregistered, this case continues to be relevant. For
instance, can we transfer assets to it? That also depends on whether or
not it's an entity.
========================================================================
Caller's Evidence:
Excerpt from rule 869:
{{{
Citizenship is an entity switch with values Unregistered
(default) and Registered, tracked by the registrar. A player is
an entity whose citizenship is Registered. Changes to
citizenship are secured.
}}}
Excerpt from rule 1586:
{{{
If the documents defining an entity are repealed or amended such
that they no longer define that entity, then that entity and its
properties cease to exist.
If the documents defining an entity are amended such that they
still define that entity but with different properties, then
that entity and its properties continue to exist to whatever
extent is possible under the new definitions.
}}}
========================================================================
Judge coppro's Arguments:
CFJs 2769 and 2772, which are effectively identical, are a stickier
issue. They question whether or not the IBA ceased to be an entity and
thus a player when the rules defining contracts were repealed. The
definition of a contract was, prior to the repeal of Rule 1742, "[a
binding agreement] goverened by the rules". This is key because it sets
a fundamental principle that the rules did not provide for contracts'
existence, merely their governance.
Binding agreements not governed by the rules can and do exist, and are
therefore valid Agoran entities. By legal convention, a binding
agreement (I will avoid the term 'contract' when referring to real-world
agreements) needs no physical existence; it can exist without any
document behind it, such as when an agreement is formed at a grocery
store to purchase a box of donuts.
Rule 1586 provides for a means for an entity to cease to exist if the
document backing it no longer defines that entity, but the real-world
law of binding agreements indicates that agreements exist without any
backing document; a document may exist to clarify the agreement, but it
is not fatal to the existence of the agreement if the document is lost
or destroyed. There are a few cases where a textual agreement is
required for it to be enforceable (see the Statute of Frauds), but the
lack of a text copy is not always fatal to the agreement (G 400 Holdings
Ltd. v. Yeoman Development Company Limited, 2008 ABQB 667)
In light of this, I find that the IBA and contracts in general did not
cease to exist as entities when Rule 1742 was repealed, although they
did cease to be subject generally to Agoran law. Accordingly, I judge
CFJs 2769 and 2772 to both be TRUE.
========================================================================
