Severity: moderate
Affected versions:
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-dapr) 4.12.0 before 4.14.8
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-dapr) 4.15.0 before 4.18.3
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-dapr) 4.19.0 before 4.21.0
Description:
Improper Input Validation, Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
vulnerability in Apache Camel DAPR component.
The camel-dapr Dapr Pub/Sub consumer (DaprPubSubConsumer) copied two fields
from each inbound CloudEvent - its Pub/Sub component name and its topic - into
the CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic Exchange headers. These two headers
are producer-direction routing headers: when the route republishes through a
Dapr producer, DaprConfigurationOptionsProxy reads them back and prefers them
over the destination configured on the endpoint. As a result, in a route that
consumes from one Dapr Pub/Sub topic and republishes to another (for example
from('dapr-pubsub:p:t').to('dapr-pubsub:p:other')), an actor able to publish a
message to the subscribed topic could set the CloudEvent's pub/sub-name and
topic to values of their choosing and cause the re-published message to be
delivered to an arbitrary Dapr Pub/Sub component and topic instead of the
configured destination - redirecting or exfiltrating the message and bypassing
the route's intended routing and any topic-level access controls in the
underlying broker. Exploitation requires the ability to publish to the topic
the route subscribes to; no other authentication or user interaction is needed.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.12.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before
4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If
users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade
to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested
to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, remove
the CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic headers from the Exchange between
the Dapr consumer and any Dapr producer in the route (for example
removeHeaders('CamelDaprPubSubName', 'CamelDaprTopic')), and restrict who can
publish to the subscribed Dapr Pub/Sub topic so that only trusted producers can
send to it.
Credit:
Leon Zlobecki (finder)
Andrea Cosentino (remediation developer)
References:
https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-49086.html
https://camel.apache.org/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-49086
