I shall go through those RFCs that you have mentioned and get back to you. If 
you have used similar artefacts earlier, may it be revived. Thank you.

-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Richardson [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: 08 July 2018 00:29
To: Anoop Kumar Pandey <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [Anima] Revision of scope of MASA in the BRSKI - Reg


Anoop Kumar Pandey <[email protected]> wrote:
    > When a device is purchased in real world, usually an invoice is issued in 
the
    > name of the purchaser with stamp of vendor/manufacturer.

    > I propose that similarly, a digital invoice can be issued which will 
contain
    > the public key(s) of the <domain owner(s)/JRC(s)> and digitally signed by 
the
    > manufacturer. The digital invoice may be embedded in the pledge along with
    > the IDevID.

That's an interesting idea, perhaps you could write it up in the form of an 
Internet-Draft?  Then I could make sure that I fully understand your proposal.

It seems very difficult to make digitally signed invoices occur in the real 
world, given the constrained of the supply chain.  Still, BRSKI makes 
provisions for higher security if the supply chain is integrated.

I once proposed something similar using signed certficates:
  
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/6tisch-security/2kObJLkLlhuI-HU9s5yqfRm0n00

In effect, the voucher artifact that we created in RFC8366 replaces these 
certificates with purpose built signed artifacts that expresses what the 
invoice attempts to express.

    > When a pledge starts the registration process, it will present the digital
    > invoice along with IDevID. The JRC can verify the digital signature of the
    > manufacturer on the digital invoice and sent a signed note of acceptance 
to
    > the pledge. The pledge can verify the signed note using the public key(s)
    > mentioned in the digital invoice, thereby verifying its true owner.

A pledge which has sat in a warehouse for a year before being sold to an owner 
will not have the invoice on it yet.  That's okay, because the invoice, being 
digitally signed, could be retrieved from another place, and that's effectively 
what the BRSKI-MASA protocol *does*.

If the invoice needs to be loaded into the Pledge via a secure-out-of-band 
mechanism, (i.e. during the manufacturing process), then the Pledge could also 
be fully configured, and could include a simple PSK too.  This is the approach 
which is being used in draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security.

Ultimately, it's not the JRC which is suspicious of who the Pledge's owner is, 
it's the Pledge which does not know who owns it.

    > This process with eliminate all the communication overhead with MASA and
    > multiple level verification (voucher request, voucher, telemetry etc at
    > JRC/MASA/Pledge).

Yes, it does, at the cost of making every device in the warehouse unique to a
specific customer.   If I may make an analogy to distribution of movies,
you are suggesting that netflix go back to mailing DVDs to people.

    > From security point of view: Given that the digital invoice is digitally
    > signed by manufacturer, the public key of domain owner embedded in the
    > digital invoice can’t be changed, otherwise verification of digital 
signature
    > of manufacturer at JRC end will fail.

    > Requesting you to give your comments as it will simplify the protocol.

    > P.S.: As you had earlier mentioned “On resale, the device should be put
    > through a factory reset to clear things. The MASA will have to be willing 
to
    > issue a new voucher to the new domain owner..”; here also, manufacturer 
may
    > issue a new digital invoice in case of resale.

yes, that's true.  But, since you said that the invoice is in the Pledge, the 
manufacturer would have to take the device back to do that.

The reason for all the JRC,MASA etc, is so that we do not need to have the 
manufacturer touch the device a second time.

--
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect  [
]     [email protected]  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [


--
Michael Richardson <[email protected]>, Sandelman Software Works  -= IPv6 
IoT consulting =-





-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ C-DAC is on Social-Media too. Kindly follow us at:
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CDACINDIA & Twitter: @cdacindia ]

This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may
contain confidential and privileged information. If you are not the
intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy
all copies and the original message. Any unauthorized review, use,
disclosure, dissemination, forwarding, printing or copying of this email
is strictly prohibited and appropriate legal action will be taken.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

_______________________________________________
Anima mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima

Reply via email to