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Washington Post
August 14, 2001
What to Do With the New Russia 
By Henry Kissinger
The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger 
Associates, an international consulting firm. 

In its sixth month in office, the Bush administration stands on the
threshold 
of a new era of post-Cold War international relations. Despite
occasional 
tactical clumsiness, it has grasped the unique opportunity that, for the

first time since World War II, no major nation is in a position to
challenge 
the United States; and, more important, that every major nation has more
to 
gain from cooperating with the United States than from confronting it.

A good example is the American relationship with post-Communist Russia,
which 
has the potential to become as symbolic of the new era as the opening to

China was after 1972. President Vladimir Putin's unexpected agreement to

discuss both offensive levels of nuclear weapons and modifications of 
existing missile defense arrangements shows that the first leader of a 
genuinely non-Communist Russia is coming to grips with the emerging 
international realities.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin had made their careers in the 
life-and-death struggles that led to their positions on the Politburo.
They 
were used to the Soviet Union as a superpower equal in reach -- at least
in 
its own perception -- to the United States. Instinctively believing that

Russia's turmoil was but a brief interruption before resumption of its 
mission, they oscillated between posing as a superpower side by side
with the 
American president and fitful stabs at traditional Soviet policies based
on 
opposition to the United States in regions such as the Middle East and
the 
Balkans.

By contrast, Putin's career was made in the bureaucracy of the KGB and
later 
as the deputy mayor of St. Petersburg. The former position placed a
premium 
on analysis of the international situation; the latter brought Putin
face to 
face with the dilemmas of post-Soviet reconstruction. Like his
predecessors, 
he wants to restore Russia's role, but unlike them he understands this
is a 
long-term process.

In terms of Russian history, Putin is best understood as comparable to
Prince 
Alexander Gorchakov, who conducted Russian foreign policy for 25 years
after 
the Russian debacle in the Crimean War in 1856. Patient, conciliatory 
policies and avoiding crises allowed Gorchakov to restore an isolated
and 
gravely weakened country to a leading international position.

Thus Putin, in his first policy statements as premier in 1999 and later
as 
president in 2000, appealed to Russian pride by putting forward the 
restoration of Russian greatness as a national objective. But he showed
his 
understanding of the limited means available by admitting that even a
heady 
annual growth of 8 percent for 15 years would allow Russia to reach only
the 
per capita income of present-day Portugal.

Putin's priorities appear to be the recovery of the Russian economy; the

restoration of Russia as a great power, preferably by cooperation with
the 
United States but, if necessary, by building countervailing power
centers; 
combating Islamic fundamentalism; establishing a new security
relationship 
toward Europe, especially with respect to NATO expansion to the Baltic 
states; and solving the missile defense issue.

These priorities explain why Putin has not pushed this agreement on
missile 
defense to the point of confrontation. A clash with the United States
would 
drain Russian resources and encourage a return to postwar patterns. 
Cooperation would symbolize a new era and perhaps bring some
technological 
progress in shared anti-missile technology. And the price would be
tolerable: 
The size of the Russian nuclear and missile arsenal will prevent any
missile 
defense foreseeable for the next quarter-century to threaten Russia's 
ultimate retaliatory capability.

On the political plane, the challenge of Islamic fundamentalism is
probably 
the dominant Russian concern. Russia's leaders perceive Afghanistan's
Taliban 
and to a lesser extent Iran and Pakistan as threats to the newly
independent 
states of Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan, 
formerly Soviet republics. Furthermore, Moscow fears that militant
ideologies 
could stimulate irredentism in Russia's southern Muslim provinces.
America 
has its own concerns about the spread of fundamentalism toward Saudi
Arabia, 
Pakistan and into the Middle East. An effort should be made to achieve 
concurrent or at least compatible policies with Russia on the Middle
East, 
including Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran and, at least as far as Russia
is 
concerned, the Balkans.

During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States were 
convinced that a gain in influence by either would amount to a weakening
of 
the global position of the other. The basic strategy of each side was to

reduce the influence of the other. Under post-Cold War conditions,
neither 
side can make lasting gains at the expense of the other in the Middle
East. 
Russia may believe it is foreclosing an American option by tolerating 
assistance to Iran in the nuclear and missile fields. Some American 
policy-makers may perceive comparable opportunities in other regions of
the 
Middle East. But in the end, the test of either country's policy will
not be 
whether one or the other has greater influence in Tehran but whether the

Tehran regime alters its policies and conduct. Unless such a change
occurs, 
both Russia and America are under threat.

There are, however, clear limits beyond which neither country may be
able to 
go. America cannot, in the name of opposition to Islamic fundamentalism,

acquiesce in Russia's methods for suppressing the upheavals in Chechnya.
Nor 
can America be indifferent should Islamic fundamentalism become a
pretext to 
force the newly independent states of Central Asia back under Russian 
strategic domination. The safety of Israel remains a fundamental
American 
goal. Russia has not in the past displayed a similar concern -- though
this 
attitude may be changing on the part of some Russian leaders who are 
beginning to view Israel as a strategic counterweight to Islamic 
fundamentalism. Finally, it is possible that the competition for access
to 
oil and the routes for its delivery will prove a major obstacle to
policy 
coordination. In the end, the possibilities of Russo-American
cooperation 
regarding Islamic fundamentalism depend on the ability to carve out a
passage 
between Cold War tendencies and reigniting a new competition for
dominance.

The most immediate challenge to Russo-American relations is NATO
expansion, 
especially to the Baltic states, which is on the agenda for 2002. The
Soviet 
subjugation of these states in 1940 was never recognized by the United 
States. And surely no group of nations is more deserving of protection
by the 
Western democracies than these small countries incapable of posing a
threat 
to any neighbor.

At the same time, for Russia, the advance of NATO to within 40 miles of
St. 
Petersburg, into countries considered by it until the last decade as
part of 
the Soviet Union, is bound to be disquieting no matter what reassurances
are 
given. Baltic membership in NATO would produce a strong Russian
reaction, if 
only to maintain the Putin government's domestic standing. On the other
hand, 
it is morally and politically impossible to ignore or postpone the
appeals of 
the Baltic democracies -- especially in view of the support given to
their 
entry into NATO by President Bush in his recent Warsaw speech. Three
options 
present themselves:

(1) To face down Russia by admitting all the Baltic states with some
security 
assurances such as agreeing not to station NATO forces on Baltic
territory 
(selective membership for some but not all Baltic states would solve
nothing; 
it raises all of the psychological and political problems and creates a 
festering sore).

(2) If the European Union were serious about strengthening its defenses
and 
if it were prepared to assign a meaningful mission to the projected
European 
force, a solution might be accelerated membership of the Baltic states
in the 
European Union, coupled with a security guarantee by both the European
Union 
and the United States but without the formal machinery of the NATO
military 
structure.

(3) Treating eligibility for NATO not so much as a security issue as a 
recognition of political and economic evolution. On this basis, any
country 
meeting stated criteria could be declared eligible, including Russia
some 
years after the Baltics, when its domestic evolution has progressed
further. 
This has been hinted at by Putin and urged explicitly by various of his 
advisers.

It is a seductive proposition, but before embarking on this road,
careful 
thought must be given to its implications.

Russian membership in NATO would end the guarantee against Russian 
intervention most desired by countries formerly under Soviet occupation,

because NATO provides no guarantee against attacks from other members of
the 
alliance. Indeed, it would put an end to NATO as heretofore conceived.
For an 
alliance protects a specific territory; once Russia joins, the alliance
will 
be either a general collective security system or an alliance of North 
Atlantic nations against China -- a step with grave long-range
implications.

It is highly desirable for Russia's relations with NATO to improve to a
point 
that the question of security disappears -- much as happened between
Germany 
and France after World War II. But to formalize such an outcome to
facilitate 
Baltic membership in NATO is both premature and ironic.

Russia should be welcomed immediately into a North Atlantic political
system, 
but membership in the military arrangements should be deferred. This
poses 
the following challenges:

• Russo-American relations need to be lifted from the psychological to
the 
political level; they cannot be made to depend on the personal relations
of 
leaders. This requires concreteness of objective and substance. With
respect 
to missile defense, it is unlikely that Russia will give us carte
blanche, as 
President Putin has made clear in his conversations with Defense
Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld; discussions will have to revolve around some specific
scheme 
or schemes; some form of understanding that has some binding quality has
to 
evolve -- though I agree with the administration that the upcoming
discussion 
should not give Russia a veto and that some time limit must be
established.

• In the political field, the necessities of the present must be
related to 
hopes for the future. This applies especially to America's NATO
relationship, 
which is our only institutional link to Europe. But it applies as well
to 
America's relations with China, Japan and Israel.

• By the same token, Russia will seek to maintain its influence in
regions of 
geopolitical and historical importance to the Russian state and as a
hedge 
should the effort to create a new basis for Russo-American relations
flounder 
-- as is seen in its recent friendship treaties with China and North
Korea.

• All this imposes a new need for imagination in American foreign
policy. 
With a wise foreign policy, America for the foreseeable future should be
in a 
position to create incentives that cause both Russia and China to stand
to 
gain more from cooperative relations with the United States than from 
confrontation with it.

• The frozen relationships of the Cold War no longer fit a world in
which 
there are no principal adversaries and in which the very distinction
between 
friends and adversaries is in transition in many regions. In such 
circumstances, the United States needs to design a diplomacy that
prevents 
threats to fundamental American interests and values without designating
a 
specific adversary in advance, and above all by a policy based on the
widest 
possible international consensus on positive goals.

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