Deb Cooley via Datatracker <[email protected]> wrote: > While this draft clearly outlines the requirements for proof of possession and > integrity/authentication of the pledge, I did not see any discussion on > integrity/authentication of the RA/CA. How can the pledge determine if it is > requesting certificates (either its own or CA) from the proper RA/CA? One of > the advantages of EST is that the pledge can verify the EST server certificate, > and an on-path attack is harder when there is an adequate TLS session. Is that > the case with CMP (or SCEP)? If so, either point me to where that is > documented or add a couple of sentences on how that is done. If not, please > add a section to the Security Considerations.
Hi, you are asking a BRSKI question, which is a super-set of EST. This is all in RFC8995, section 5, especially section 5.6.2. The short answer is that the RFC8366 voucher pins the RA/CAs' key. For CMP, the process is similiar. A TLS or DTLS is still created, but when it comes to enrollment, EST is not used. I wonder if including the vouchers in figure 2 would help? brski.org contains a bunch of slides, and some videos of a few presentations on BRSKI. https://brski.org/brski-impls.html _Generic Animation of BRSKI - Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure_ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mtbh_GN0Ce4 is something I put together specifically to answer this question. It's only 5 minutes. Watchable at 1.5X too. -- Michael Richardson <[email protected]> . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting ) Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
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