My view is that, if the IDevID has a CRL/OCSP URL listed, then the validator SHOULD do the checking. If the vendor didn't actually want revocation checking done, then the vendor should've excluded such information from their IDevID certs.
FWIW, 802.1AR takes a much neutral stance in Section 6.5.3 (Validation of DevIDs): The DevID is an X.509 credential and can be validated using the RFC 5280 defined mechanisms. IDevIDs are intended to have very long validity periods even exceeding what would normally be cryptographically acceptable. The manufacturer is not required to provide a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) although the validator may do CRL checking if the manufacturer provides CRLs. The validator may verify CRLs for LDevIDs as necessary. Kent -----ORIGINAL MESSAGE----- Thanks, Kent. Then it seems to me that we have a MAY floating around for CRL checking on the part of the registrar for BRSKI. Right? Eliot On 3/9/17 7:25 PM, Kent Watsen wrote: > Hi Elliot, > > >> What is the thinking on including CRL pointer in the manufacturer >> signing cert? This question came up in industry discussions. > 802.1AR says that the IDevID secrets must be stored confidentially and be not > available outside the module. In practice, a crypto processor with > tamper-resistant NVRAM is used (e.g., TPM). As such, the likelihood of the > credentials being stolen/discovered are near zero, but it is not zero, as a > determined adversary with sufficient resources can still have their way with > it. Still, vendors will likely conclude that protecting against that level > of attack isn't necessary. That said, vendors face a more likely scenario, > of issues occurring by contract manufacturers, whether it be accidental or > intentional. And as unlikely this scenario may seem, things happen and the > vendor would be without recourse if unable to issue revocations. To this > extent, setting up the infrastructure to support revocations can be compared > to insurance - hopefully you never need it, but when you do, you're glad you > have it. > > Kent > > > > _______________________________________________ > Anima mailing list > Anima@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima > _______________________________________________ Anima mailing list Anima@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima
