Michael, Magnus, I want to reinforce a point I made in that previous discussion about pledges using BRSKI with H2 (and by extension QUIC). In this limited case, both present needless overhead both in terms of dev costs and COGS. H2 in particular, and in this particular case, introduces new dev complexity because the provisional trust model used in BRSKI means that you cannot make use of multiple channels within the transport until at least the BRSKI transaction is complete. And once it’s complete, and once EST is complete, the session is expected to terminate(*). When BRSKI is in play, these transactions will happen lock step.
Eliot (*) Keep in mind these protocols are used to establish network access. A good analogy is that they are the language used to communicate at the gate with the security guard. Typically one prefers that conversation to be short and to the point, so that one can get on with the business at hand. > On 13 Jul 2019, at 20:41, Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca> wrote: > > > <#secure method=pgpmime mode=sign> > > Magnus Westerlund via Datatracker <nore...@ietf.org> wrote: >> A. This is really a discuss discuss. With to little time to dig into >> the details it appears that this protocol is making i hack of its >> interface towards the its transport. It appears to attempt to use an >> HTTP rest interface, but then it is also have a lot of talking about >> requirement for the TLS connection underlying the HTTP. So to >> illustrate the issue I see here is what happens if one like to use QUIC >> as the underlying transport for the rest interface rather than TCP/TLS? >> So can this document achieve a clearer interface to the lower layers so >> that it will be simpler to move the protocol to another underlying >> version of the HTTP "transport"? > > Between the JRC (Registrar) and the MASA, we can support any HTTPS, including > HTTP/2 with QUIC (with the 'normal' corporate firewall issue with UDP). > > Between the Pledge and the Registrar, we support any HTTPS that works over a > single TCP connection. We can not support QUIC, since the Pledge is behind > an intentionally limited proxy. We had some discussion about this a year or > so ago, please see: > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/ml1OSEKhR4-ICS0Bd0zfuzn8uw4 > > You are certainly right: we have linkage between the TLS layer and the > application layer, and we expect TLSClientCertificates and > TLSServerCertificates to have meaning at the application layer. > > None of the connections could go through TLS "forced proxies" of the kind > that are apparently common in Enterprises. > > I am open to suggestions on how to make the document clearer about how it > interfaces to TLS. We have a sections: > 5.1. BRSKI-EST TLS establishment details . . . . . . . . . . . 36 > 5.4. BRSKI-MASA TLS establishment details . . . . . . . . . . 38 > > > >> B. Section 5.6: > >> The server MUST answer with a suitable 4xx or 5xx HTTP [RFC2616] error >> code when a problem occurs. > >> Referencing RFC 2616 that has been obsolete by RFC 7230 and >> companions. I do note that there are no normative reference for that >> part in this document. > > Fixed to 7230. > Yes, that wasn't even a real reference, just a literal [RFC2616]. > > -- > ] Never tell me the odds! | ipv6 mesh networks [ > ] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works | network architect [ > ] m...@sandelman.ca http://www.sandelman.ca/ | ruby on rails > [ > > > -- > Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works > -= IPv6 IoT consulting =- > > > > _______________________________________________ > Anima mailing list > Anima@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima
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